NATURAL   LAW   IN    SCIENCE  AND 
PHILOSOPHY 


NATURAL  LAW 


IN 


SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 


B7 

EMILE    BOUTROUX 

(Member  of  the  Academy) 


Authorized  Translation  by 
FRED     ROTH WELL 


NEW   YORK 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1914 


"B 


PREFACE    BY  THE   AUTHOR 

MORE  than  twenty  years  have  elapsed 
since  these  lessons  were  delivered 
at  the  Sorbonne.  In  the  interval,  science 
has  advanced  with  giant  strides  ;  and  there 
can  be  no  doubt  but  that  I  should  have  to 
examine  many  a  scientifico-philosophical  theory 
of  which  this  work  makes  no  mention,  were 
I  now  to  recommence  the  course  I  then 
gave.  All  the  same,  I  do  not  think  that 
the  problem  raised  in  my  classes  during  the 
session  1892-3  has  been  solved  or  that  it 
has  ceased  to  elicit  the  keenest  interest.  Our 
object  is  to  discover  whether  the  idea  of 
natural  law  is  the  same  for  the  scientist  as  it  is 
for  the  philosopher. 

Science  proposes  to  explain  things  scien- 
tifically. And,  in  these  days  more  espe- 
cially, the  concept  of  scientific  explanation 
has  received  precise  definition.  It  comprises 
\  neither  the  knowledge  of  the  intrinsic  nature 
of  things,  nor  that  of  their  origin  or  value. 

5 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

It  implies  the  possibility  of  extracting, 
from  the  given  reality,  sensibly  constant 
rapports,  and  it  declares  that  such  a  rap- 
port is  explained,  when  it  has  been  possible 
to  reduce  it  to  some  other  rapport  already 
known  and  recognized  as  permanent  and 
general.  Science  is  reduction.  Mathematics 
is  its  ideal,  its  form  par  excellence,  for  it  is  in 
mathematics  that  assimilation,  identifica- 
tion, is  most  perfectly  realized.  The  uni- 
verse, scientifically  explained,  would  be  a 
certain  formula,  one  and  eternal,  regarded 
as  the  equivalent  of  the  entire  diversity  and 
movement  of  things. 

The  philosopher  asks  himself  whether 
natural  law  as  assumed  by  science,  wholly 
coincides  with  law  as  really  existing  in  nature  ; 
whether  science  and  reality  are  so  alike 
that  science  may  be  regarded  as  exhaust- 
ing everything  intelligible  and  true  that 
the  real  contains. 

The  theory  upheld  in  the  present  work 
is  that  no  absolute  coincidence  exists  be- 
tween the  laws  of  nature  as  science  assumes 
them  to  be,  and  the  laws  of  nature  as  they 
really  are.  The  former  may  be  compared 
to  laws  proclaimed  by  a  legislator  and  im- 

6 


PREFACE   BY  THE  AUTHOR 

posed  a  priori  upon  reality.  The  latter  are 
harmonies  towards  which  we  ascertain  that 
the  actions  of  different  beings  really  tend. 
The  former  are  abstract  rapports,  the 
elements  of  which  are  themselves  rapports; 
the  latter  are  concrete  rapports,  the  terms 
of  which  are  real  subjects,  true  beings. 

Now,  the  doctrine  here  set  forth  consists 
in  regarding  scientific  intelligibility  as  the 
most  objective  form,  but  not  as  the  sole 
type,  of  intelligibility.  Science  acquires 
that  perfection  which  characterizes  it,  by 
setting  aside,  sending  about  their  business, 
as  Plato  would  say  (e'«  xa'LPeLV}>  indivi- 
duals, natural  beings.  The  philosophy  with 
which  our  doctrine  is  connected  admits 
that  between  individuals  themselves,  be- 
tween concrete  realities  as  such,  there  may 
be  found  relations  which,  though  they  can- 
not be  reduced  to  mathematical  relations, 
nevertheless  exhibit  a  certain  order  which 
satisfies  the  intelligence.  There  exist  in- 
telligible relations  other  than  those  of  re- 
ducibility  and  identity :  it  is  the  purpose 
of  philosophy  to  reveal  and  define  such 
relations.  In  Plato,  for  instance,  we  have 
the  commonalty,  or  mutual  participation 

7 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 


LO)  •  in  Aristotle,  finality  ;  in  Des- 
V  cartes,  evident  connexion  ;  in  Leibnitz,  har- 
mony ;  and  in  Hegel,  rational  synthesis. 
Thus,  philosophy  both  widens  and  renders 
flexible  —  without  destroying  —  the  concept  of 
intelligibility. 

The  present  doctrine  regards  as  both  con- 
tingent and  intelligible  those  relations  be- 
tween beings  that  it  discovers  in  the 
relations  between  relations  ;  it  sees  in  the 
mechanically  necessary  rapports  implied  by 
science,  an  abstraction,  that  consists  in 
isolating  the  relations  from  their  living  sub- 
jects, and  looking  upon  them  as  self  -sufficient. 
In  the  reality  of  things,  the  rigid,  eternal,  - 
mathematical  order,  which  science  considers 
from  its  own  point  of  view,  serves  to  obscure 
an  order  that  is  invisible,  supple  and  un- 
trammelled, and  therefore  all  the  more 
beautiful  : 

ap/u.ovirj  dcpavfo   (paveprjs   Kpeirrcov  (Heraclitus). 

EMILE  BOUTROUX. 


Contents 

i 

PAGE 

PREFACE  BY  THE  AUTHOR.        .         ..*'.<       5 

I 
THE   PROBLEM  OF  THE  MEANING  OF  NATURAL 

LAWS         .         .  ...»      ii 

II 

THE  LOGICAL  LAWS          .        ,         .         .         .21 

III 

A      THE  MATHEMATICAL  LAWS         .         .         ...      35 

IV 

,-THE  MECHANICAL  LAWS    .         .  .         .46 

sf 

THE  MECHANICAL  LAWS  (continued]    .  61 

VI 
THE  PHYSICAL  LAWS         .        .         .        .  79 

VII 

THE  CHEMICAL  LAWS        .  •       .        .-       '..       .      94 

VIII 

THE  BIOLOGICAL  LAWS      .         »        .         .         .109 

9 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 
IX 

THE  BIOLOGICAL  LAWS  (continued)     .         .       •  .     127 

X 

THE  BIOLOGICAL  LAWS  (continuation  and  end)    .     143 

XI 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LAWS        .       ..         .         |   I5s 

XII 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LAWS  (continuation  and  end)     175 

XIII 
THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  LAWS  .         «        .'...'       .     188 

XIV 
CONCLUSION      .         .        ,        ,        ,        ,  204 


10 


NATURAL  LAW  IN 
SCIENCE  AND    PHILOSOPHY 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  MEAN- 
ING  OF   NATURAL   LAWS 

IT  is  our  purpose  to  study  the  idea  of 
natural  law  as  presented  in  modern 
times,  to  interpret  it  philosophically  and 
determine  its  metaphysical  and  moral  signi- 
fication. In  order  to  state  the  problem 
with  the"  requisite  precision,  we  shall  rely 
on  the  results  of  the  speculations  of  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries, — specu- 
lations closely  connected  with  the  develop- 
ment of  modern  science. 

Bacon  and  Descartes,  the  founders  of 
modern  philosophy,  regarded  science  as 
having,  for  its  object,  to  arrive  at  laws  which 
should  possess  the  dual  characteristic  of 

ii 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

universality  and  reality.  It  was  the  ambi- 
tion of  both,  in  spite  of  appearances  which 
are  often  wrongly  interpreted,  to  supersede 
the  ancient  point  of  view,  in  accordance 
with  which,  laws  were  only  general  and 
ideal,  to  rise  beyond  the  probable  and  the 
possible,  and  to  obtain  a  sure  knowledge 
of  the  real.  But  though  their  object  is 
identical,  their  methods  of  attaining  it  are 
different :  Bacon  takes  the  path  of  empiri- 
cism ;  Descartes  that  of  rationalism. 

The  Cartesians  consider  that  it  is  possible 
to  find  the  principles  of  universal  and  real 
1  laws  in  certain  mental  operations,  which 
have  not  yet  been  sufficiently  investigated. 
Descartes  analyses  the  matter  immediately 
given,  i.e.  ideas,  and  in  them  finds  elements 
the  specific  characteristic  of  which  is  that  they 
are  obvious  when  compared  with  intellectual 
intuition.  These  elements,  according  to  him, 
are  the  principles  sought  after.  And,  indeed, 
they  seem  calculated  to  supply  universal 
laws ;  but  as  it  is  from  the  mind  that  they 
have  been  drawn,  will  they  allow  of  real 
laws  being  discovered  ?  This  is  the  pro- 
blem with  which  Descartes  is  immediately 
confronted.  In  his  Cogito,  ergo  sum,  what 

12 


PROBLEM  OF  THE  MEANING  OF  NATURAL  LAWS 

is  the  meaning  of  ergo  ?  Even  now  it  is 
no  easy  matter  to  connect  personal  exis- 
tence with  the  Cogito  ?  But  the  existence 
of  God,  and  in  particular  of  things  corporeal, 
will  call  for  a  real  deduction,  one  of  ever 
increasing  complexity.  After  Descartes,  Male- 
branche  considers  it  necessary  to  distin- 
guish the  laws  of  action  or  of  existence 
from  those  of  essence ;  and  so  he  con- 
ceives his  theory  of  occasional  causes. 
Spinoza  proves  that  a  similar  distinction 
may  be  drawn  between  internal  and  exter- 
nal causality ;  he  endeavours  to  connect  the 
laws  of  existence  with  those  of  essence. 
According  to  Leibnitz,  these  various  systems 
cannot  supersede  possibility.  It  is  indis- 
pensable that  a  new  principle,  equally  abso- 
lute, the  principle  of  sufficient  reason,  be 
added  to  that  of  contradiction,  the  only 
one  with  which  they  are  acquainted.  This 
will  be  the  distinctive  principle  of  the  real. 
Again,  deep  within  existing  things,  separa- 
tions befcome  marked.  Everything  is  not 
reducible  to  mathematical  order ;  substances 
govern  it;  and  in  this  higher  order,  we 
must  consider,  on  the  one  hand,  physics, 
the  domain  of  efficient  causes,  and  on  the 

13 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

other  hand,  ethics,  the  domain  of  final  causes. 
In  the  case  of  Kant,  these  distinctions  be- 
come separations,  which,  to  us,  are  radical  and 
absolute.  Again  deep  within  the  real  world  and 
coming  between  the  physical  and  the  moral 
laws,  he  sets  up  the  biological  laws,  which, 
to  our  mind,  at  all  events,  are  incapable  of 
being  reduced  to  the  former,  and  presuppose 
finality.  And  lastly,  Schelling  and  Hegel 
regard  -the  laws  of  essence  and  of  existence 
as  inadequate  :  to  account  for  the  real,  we 
must. .posit  laws  of  development,  deter- 
mine a  process  which  precedes  all  essence 
and  all  existence  alike,  and  is  the  repro- 
duction, in  thought,  of  the  very  creation  of 
things. 

Thus,  rationalistic  philosophy,  starting  with 
unity,  has  found  itself  compelled  to  recog- 
nize different  types  of  laws.  It  has  been 
confronted  with  experience,  and,  when  its 
principles  have  been  compared  with  facts, 
has  been  forced  to  enlarge  its  scope. 
Truth  to  tell,  rationalistic  philosophy  ex- 
pected to  reduce  this  diversity  and  make 
it  intelligible.  Only  apparently,  however, 
and  by  continually  modifying  the  con- 
cept of  intelligibility,  did  it  effect  this. 

14 


PROBLEM  OF  THE  MEANING  OF  NATURAL  LAWS 

Descartes,  by  his  intuition,  actually  modifies 
the  idea  of  intellectualism  which  the  ancients 
had  set  up.  Spinoza  places  in  the  fore- 
ground a  new  notion,  that  of  the  infinite, 
which  the  ancients  regarded  as  the  very 
essence  of  unintelligibility.  Leibnitz  boldly 
affirms  the  actual  realization  of  this  infinite. 
Kant  effects  a  revolution  in  the  doctrine  of 
intelligibility  by  recognizing  two  kinds  of 
logic :  the  old  logic  of  Aristotle,  which  is 
purely  formal  and  incapable  of  establishing 
anything ;  and  transcendental  logic,  which 
proceeds  by  synthetic  judgments  d  priori. 
Finally,  Schelling  and  Hegel,  who  even 
affirm  the  identity  of  contradictories,  openly 
reject  the  standpoint  of  the  old  logic.  The 
latter,  then,  has  been  regarded  as  inade- 
quate to  explain  existence,  and  intellectualism 
has  almost  been  compelled  to  abrogate  it 
entirely,  in  attaining  to  a  comprehension 
of  the  real. 

But,  say  the  empiricists,  what  is  the  use 
of  troubling  about  the  d  priori  principles 
of  intellectualism  ?  There  is  no  need  to  de- 
part from  nature  in  order  to  understand  her. 
Observation  and  induction,  if  properly  ap- 
plied, are  sufficient  to  realize  the  modern 

15 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

idea  of  science.  Still,  a  difficulty  here  arises, 
the  very  opposite  of  that  which  the  rational- 
ists encountered.  In  the  case  of  Descartes, 
the  problem  was  to  link  on  the  real  to 
the  universal ;  the  problem  for  Bacon  is  to 
link  on  the  universal  to  the  real.  The 
latter  philosopher,  indeed,  looks  upon  the 
mind  as  absolutely  passive ;  or  rather,  in 
order  to  establish  science,  the  mind  must 
make  itself  truly  passive,  a  veritable  tabula 
rasa  on  which  the  events  of  the  outer 
world  are  impressed.  Bacon,  however,  be- 
sides being  still  embarrassed  by  the  scholastic 
conception  of  quality,  rather  expresses  a 
desideratum  than  demonstrates  the  possi- 
bility of  realizing  valid  inductions.  Locke 
clearly  sees  that  the  thing  which  needs 
explanation  is  the  connexion  of  ideas ;  he 
maintains  that  we  connect  our  ideas  by 
means  of  faculties  innate  within  ourselves. 
Mere  passiveness  is  inadequate  as  an  ex- 
planation :  experience  traces  innumerable 
characters  on  a  tabula  rasa  ;  but  the  soul,  of 
itself,  unites  together  the  simple  ideas  with 
which  this  external  influence  supplies  it. 
Still,  of  what  worth  are  laws  thus  created 
by  human  faculties  ?  What  sort  of  universality 

16 


PROBLEM  OF  THE  MEANING  OF  NATURAL  LAWS 

can  they  claim  ?  Hume  comes  along  and 
explains  that  we  have,  deep  within  our- 
selves, the  power  to  join  together  the  ideas 
of  phenomena  in  relations  of  resemblance, 
contiguity  and  causality.  As  regards  causa- 
lity, which,  of  itself,  would  never  obtrude 
upon  us,  habit  replaces  the  intuition  lacking, 
makes  association  practically  indissoluble, 
and  so  inclines  us  to  look  upon  the  laws  of 
nature  as  really  universal  and  necessary. 

Therefore,  just  as  intellectualism,  in  order 
to  comprehend  reality,  has  had  to  extend  and 
perhaps  to  violate  its  principle,  so  also  em- 
piricism, to  attain  to  universality,  has  found 
itself  compelled  to  deviate  from  its  original 
direction,  either  by  recognizing,  with  Locke, 
mental  faculties  that  cannot  be  reduced 
to  experience,  or,  as  \jlume__  does,— r  egard- 
ing  external  jaws^as^the  result  of  internal 
ljw^j:>|^ 

Thus  it  would  appear  very  difficult  for  the 
human  mind  to  conceive  the  laws  of  nature 
as  being  both  universal  and  real  at  the  same 
time.  When  we  explain  to  ourselves  univer- 
sality, reality  slips  out  of  our  grasp,  and  vice 
versa.  Must  we  then  conjoin  rationalism 
and  empiricism,  purely  and  simply  ?  The 

17  B 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

conjunction  of  these  two  opposite  points  of 
view  will  give  only  a  juxtaposition,  not  a 
synthesis.  Now,  what  to  philosophy  was 
only  an  ideal  and  a  problem,  has  been 
realized  by  science,  which  has  succeeded  in 
effecting  a  union  between  mathematics  and 
experience,  and  supplying  laws  that  are 
both  concrete  and  intelligible.  Its  method 
has  been  to  try  to  discover  an  appropriate 
positive  principle  for  each  order  of  realities. 
Newton  supplied  the  type  of  scientific  ex- 
planation by  basing  celestial  mechanics  on 
the  law  of  gravitation,  which  is  radically 
distinct  from  purely  geometrical  laws.  The 
sciences  have  thus  been  emancipated,  one 
after  the  other ;  they  have  been  set  up  as  auto- 
nomous, with  the  aid  of  special  principles 
regarded  as  irreducible ;  for  instance,  a 
distinction  has  been  made  between  physi- 
cal principles  and  those  that  are  purely 
mechanical,  between  chemistry  and  physics, 
between  vital  properties  and  physical  and 
chemical  properties.  No  doubt  attempts 
are  made  to  liken  every  science,  mutatis 
mutandis,  to  the  mathematical  sciences  ; 
but  certain  sciences  are  no  longer  looked 
upon  as  a  mere  extension  of  the  rest ;  the 

18 


PROBLEM  OF  THE  MEANING  OF  NATURAL  LAWS 

special   sciences   are   allowed   to   have   their 
own  specific  principles. 

Therefore,  in  order  to  study  the  idea  of 
natural  law,  we  must  start  with  the  various 
sciences,  at  the  same  time  appealing  to 
philosophy  for  hints  as  to  the  manner  of 
interpreting  their  principles  and  results.  Wei 
will  take  the  laws  just  as  the  sciences  offer j 
them,  divided  into  distinct  groups,  study; 
each  group  separately  and  ask  ourselves/ 
questions  regarding  each  of  them  : 

1.  Their  nature. — How   far    and   in    what 
sense  are  these  laws  intelligible  ?     Are  there 
not  differences  in  generality  and  complexity, 

or  does  the  appearance  of  a  new  group  really 

m 

mark   the   introduction   of   a   new  principle 
which  is  philosophically  irreducible  ? 

2.  Their   objectivity. — Do   we   regard  these 
laws  as  forming  the  substance  of  things,  or 
do   they   govern   only   the   mode   in   which 
phenomena   appear  ?     Are   they   true   abso- 
lutely or  only  relatively  ?     Are  they  elements 
or   merely   symbols   of   reality  ? 

3.  Their     meaning. — Does     determination 
really  exist  in  nature,  or  does  it  simply  represent 
the  way  in  which  we   must  connect  things 
in  order  to  make  of  them  objects  of  thought  ? 

19 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

In  this  way,  we  shall  attempt  to  answer,  from 
the  present-day  standpoint,  the  old  question 
as  to  whether  there  are  things  that  depend 
on  ourselves,  whether  we  are  really  capable  of 
acting,  or  whether  action  is  pure  illusion. 


20 


II 

THE  LOGICAL  LAWS 

THE  logical  laws  are  those  that  govern 
all  scientific  research.     By  logical  laws 
we  usually  mean  those  of  syllogistic  logic 
as  formulated  by  Aristotle ;   but  there  are 
logical  laws   of  a  still   more  general  nature 
to  wit,  the  three  principles  of  identity,  con- 
tradiction  and   excluded   middle. 

The  principle  of  identity  may  be  expressed 
thus  :  A  is  A .  I  do  not  say  Being,  but 
simply  A,  i.e.  anything  whatsoever  that  is 
capable  of  being  conceived ;  nor  do  I  say 
A  =  A,  for  the  sign  =  is  a  mathematical 
sign,  actually  limiting  the  very  relation 
which  has  to  be  established.  The  prin- 
ciple of  identity,  thus  defined,  represents  the 
type  of  possibility.  The  principle  of  contra- 
diction, on  the  other  hand,  represents  the 
type  of  the  false,  of  logical  impossibility : 
its  expression  is  A  is  not- A.  This  affirma- 

21 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

tion  is  impossible,  i.e.  A  and  not- A  cannot  be 
presented  or  posited  together.  The  prin- 
ciple of  excluded  middle  means  that  there  is 
no  middle  term  between  A  and  not- A.  It 
may  be  called  the  principle  of  indirect  possi- 
bility, for  the  new  element  in  what  it  enun- 
ciates is  that  if  not-A  is  excluded,  A  is 
posited.  Two  negatives  make  an  affirmative : 
such  is  the  essence  of  this  latter  principle. 
Suppose  there  is  a  middle  term  between  A 
and  not-A,  this  middle  term  will  be  both 
not-A  and  not-not-A.  Now,  if  not-not-A  —  A, 
the  middle  term  will  be  both  not-A  and  A, 
which  lands  us  in  a  contradiction.  Just 
as  the  second  principle  prevents  two  contra- 
dictories from  being  posited  together,  so  the 
third  prevents  them  from  being  abolished 
together. 

These  strictly  logical  laws  are  intelligi- 
bility itself,  they  appear  as  the  type  of  evi- 
dence ;  but,  of  themselves  alone,  they  do  not 
constitute  the  whole  of  logic.  Ordinary, 
so-called  syllogistic,  logic,  is  not  content 
with  these  three  principles.  Consider  the 
principle  of  contradiction  as  formulated  by 
Aristotle ;  it  contains  elements  which,  mani- 
festly, are  not  included  in  the  strictly  logi- 

22 


THE  LOGICAL  LAWS 

cal  laws.  "It  is  impossible  for  one  and  the 
same  thing  to  belong  and  not  to  belong  to 
one  and  the  same  subject  at  the  same  time 
and  in  the  same  connexion/'  Pure  logic 
does  not  say  of  what  nature  A  must  be ; 
whereas  in  the  case  of  Aristotelian  logic, 
A  is  not  anything  whatsoever  :  it  is  concept, 
i.e.  a  determinate  thing.  Besides,  the  ex- 
pressions :  ' '  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same 
connexion/'  are  not  found  in  the  formulae 
of  pure  logic,  From  this  standpoint,  let  us 
examine  concept,  the  arrangement  of  con- 
cepts into  propositions  and  the  arrangement 
of  propositions  into  syllogisms. 

What  is  concept  ?  It  is  not  absolute 
unity,  for,  in  order  to  explain  things,  it  must 
involve  multiplicity.  Nor  is  it  absolute  mul- 
tiplicity, for  it  reduces  diversity  to  unity. 
It  thus  represents  a  certain  conjunction  of 
elements  of  a  certain  nature,  a  relation  not 
merely  of  homogeneity  but  of  heterogene- 
ity, at  least  relative,  between  modes  of 
being. 

Nor  can  proposition,  any  more  than  con- 
cept, be  strictly  conformable  to  the  formula 
A  is  A.  A  is  A  teaches  us  nothing.  Now, 
a  proposition  must  always  teach  some- 

23 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

thing,  and  thus  admit  of  the  formula  A  is  B. 

And,  lastly,  the  reasoning  which  links 
propositions  to  one  another  is  not  an  exact 
identity,  either ;  it  is  to  propositions  what 
propositions  are  to  concept.  Thus,  we  have 
not  simply  deduced,  from  the  laws  of  pure 
logic,  matter  appropriate  to  the  application 
of  these  laws ;  we  have  composed  the  syllo- 
gism with  the  aid  of  the  laws  of  pure  logic 
and  of  a  super  added  matter. 

Does  this  matter,  at  all  events,  exactly 
harmonize  with  the  logical  form  supplied 
by  the  three  fundamental  principles  ?  Can 
the  pure  logical  form  be  applied  to  it  with- 
out being  weakened.  The  history  of  philo- 
sophy teaches  us  that  Aristotelian  logic 
has  had  many  adversaries.  The  English 
school,  for  instance,  regards  it  as  a  vain 
sport  of  the  mind,  and  intellectualist  philo- 
sophers, such  as  Herbart,  make  ineffectual 
attempts  to  establish  logically  the  legitimacy 
of  the  idea  of  connexion.  In  syllogistic  logic, 
there  is  something  not  only  new,  but  also 
strange,  when  compared  with  pure  logic. 

Concept,  in  fact,  must  express  a  unity  in- 
volving a  multiplicity.  But  then,  what  idea 
are  we  to  form  of  this  conjunction  ?  If  we 

24 


THE  LOGICAL  LAWS 

say  that  multiplicity  is  potentially  in  con- 
cept, we  introduce  an  element  of  obscurity. 
If  we  say  that  concept  contains  its  parts 
as  a  vase  contains  whatever  is  put  into  it, 
we  are  the  victims  of  a  physical  conception, 
we  pre-suppose  the  confused  idea  of  space. 
Frequently  we  think  we  form  a  clear  idea  of 
space  because  we  reduce  it  to  a  collection 
of  elements.  But,  when  unity  has  vanished, 
concept  is  non-existent,  and  to  bring  reason- 
ing to  bear  on  facts  themselves,  as  immediate 
matter,  would  imply  the  suppression  of  logic 
altogether. 

And  so  judgment  contains  something 
obscure.  What  is  the  connexion  it  sets  up 
between  subject  and  predicate  ?  Is  it  a 
relation  of  determination  ?  For  instance, 
does  the  judgment :  Paul  is  a  man  mean 
that  mankind  is  matter  of  which  Paul  is  a 
specification  ?  To  understand  judgment  in 
this  fashion  is  to  relapse  into  the  obscure 
metaphysical  notions  of  potency  and  act, 
form  and  matter.  Will  it  be  urged  that  the 
predicate  is  analytically  drawn  out  of  the 
subject  ?  But  that  is  only  a  sensible  image, 
obscure  to  the  understanding. 

Finally,  syllogism  also  lends  itself  to  objec- 
25 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

tions  that  have  never  been  clearly  refuted  : 
either  tautology  or  the  vicious  circle  is  the 
danger  it  has  to  face.  All  men  are  mortal: 
this  major  premise  implies  the  conclusion. 
Every  man  is  mortal :  this  expression,  indeed, 
does  away  with  the  vicious  circle ;  but  the 
word  Every  (Tout),  whether  expressing  a 
metaphysical  essence  or  indicating  the  exist- 
ence of  a  genus,  raises  insoluble  difficulties. 
Speaking  generally,  syllogistic  logic  pre- 
supposes the  distinction  between  the  implicit 
and  the  explicit,  a  distinction  which  cannot 
be  cleared  up. 

\  Not  only,  then,  do  the  laws  of  syllogistic 
logic  contain  something  more  than  do  the 
flaws  of  pure  logic,  they  also  deviate  from 
'them,  to  some  extent. 

What,  now,  is  the  origin  of  Aristotelian  logic? 
This  origin  is  not  wholly  d  priori,  since  it 
cannot  be  resolved  exactly  into  pure  logic. 
Must  we  say,  along  with  the  empiricists,  that 
it  is  wholly  d  posteriori  ?  To  maintain  this 
doctrine  is  to  affirm  that,  strictly  speaking, 
there  are  no  syllogistic  laws,  but  only  special 
laws  applicable  to  future  events,  in  so  far  as 
they  are  demonstrated  by  experience  and 
induction.  Such  was  the  opinion  of  Stuart 

26 


THE   LOGICAL  LAWS 

Mill.  Quite  logically  Herbert  Spencer  main- 
tained that  in  reality  there  were  only  reasonings 
by  analogy,  and  no  syllogisms  at  all.  And  yet, 
the  answer  might  be  urged,  this  syllogistic  ex- 
actly represents  the  reasoning  process  of  reflec- 
tive consciousness.  Indeed, we  cannot  do  with- 
out it ;  whatever  we  do,  it  is  implied  in  every 
demonstration  which  carries  conviction  with 
it.  It  has  not  the  full  evidence  of  pure  logic, 
though  it  shares  therein  ;  consequently,  it  is 
not  wholly  d  posteriori  but  seems  rather  a 
blend  of  d  priori  and  d  posteriori.  The  human 
mind,  we  may  say,  bears  within  itself  the 
principles  of  pure  logic ;  but  since  the  matter 
offered  to  it  does  not  seem  to  conform  ex- 
actly with  these  principles,  it  endeavours 
to  adapt  logic  to  things  so  as  to  interpret  the 
latter  in  a  way  that  approaches  perfect  intelli- 
gibility as  nearly  as  possible.  Syllogistic 
logic  may  therefore  be  regarded  as  a  method, 
an  ensemble  of  symbols  by  which  the  mind 
is  rendered  capable  of  thinking  things,  a 
mould  into  which  it  will  introduce  reality 
to  make  it  intelligible.  It  is  in  this  way 
that  we  would  answer  the  question  of  the 
nature  and  degree  of  intelligibility  of  the 
logical  laws. 

27 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

At  first  sight,  it  may  appear  useless  to 
question  the  objectivity  of  these  laws,  for 
there  is  nothing  that  seems  more  certain,  more 
beyond  all  dispute,  than  this  objectivity. 
And  yet  logic  has  been  attacked  quite  as 
frequently  as  it  has  been  extolled.  No  doubt 
it  is  a  grave  reproach  against  a  person  to  say 
that  he  is  not  logical ;  as  a  rule,  we  admire 
those  who  are  capable  of  organizing  a  vast 
mass  of  material  after  the  type  of  the  principles 
of  identity  and  contradiction.  But  then,  at 
times,  we  blame  those  who  are  looked  upon 
as  stubbornly  logical  and  systematical : 
every  system,  it  is  alleged,  is  artificial ;  to 
try  to  find  some  shade  of  difference  even 
at  the  risk  of  encountering  contradiction, 
is  the  way  to  grasp  reality.  This  diver- 
gence of  opinions  seems  as  though  it  might 
be  explained  by  the  distinction  established 
above.  Pure  logical  laws  are  indisputable, 
but  they  concern  not  at  all — or  but  very 
slightly — the  inner  nature  of  things ;  the 
laws  of  syllogistic  go  deeper  into  the  nature  of 
things,  but  a  certain  amount  of  discretion 
must  be  used  in  applying  them. 

The  former  we  regard  as  absolutely  neces- 
sary :  it  does  not  lie  within  our  power  to 

28 


THE  LOGICAL  LAWS 

conceive  of  them  as  aught  but  purely  sub- 
jective and  unrealized  by  nature  ;  we  do  not 
even  see  how  experience  could  contradict 
them,  since  all  they  do  is  to  declare  that  if 
something  is,  it  is.  But  that  which  constitutes 
their  strength  also  constitutes  their  weakness  : 
they  leave  indeterminate  the  very  things  to 
which  they  apply.  When  I  say,  A  is  A,  I 
lay  no  prohibition  upon  myself  from  implying 
that  A,  in  itself,  is  devoid  of  identity.  We 
have  therefore  to  discover  whether  the  very 
nature  of  things  also  is  in  conformity  with 
these  principles.  The  Eleatics  maintained 
that  being,  in  effect,  expresses  identity, 
and  is  exempt  from  contradiction,  but  over 
against  such  a  system  the  history  of  philo- 
sophy sets  that  of  Hegel,  who,  on  the  other  , 
hand,  regards  contradiction  and  necessary^ 
strife  as  in  the  inmost  nature  of  things. 
There  is  no  difference  between  these  two 
systems,  as  regards  the  laws  of  pure  logic. 
They  both  conform  to  these  laws.  For 
Hegel  did  not  say  that,  in  stating  a  proposi- 
tion, you  could  also  state  the  contradictory 
proposition.  He  thought  that  if,  in  the 
formula  A  is  A,  we  replace  A  by  its  real 
value,  we  have,  from  the  very  outset,  being 

29 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

identical  with  non-being.  Which  is  the  true 
doctrine,  the  Eleatic  or  that  of  Hegel  ? 
Neither  of  them,  probably.  At  all  events,  it 
is  not  the  consideration  of  logical  laws  in 
themselves,  but  only  the  consideration  of  the 
concrete  laws  of  nature,  that  can  teach  us 
to  what  extent  real  beings  essentially  partici- 
pate in  identity  and  contradiction. 

It  is  less  hazardous  and  more  customary 
to  regard  the  laws  of  syllogistic  as  the  expres- 
sion of  the  universal  conditions  to  which 
the  laws  of  nature  are  subject.  According 
to  this  view,  dogmatists  are  inclined  to 
assimilate  logic  to  reality.  They  base  their 
opinion  on  what  they  call  the  natural  harmony 
between  thought  and  things,  a  principle 
they  look  upon  as  necessary  and  innate. 
This  principle,  however,  is  nothing  but  a 
wish,  a  desire,  a  mere  postulate.  Moreover, 
even  if  it  were  certain,  it  would  not  guarantee 
the  objectivity  of  syllogistic  logic,  if  this 
latter,  as  we  have  endeavoured  to  show,  is 
not  thought  itself  but  rather  a  misrepresenta- 
tion of  the  principles  of  thought  resulting 
precisely  from  the  opposition  between  thought 
and  things. 

Must  we  then  altogether  renounce  the 
30 


THE  LOGICAL  LAWS 

objectivity  of  this  logic,  and,  with  the  empiri- 
cists, maintain  that  there  are  only  facts, 
and  that  these  facts  create  within  us  habits, 
imperious  enough,  no  doubt,  but  purely 
subjective  ?  It  would  appear  that  the  logicalv/ 
laws  cannot  be  regarded  as  derived  exclusively 
from  experience :  this  latter  presents  no 
groupings  analogous  to  concepts,  and  concept 
is  not  a  tardy  acquisition  of  the  mind.  In  spite 
of  a  prejudice  handed  down  to  us  from  Locke, 
it  is  with  general  concepts  that  the  child  begins, 
and  it  is  precisely  the  function  of  experience 
to  contradict  and  break  them  up.  Concept, 
then,  originates  in  the  mind.  No  doubt  it 
is  formed  on  the  occasion  of  experience  and 
with  materials  borrowed  from  experience, 
but  it  is  the  mind  that  forms  it.  Now,  it  is 
beyond  dispute  that  our  reasonings  are  sus- 
ceptible of  being  in  harmony  with  facts ; 
when  they  are  out  of  harmony,  we  do  not 
consider  that  reasoning  is  a  vicious  instru- 
ment, but  rather  that  we  have  insufficient 
data,  that  our  field  of  operations  is  too  limited. 
Consequently,  things  possess  relations  which, 
in  a  measure,  correspond  to  syllogistic  con- 
catenation. In  nature,  there  is  something 
resembling  classes  of  beings  or  species,  and 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

something  resembling  classes  of  facts  or  laws. 
Still,  we  cannot  know,  d  priori,  how  far  this 
condition  is  realized  ;  nothing  but  the  develop- 
ment of  science  can  tell  us  that.  Perhaps  the 
following  is  all  we  can  conjecture  d  priori. 
Man,  to  all  appearance,  is  not  a  monster  in 
nature ;  the  intelligence  that  characterizes 
him  must  bear  some  relation  to  the  nature 
of  beings  in  general.  Therefore,  at  the  root 
of  things,  there  must  be,  if  not  an  intelligence 
similar  to  the  human,  at  all  events  properties 
and  dispositions  that  bear  some  analogy  with 
this  intelligence.  It  is  reasonable  to  admit 
in  nature  a  sort  of  tendency  towards  intelligi- 
bility. If  this  be  the  case,  reasoning  repre- 
sents a  mode  of  interpretation,  of  interroga- 
tion which  may  legitimately  be  employed 
in  dealing  with  nature. 

What,  now,  is  the  signification  of  the  logical 
laws  ?     Logic,  certainly,  is  the  most  perfect 
type  of  absolute  necessity,   but  it  offers  a^ 
minimum    of    objectivity/  It    governs    the    / 
surface    of   things   but    does   not    determine 
their  nature  ;    it  remains  true,  whatever  be 
that  nature.     The  necessity  it  implies  will  be 
safeguarded,  even  if  beings  are  to  be  considered 
as  endowed  with  spontaneity,  even  if  beings 

32 


THE  LOGICAL  LAWS 

are  free.  It  is  an  absolute  master,  though 
infinitely  remote  from  ourselves;  an  insur- 
mountable barrier,  though  between  it  and 
ourselves  there  is  more  space  than  we  shall 
ever  be  able  to  compass. 

If  syllogism  is,  in  reality,  but  a  symbol 
invented  by  the  human  mind,  it  cannot  be 
regarded  as  self-evident  that  the  necessity, 
proper  to  it,  is,  in  effect,  found  realized  in 
things.  This  necessity  is  the  relationship 
implied  in  the  notions  of  species  and  genus. 
The  special  sciences  alone  will  inform  us  if 
there  are  genera  and  species  in  nature.  How- 
ever, as  man  is  not  an  empire  within  an  empire, 
as  not  only  are  our  reasonings  successful, 
but  it  is  natural  that  they  should  be  successful, 
we  have  reason  to  infer  that  in  things  there! 
is  a  tendency  to  order  and  classification,  toj 
the  realization  of  species  and  laws.  And  so 
already  we  dimly  foresee  that  in  the  being 
all  around  us  there  might  exist  a  duality 
analogous  to  that  which  we  acknowledge 
within  ourselves.  Besides  intelligence,  we 
possess  a  mass  of  faculties  grouped  under 
the  heading  of  activity.  Intelligence  is  the 
rule  of  activity ;  but  we  cannot  say  d  priori 
how  far  activity  realizes  intelligence.  Per- 

33  c 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

haps  the  same  thing  happens  in  nature. 
There  is  a  principle  of  necessity,  but  this 
principle  is  only  the  rule,  not  the  basis  of 
things.  The  knowledge  of  particular  laws 
alone  will  give  us  some  idea  as  to  how  far 
necessity  is  realized. 


34 


Ill 

THE   MATHEMATICAL   LAWS 

AFTER  the  logical  laws,  the  mathema-\ 
tical  laws  are  those  that  appear  most  I 
general.  It  would  seem,  at  the  outset,  as  if 
they,  too,  were  perfectly  clear,  and  that  it 
was  superfluous  to  question  their  intelligibi- 
lity. Was  it  not  to  these  laws  that  Descartes 
appealed,  when  seeking  after  the  type  of 
evidence  ?  And  yet,  in  order  to  establish 
the  effective  value  of  mathematics,  this 
same  Descartes  regarded  it  as  necessary 
to  fall  back  upon  divine  immutability  and  * 
truth.  On  the  other  hand,  the  entire  em- 
piric school  calls  in  question  the  certainty 
proper  to  mathematics.  It  may  also  be  said 
that  the  distinction  between  logic  and  mathe- 
matics is  a  fact  of  ordinary  life  ;  judging 
by  the  mathematical  inaptitude  of  certain 
dialecticians  who,  in  other  matters,  are 
exceedingly  subtle,  and  vice  versa,  there 

35 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

would  appear  to  be  two  ways  of  reasoning, 
quite  distinct  from  each  other.  These  con- 
siderations call  upon  us  to  examine  the 
nature  of  mathematical  certainty. 

For  one  school  of  philosophers,  mathematics 
is  a  mere  application,  a  special  development 
of  general  logic.  So  thought  Leibnitz.  If 
this  be  the  case,  the  difference  between  the 
mathematical  and  the  logical  laws  is  not  an 
essential  one  :  the  latter  are  simply  more 
general  than  the  former  ;  there  is  nothing 
in  mathematics  that  cannot  be  reduced  to 
logic.  For  other  schools,  on  the  contrary, 
in  conformity  with  the  doctrine  of  Kant, 
these  two  kinds  of  law  are  irreducible  to  each 
other  ;  in  the  mathematical  there  is  some- 
thing more  than  in  the  logical  relationship. 
Now,  speaking  generally,  the  speculations 
of  mathematicians  seem  more  favourable  to 
the  second  theory  than  to  the  first. 

What  is  there  new  in  mathematics,  when 
compared  with  logic  ?  In  a  general  way  : 
intuition.  Then  what  is  it  that  character- 
izes mathematical  intuition  ? 

Logic,  if  we  consider  the  matter  closely, 

(presupposes    a     given     whole,     a     concept 

which    it     purposes     to    analyse;     in    this 

36 


THE  MATHEMATICAL  LAWS 

concept,  it  admits  elements  set  alongside  of 
each  other,  and  does  not  determine  the  bond 
that  unites  them.  Mathematics,  on  the  other 
hand,  does  an  essentially  synthetic  work ; 
it  posits  the  relations  which  logic  supposits, 
creates  a  link  between  the  various  parts  of  a 
multiplicity,  proceeds  from  the  simple  to  the 
compound,  itself  generates  the  compound 
instead  of  taking  it  as  given.  Thus,  mathe- 
matical intuition  is  really  something  new, 
though  in  what  way  ? 

In  conceptual  logic,  in  so  far  as  it  is  dis- 
tinguished from  really  pure  logic,  the  notion 
of  the  general  actually  embarrasses  the  under- 
standing which  is  trying  to  arrive  at  perfect 
intelligibility.  In  mathematics,  there  is  more 
than  this.  Fundamental  definitions  are  not 
mere  propositions.  An  infinite  number  of 
definitions  are  frequently  condensed  in  a 
mathematical  definition.  For  instance,  in 
numeration,  the  unit  is  taken  as  the  starting- 
point,  and  the  following  definitions  are  formed : 

2  =  i+i;3==2+i;4  =  3+I*  etc-'  or> in 
a  general  way,   0+2  =  (0+i)+i;    a  + 

3  =  (a  +  2)  +  i  ;     a  +  4  =  (a  +  3)  +  i. 
After   thus   forming   the    definitions    of   the 
first   few  numbers,  we   add :    etc.     What   is 

37 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

this  etc.  but  the  idea  of  an  endless  number 
of  definitions,  analogous  to  those  we  have 
created  ?  Now,  the  arithmetician  reduces  this 
infinity  to  the  following  formula  :  a  +  b  — 
a  +  (b  ~  J)  +  J> a  definition  which  in  itself  con- 
tains an  infinite  number  of  definitions.  Such 
a  concept  is  more  than  a  novelty,  in  relation 
to  the  purely  logical  concept :  it  is  already 
a  deviation  from  perfect  intelligibility. 

It  is  the  same  with  demonstrations.  Mathe- 
matics frequently  calls  for  a  mode  of  reasoning 
different  from  logical  deduction,  and  which 
consists  in  generalizing,  with  demonstrative 
force,  the  result  of  a  particular  demonstration. 
This  we  see  in  the  theory  of  addition,  on 
which  the  whole  of  mathematics  is  based. 
Suppose  we  have  to  demonstrate  that  a  +  i 
=  i  +  #.  First  we  make  a  =  i,  then  we 
have  1  +  1  =  1+1,  by  identity.  Then 
we  adopt  a  roundabout  method,  and  say  : 
suppose  (a  —  i)  +  i  =  i  +  (a  —  i).  If  this 
supposition  is  granted,  adding  i  to  each  of 
the  two  members,  we  have  (a  —  i)  +  i  +  i 
—  i  +  (a  —  i)  +  i,  which,  on  crossing  out  the 
terms  that  cancel  each  other,  gives  0+1  = 
i  +  a.  We  have  supposed  that  (a  —  i)  +  i 
=  i  +  (#—i).  But  if  we  call  (a,  —  i) :  a, 

38 


THE  MATHEMATICAL  LAWS 

we  are  brought  back  to  the  preceding  prob- 
lem.   We  may  continue  in  this  way  until  we 
come  to  the  case  in  which  a  =  i.    This  mode 
of  demonstration  is  called  reasoning  by  re- 
currence.    As  we  see,  it  is  a  demonstration 
that  contains  as  large  a  number  of  demon- 
strations as  we  please,  since  a  may  be  sup- 
posed as  large  as  we  please.     The  same  kind 
of  reasoning  takes  place  in  a  great  number  of 
cases,  for  instance,  in  demonstrating  that  the 
sum    of    several    consecutive    odd     numbers 
from   i  upwards  is  equal  to  the  square  of 
their  number.     This  reasoning  is  a  kind   of 
apodeictic  induction.     There  is  induction,  for 
in  this  case  demonstration  deals  first  with  the 
particular,    and    generalization    comes    only 
afterwards.     And  the  induction  is  apodeic- 
tic,  since  it  extends  to  all    possible    cases. 
Now,  from  the  logical  point  of  view  :    it  is 
strange    that  a    generalization  can  thus  be 
conceived  as  necessary ;    and  the  reason  we 
are   here  compelled  to  bring  together   these 
two  words,  which  might  almost  be  said  to 
repel  each  other,  lies  not  only  in  the  fact  that 
mathematics  is  not  a  simple  development  of 
logic,  but  that  it  does  not  even  simply  differ 
from  it,   as  synthesis  differs  from  analysis. 

39 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

Mathematical  intelligibility   actually  implies 
some  modification  of  logical  intelligibility. 

If  this  is  so,  what  is  the  origin  of  the  mathe- 
matical laws  ?  If  they  were  wholly  known 
d  priori,  their  intelligibility  would  be  perfect. 
As  it  is,  they  imply  elements  that  cannot 
be  fathomed  by  thought.  We  are  compelled 
to  acknowledge  them  :  we  cannot  say  we 
find  them  clearly  springing  from  the  funda- 
mental nature  of  the  intellect.  Nor  can  they 
be  connected  with  knowledge  d  posteriori, 
for  they  deal  only  with  limits.  A  limit  cannot 
be  understood  empirically,  since  it  is  the 
purely  ideal  term  towards  which  tends  a 
quantity  supposed  to  increase  or  decrease 
indefinitely.  The  mathematical  laws  pre- 
suppose a  very  complex  elaboration.  They 
re  not  known  exclusively  either  d  priori  or 
d  posteriori,  but  are  a  creation  of  the  mind ; 
and  this  creation  is  not  an  arbitrary  one,  but, 
owing  to  the  mind's  resources,  takes  place 
with  reference  to  experience  and  in  view  of  it. 
Sometimes  the  mind  starts  with  intuitions 
which  it  freely  creates ;  sometimes,  by  a 
process  of  elimination,  it  gathers  up  the 
axioms  it  regards  as  most  suitable  for  pro- 
ducing a  harmonious  development,  one  that 

40 


THE  MATHEMATICAL  LAWS 

is  both  simple  and  fertile.  Thus,  mathe- 
matics is  a  voluntary  and  intelligent  adapta- 
tion of  thought  to  things,  it  represents  the 
forms  that  will  allow  of  qualitative  diversity 
being  surmounted,  the  moulds  into  which 
reality  must  enter  in  order  to  become  as  - 
intelligible  as  possible. 

Such  is  the  nature,  such  the  degree  of 
intelligibility  of  the  mathematical  laws.  What 
follows,  as  regards  their  objectivity  ?  Accord- 
ing to  Descartes,  mathematics  is  realized 
such  deep  within  the  sensible  world ;  it 
constitutes  the  very  substance  of  material 
things.  After  Descartes,  this  point  of  view 
became  more  and  more  limited  and  disputed, 
and  the  positivism  of  Auguste  Comte  summed/ 
up  the  results  of  criticism  by  declaring  thai[ 
the  higher  is  not  reducible  to  the  lower,  and 
that,  the  more  we  would  account  for  a 
loftier  reality,  the  more  we  must  introduce 
new  laws  which  have  a  specificity  of  their 
own  and  cannot  be  reduced  to  the  preceding 
ones. 

The  mathematical  laws,  considered  in 
themselves,  appear  inapt  for  realization, 
since  they  imply  infinite  number ;  now,  an 
actual  infinite  number  is  altogether  incon- 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

ceivable.      Every    system    of    mathematical 
realism  splits  on  this  rock. 

But  then,  the  idealist  will  say,  what  makes 
inconceivable  the  reality  of  infinite  number, 
is  that  we  insist  on  actualizing  it  as  substance. 
If  mind  is  the  only  reality  and  things  but  the 
projection   and  representations  of    its    acts, 
the  mathematical  laws  may  be  conceived  as 
real,  in  so  far  as  they  form,  within  the  mind 
itself,  the  groundwork  of  the  world  of  repre- 
sentations.    Our  answer  to  the  idealist  will 
be  that  his  system  has  no  justification.     In 
order   that   we   may   find,    in   mathematics, 
thought  itself  rendered  objective,  the  laws  of 
mathematics    would    have    to    be    perfectly 
intelligible ;  now,  the  mind  cannot  assimilate 
them  without  a  certain  effort.     Moreover,  our 
mathematics  represents  a  particular  form  of 
mathematics ;    others  are  possible,  but  the 
reason  we  keep  to  our  own  is  solely  because  it 
is  more    simple  or  convenient  for  our  com- 
prehension of  external  phenomena.     How  will 
the   idealist   distinguish   what   is   absolutely 
necessary  from  what  might  be  different  in  the 
development  of  mathematics  ? 

There  exists,  it  would  appear,  a  means  of 
maintaining  the  absolute  objectivity  of  mathe- 

42 


THE   MATHEMATICAL  LAWS 

matics,  in  spite  of  the  difficulties  which  the 
intellect  experiences  in  realizing  the  infinite  ; 
and  that  means  consists  in  saying  that  the 
law  of  the  real  is  actually  the  radical  incon- 
sistency or  illogism  and  even  the  identity  of 
the  contradictories.  But  what  would  then  be 
conceived  as  realized  would  be  something 
different  from  mathematics  as  such,  since  the 
latter  was  instituted  for  the  very  purpose  of 
removing,  as  far  as  possible,  the  contradictions 
offered  by  phenomena, 
recording  to  others,  the  substance  of  things 
eludes  us,  but  the  mathematical  laws  represent 
their  forms  and  relations  ;  these  laws  are  the 
common  element  between  ourselves  and  ex- 
ternal reality.  Such,  for  instance,  was  the 
doctrine  of  Ampere.  This  is  a  simple  and  clear, 
though  artificial,  conception  ;  for  the  form  and 
the  substance  of  things  cannot  thus  be  radi- 
cally separated.  When  the  form  of  a  thing  is 
perfectly  known,  it  is  no  longer  possible  foi 
us  to  say  that  we  are  altogether  ignorant  oj 
its  nature.  The  separation  between  matter 
and  form  is  only  a  logical  one,  it  cannot  be 
a  real  separation.  Not  only,  then,  are  the 
mathematical  laws  unreal,  both  in  the  sub- 
stantial and  in  the  idealistic  sense,  but  they  do 

43  , 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

not  even  express  a  form  of  things  that  is  really 
separable  from  their  matter.  All  the  same, 
mathematics  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  mere 
convention, a  simple  sport  of  the  mind.  It  is./ 
a  fact  that  mathematics  does  apply  to  reality. 
How  far  and  in  what  way  cannot  be  deter- 
mined d  priori.  All  we  are  permitted  to  say 
is  that,  since  man,  apparently,  is  no  anomaly 
in  nature,  that  which  satisfies  his  intellect 
must  not  be  unrelated  to  the  rest  of  things. 
We  may  therefore  conjecture  that  there  exists 
a  correspondence  between  the  mathematical 
laws  and  the  laws  of  things ;  but  it  is  the 
study  of  the  particular  concrete  laws  of  nature 
that  will  teach  us  how  far,  in  effect,  the  mathe- 
matical laws  govern  reality ."7 

What,  in  short,  is  the  meaning  of  mathe- 
matics as  regards  the  necessity  which  may 
be  ruling  throughout  the  world  ?  These 
laws  are  still  closely  bordering  on  absolute 
necessity ;  but  they  are  also  very  far  from 
things  and  from  reality.  And  though  they  evi- 
dently have  a  closer  connexion  with  being  than  v 
the  logical  laws  have,  still,  we  cannot  say  that 
they  introduce  absolute  necessity  into  being, 
for  they  actually  admit  of  a  strict  deduction 
only  through  imperfectly  intelligible  axioms 

44 


THE  MATHEMATICAL  LAWS 

which  the  mind  has  combined  with  a  view 
to  this  very  deduction.  How  far  does  the 
necessity  peculiar  to  them  rule  in  things  ? 
This  we  shall  learn  by  comparing  the  physical 
with  the  mathematical  laws.  We  must  now 
apply  ourselves  to  investigating  them.  In  the 
next  chapter,  we  shall  take  up  the  mechani- 
cal laws  and  the  idea  of  force. 


45 


IV 

THE    MECHANICAL   LAWS 

OUR  present  object  is  to  examine  critically 
the  idea  we  have  of  the  laws  of  nature, 
in  the  hope  of  extracting  information  as  to 
the  relation  these  laws  bear  to  reality,  and  the 
position  of  the  human  individual  in  nature 
herself.  It  is  our  ultimate  end  to  know 
whether,  in  the  present  state  of  the  sciences, 
we  may  yet  regard  ourselves  as  possessed 
of  any  power  to  act  freely,  any  reality  as 
persons.  Along  these  lines,  we  have  ex- 
amined the  logical  and  mathematical  laws, 
which,  after  all,  are  more  than  laws  and 
express  the  most  general  relations,  the  con- 
ditions of  all  the  rest.  We  have  shown  that 
the  laws  of  real  logic  cannot  actually  be 
reduced  exactly  to  the  only  principle  most 
certainly  known  d  priori,  namely  A  is 
A,  and  that  concept,  judgment,  syllogism, 
all  imply  a  new  element :  the  many  as  con- 

46 


THE  MECHANICAL  LAWS 

tained  in  the  one,  or  again  the  relation 
of  the  explicit  to  the  implicit.  Mathematics 
also  introduces  new  elements  which  the  mind 
cannot  thoroughly  assimilate :  it  creates 
relations  of  adjustment ;  it  diversifies  the 
identical  with  the  aid  of  intuition  ;  more  than 
that,  in  its  generalizations,  it  cannot  dispense 
with  a  mode  of  reasoning  which  may  be  called 
apodeictic  induction.  If  both  the  mathe-  i 
matical  and  the  logical  laws  do  not  proceed  I 
immediately  from  the  nature  of  the  mind,  I 
neither  are  they  deduced  from  experience.^ 
Indeed,  were  this  the  case,  they  would  have 
to  coincide  with  parts  or  aspects  of  reality  : 
now,  this  is  not  so.  Neither  the  universals  of 
logic  nor  the  infinite  number  of  mathematics 
are  given  to  us.  We  cannot  even  conceive 
how  they  could  be.  Thus,  logic  and  mathe-1 
matics  are  solely  derived  neither  from  know- 
ledge d  priori,  nor  from  knowledge  d  posteriori  : 
they  represent  the  work  of  the  mind  which, 
incited  by  things  to  exert  itself,  creates  a  mass 
of  symbols  in  order  to  subject  these  things  to 
necessity  and  thus  make  them  capable  of  be- 
ing assimilated  by  itself.  The  logical  and  the 
mathematical  laws  testify  to  the  mind's  need 
of  conceiving  things  as  being  necessarily  deter- 

47 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

mined  ;  Lbut  it  cannot  be  known  d  priori  how 
far  reality  conforms  with  these  mind-imagined 
symbols :  we  must  appeal  to  observation 
and  analysis  of  the  real  if  we  would  know 
whether  mathematics,  in  effect,  rules  through- 
out the  universe.  All  that  can  be  admitted, 
previous  to  this  experimental  study,  is  that 
there  is  probably  a  certain  analogy  between  our 
intellectual  nature  and  the  nature  of  things. 
Were  it  not  so,  man  would  be  isolated  in  the 
universe.  This,  however,  is  but  conjecture.^ 
A  consideration  of  the  concrete  sciences  will 
alone  enable  us  to  say  what  degree  of  reality  we 
must  attribute  to  logic  and  to  mathematics. 

The  laws  of  reality  given  to  us  as  approach- 
ing nearest  to  mathematical  relations,  are  the 
mechanical  laws.  The  essential  and  char- 
acteristic element  of  these  laws  is  the  notion 
of  force.  In  order  to  understand  the  forma- 
tion and  the  present  state  of  this  notion,  we 
will  now  study  its  historical  evolution. 

In  antiquity,  and  especially  in  the  times 
of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  what  seems,  above  all 
else,  to  strike  the  human  mind,  is  the  differ- 
ence between  motion  and  rest.  This  opposi- 
tion is  made  the  point  of  departure,  and  it 
is  admitted  that  matter,  in  itself,  is  in  a  state 

48 


THE  MECHANICAL  LAWS 

of  rest.  What  has  then  to  be  explained  is  the 
transition  from  rest  to  motion.  To  solve  the 
question,  the  production  of  motion  in  man  is 
considered.  Now,  motion  appears,  in  man, 
as  resulting  from  the  action  of  the  mind  on 
the  body.  Thus,  above  matter,  there  is 
assumed  a  separate  force,  resembling  a  soul 
more  or  less,  and  as  such,  suited  for  acting 
upon  bodies.  This  view  may  readily  be 
connected  with  the  teleological  conception, 
in  virtue  of  which  God  rules  and  moves  the 
totality  of  things ;  thus,  it  shows  itself 
favourable  to  ethics  and  religion.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  opposes  the  progress  of  science. 
How,  in  effect,  are  we  to  gauge  and  foresee 
the  action  of  an  immaterial  force,  called 
upon  to  exert  itself  from  aesthetic  and  ethical 
reasons  ?  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  science! 
of  the  real  made  little  progress,  so  long  as  iti 
regarded  things  from  this  point  of  view. 

At  the  time  of  the  Renaissance,  a  totally 
different  conception  grew  up.  Instead  of  con- 
trasting motion  with  rest,  Galileo  looked  upon 
them  as  analogous  :  matter  is  self-sufficient, 
both  in  motion  and  in  rest.  Of  itself  and  apart 
from  supernatural  intervention,  it  continues 
indefinitely  in  a  uniform,  rectilinear  motion  ; 

49  D 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

of  itself,  it  can  pass  neither  from  rest  to  motion 
nor  from  motion  to  rest :  it  is  the  principle 
of  inertia.  No  doubt,  if  we  wish  to  bring 
before  the  mind  the  first  origin  of  motion,  we 
must  presuppose  a  first  impulsion,  a  fillip, 
— chiquenaude,  as  Pascal  called  it ; — but  as 
regards  its  present  state,  which  alone  is  the 
object  of  science,  matter  contains  within  itself 
the  explanation  both  of  its  motion  and  of  its 
rest.  From  this  idea  of  inertia,  it  was  at 
first  thought  possible  to  infer  the  abolition 
of  force  as  a  separate  idea.  Thus,  Descartes 
thought  he  could  explain  all  physical  pheno- 
mena by  the  one  law  of  the  conservation  of 
the  quantity  of  motion,  a  corollary  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  inertia.  Force,  as  such,  is  banished 
from  his  system.  This  philosophy  might 
have  been  developed  deductively,  like  mathe- 
matics, of  which  it  formed  the  continuation  ; 
but  there  came  a  time  when  it  was  confronted 
with  facts  and  then  found  to  be  inadequate. 
Newton,  in  order  to  account  for  the  motions  of 
the  heavenly  bodies,  regarded  it  as  necessary 
to  re-establish  the  idea  of  force.  He  started  with 
the  principle  of  inertia,  according  to  which  a 
body  retains  its  uniform,  rectilinear  motion 
for  an  indefinite  period.  The  heavenly  bodies, 


THE  MECHANICAL  LAWS 

however,  moved  in  a  curvilinear,  non-uniform  / 
fashion.  To  explain  this  modification  of 
motion,  we  must  admit  that  some  external) 
force  acts  upon  the  moving  body.  This 
reappearance  of  the  idea  of  force,  moreover, 
is  not  the  restoration  of  the  ancient  con- 
ception. The  ancients  regarded  force  as 
dwelling  in  a  higher,  metaphysical  form  ;  it 
acts  from  above,  after  the  fashion  of  a  soul ; 
it  is  God  Himself,  who,  by  His  perfection, 
produces  the  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies. 
Newton,  on  the  other  hand,  attributed  force 
to  matter ;  an  atom  has  not  the  power  to 
modify  its  own  motion,  but  it  can  modify 
the  motion  of  other  atoms.  Thus,  without 
leaving  matter,  we  come  to  explain  modifica- 
tions in  the  speed  and  direction  of  motion. 
God  is  eliminated  from  the  world,  in  so  far, 
at  least,  as  He  is  considered  to  be  an  artist 
who  produces  by  separate  acts  every  detail 
of  His  work. 

Are  we  not,  however,  restoring  the  occult 
powers  of  the  Schoolmen  if  we  admit 
the  existence  of  such  a  force  ?  Newton,  as 
we  know  by  his  own  declarations,  does  not 
regard  attraction  as  a  metaphysical  force, 
analogous  to  a  soul's  activity,  To  him,  this 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

is  but  an  expression,  a  kind  of  metaphor, 
pointing  to  a  phenomenal  relationship.  Force, 
as  he  interprets  it,  is  none  the  less  the  cause 
of  motion.  Now,  cause  must  be  prior  to 
effect.  If,  then,  this  is  not  an  occult  power, 
at  least  it  is  something  metaphysical  and 
invisible,  which  logically  precedes  phenomena. 
Mathematicians  have  taken  it  into  account, 
and  so  we  find  them,  nowadays,  endeavour- 
ing to  transform  the  relation  between  force 
and  motion  into  a  simple  mutual  dependence, 
a  mere  relation  of  solidarity.  It  is  in  this 
way  that  force  is  defined  as  the  product  of  the 
mass  into  the  velocity.  Here,  force  and 
motion  are  two  data  related  to  each  other, 
without  there  being  any  necessity  to  inquire 
whether  it  is  force  that  is  the  cause  of  motion, 
or  motion  that  is  the  cause  of  force :  just  as, 
in  geometry,  we  have  the  relation  of  diameter 
to  circumference. 

LIs  force,  as  thus  conceived,  reduced  to  a 
purely  mathematical  notion,  or  does  it  contain 
some  new  element  ?  Doubtless,  abstract 
mechanics  does  not  differ  from  mathematics 
and  consists  solely  of  substitutions  of  formulae. 
But  abstract  mechanics  does  not  suffice  for 
the  realization  of  the  science  of  nature.  This 

52 


THE  MECHANICAL  LAWS 

was  clearly  seen  by  Newton  ;  he  tried  to  find 
in  experience  the  mathematical  principles 
of  his  natural  philosophy.  Now,  what  is 
that  element  which  cannot  be  found  in 
mathematics  and  which  only  experience  can 
give  us  ?  It  is  the  measure  of  the  action 
which  bodies  exercise  upon  one  another:T 
In  mathematics,  consequences  are  analytically 
deduced  from  definitions ;  we  start  with  the 
identical  and  then  diversify  it.  But,  in 
nature,  we  start  with  things  foreign  to  one 
another,  such  as  the  sun  and  the  planets, 
and  set  up  a  definite,  constant  dependence 
between  these  things.  We  are  really  dealing, 
then,  with  a  mathematical  connexion,  though 
it  can  neither  be  affirmed  nor  known  d  priori. 
Thus,  what  there  is  new  in  the  notion  of  force, 
is,  in  short,  the  idea  of  physical  causality,  or, 
in  more  precise  terms,  the  idea  of  natural  law, 
strictly  so  called.  /"Force  is  a  uniform  depend- 
ence, experimentally  known,  between  things 
exterior  to  one  another.  Consequently  it 
contains  an  extra-mathematical  element^ 

But  then,   may  it  not  be  said  that  the 
affirmation  of  the  natural  laws  results  from  a 
special  necessity  of    the  mind  ?     Followingl  "J 
on    Kant,    profound   philosophers   maintain,  | 

53 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

even  nowadays,  that  the  notion  of  law  is  the 
result  of  our  mental  make-up,  and  consists 
of  a  synthetic,  d  priori  judgment.  These 
philosophers  justify  their  theory  by  setting 
forth  how  such  an  idea  of  causal  law  is  neces- 
sary in  order  to  think  phenomena,  i.e.  to 
reduce  them  to  unity  within  a  consciousness. 
Phenomena,  in  themselves,  are  heterogeneous 
with  regard  to  one  another.  The  notion  of 
law,  by  establishing  universal  and  necessary 
relations  between  them,  gives  them  the  only 
unity  of  which  a  heterogeneous  multiplicity 
admits.  This  theory,  to  our  mind,  is  open 
to  objections. 

At  the  outset,  is  it  clear  that  we  have  an 
irresistible  need  to  think  phenomena,  to 
reduce  them  all  to  unity,  to  set  up  between 
ourselves  and  them,  in  an  absolute  sense, 
the  metaphysical  relationship  of  subject  and 
object  ?  No  doubt  we  have  need  of  unity ; 
but  it  is  difficult  to  prove  that  this  need  takes 
precedence  of  all  others  and  governs  the 
whole  of  our  intellectual  life.  Indeed,  the 
history  of  philosophy  offers  us  not  only  minds 
that  aim  at  an  explanation  of  the  uniform 
by  the  multiple  and  the  changing,  but  also 
logicians  enamoured  of  a  reduction  to  unity. 

54 


THE  MECHANICAL  LAWS 

Now,  if  unity  in  the  conception  of  being  is 
not  necessary,  neither  are  the  means  of 
obtaining  it. 

But  we  may  go  farther.  Even  granting 
that  we  feel  this  absolute,  imperious  need  to 
think  things,  is  it  certain  that  the  categories 
of  the  understanding  realize  the  end  assigned 
to  them,  viz.  the  assimilation  of  things  by  the 
mind  ?  It  would  appear  as  though  this 
point  had  been  too  readily  granted  to  the 
Kantian  doctrine.  Indeed,  to  think  things 
is  to  understand  their  particular  affinities 
and  connexions,  to  see  how  they  unify  and 
group  together  of  themselves.  Kant's  cate- 
gories, however,  leave  things  as  they  find 
them,  exterior  and  alien  to  one  another. 
They  bring  them  together  artificially,  as  stones 
are  brought  together  in  building  a  house. 
They  reconcile  nature — which  unites  beings 
according  to  their  consanguinity  or  kinship 
— with  art — which  brings  them  together  in 
accordance  with  its  own  ideas  of  fitness.  Is 
a  bundle  of  sensations  a  thought  taking 
possession  of  things  ? 

This  is  not  all,  and  we  may  enquire  whether 
the  position  adopted  by  Kant  can  be  main- 
tained as  ultimate,  or  whether  it  must  not 

55 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

of  necessity  be  transcended  in  one  direction 
or  the  other.  The  objection  is  frequently 
urged  that,  if  Kant's  categories  are  purely 
subjective,  it  is  inexplicable  that  nature 
should  conform  to  them.  Stated  thus,  the 
objection  is  perhaps  not  well  founded;  for, 
in  Kantianism,  what  we  call  nature  is 
already  the  work  of  the  mind,  not  perhaps  of 
the  individual  thought,  but  of  the  universal 
human  thought  identical  in  each  individual 
consciousness,  and  the  individual  mind  only 
recognizes  empirically  and  successively  that 
which  reason  builds  up  and  unifies  d' priori. 
But  it  would  seem  that  a  somewhat  similar 
objection  might  be  raised.  Either  the  laws,  we 
may  say,  that  the  mind  brings  forward,  will  find 
analogous  matter,  obedient  to  their  action,  in 
which  case  how  shall  we  know  that  the  notion 
of  these  laws  comes  from  ourselves  rather 
than  from  the  observation  of  things,  that 
they  are  known  to  us  d  priori  rather  than  d 
posteriori?  Or  else  things  will  not  conform 
to  these  laws,  and  in  that  case  shall  we  claim 
that  it  is  ourselves  who  are  right  and  nature 
who  is  wrong  ?  It  is  clear  that,  as  soon  as 
it  is  proved  that  facts  do  not  fit  in  .with  the 
limits  we  wish  to  impose  upon  them,  we  shall 

56 


THE  MECHANICAL  LAWS 

make  it  our  object  to  free  ourselves  of  these 
limits  and  form  conceptions  more  in  accord 
with  facts. 

Thus,  the  mechanical  laws  are  not  an  ana- 
lytical   succession   of    mathematical  truths; 
neither  do  they  rest  on  synthetic  d  priori 
judgments.     Are  they  derived  from  experi- 
ence ?     The  ancients  claimed  to  obtain  from 
experience  only  the  general  and  the  probable, 
i.e.  what  happens  in  the   ordinary  way  of 
things,  W?   eVJ    TO    TToXv ;    what  they  wanted 
it  to  give  them  was  universal  and  necessary 
rules,  not  laws.     For  the  moderns,  however 
induction  is  a  kind  of  magic  word,  in  virtu 
of  which,  fact  is  transmuted  into  law.     B 
so-called    scientific    induction,     which     evi 
dently  has    scarcely   anything  in    commo: 
with   ancient   induction,  it   is   claimed   tha 
the   universal    can    be    deduced    from    th 
contingent,  the  necessary  from  the  partial 
lar.     Still,  however  productive  and  methodical 
modern    induction    may    be,    it    will    never 
succeed,    without     superseding     experience 
in  bringing  us  to  true  laws.     For  instan 
we   cannot   possibly,  by  experience,  beco 
acquainted  with  inertia  and  force ;    to  d 
this,  we  should  have  had  to  be  present  at  th 

57 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

creation.  We  never  observe  the  exactly 
uniform  and  rectilinear  motion  of  a  moving 
body,  removed  from  all  extraneous  influence, 
any  more  than  the  continuance  in  rest  of  a 
body  that  has  received  no  impulsion.  The 
duality  of  inertia  and  force,  the  action  of 
multiple  forces,  and  the  composition  of  these 
forces,  are  abstractions  that  cannot  be  verified. 
\  We  may  go  even  further  and  say  that 
induction  cannot  even  account  for  the  most 
'  general  characteristics  of  the  mechanical  laws. 
In  fact,  we  observe  only  moments  separate 
from  one  another,  i.e.  discontinuity,  and  yet 
ur  laws  give  us  continuity.  Secondly,  these 
aws  imply  precision,  whereas  experience 
gives  us  only  approximations.  Afterwards, 
we  assume,  as  fundamental,  definite  relations 
between  such  and  such  phenomena,  whereas 
experience  offers  us  an  infinite  number  of 
elations  between  which  there  is  neither 
riority  nor  separation.  Finally,  we  attri- 
bute to  our  laws,  fixity,  as  an  essential 
characteristic.  Now,  in  this  we  cannot  say 
that  we  are  judging  the  future  by  the  past, 
for  only  to  an  insignificant  extent  do  we 
know  the  past.  It  is  most  seriously  alleged 
nowadays  that  species  are  not  eternal,  but 

58 


THE  MECHANICAL  LAWS 

have  a  history  of  their  own.  Why  also 
should  not  laws,  those  types  of  the  relations 
that  exist  between  phenomena,  be  subject 
to  change  ?  The  fixity  we  attribute  to  them 
is  a  characteristic  that  we  add  on  to  the  data 
of  experience,  one  that  cannot  be  revealed  to 
us  from  without. 

Nevertheless,  if  the  mechanical  laws  are 
known  neither  d  priori  nor  a  posteriori,  in  their 
distinctive  form,  it  does  not  therefore  follow 
that  they  are  fictitious.  jThe  concept  of  law 
results  from  the  effort  we  make  to  adapt  things 
to  the  mind.  Law  represents  the  characteristic 
we  must  attribute  to  things  in  order  that 
they  may  be  expressed  by  the  symbols  at 
our  disposal,  the  matter  that  physics  must 
offer  to  mathematics,  so  that  mathematics 
may  unite  with  it.  And  the  result  proves 
that  certain  phenomena  of  nature  comply 
with  this  requirement,  the  consequence 
being  that  the  notion  of  mechanical  law 
dominates  the  whole  of  scientific  research, 
as  a  guiding  idea,  at  all  events/) 

We  have  inquired  into  the  nature  of  the 
mechanical  laws ;  now  we  must  examine 
their  objectivity  and  signification,  i.e.  we 
must  see  how  far  we  are  justified  in  believing 

59 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

that  things  realize  mechanism,  and  to  what 
extent  we  are  included  in  this  mechanism. 
These  questions  will  be  dealt  with  in  the 
next  chapter. 


60 


V 
THE    MECHANICAL   LAWS 

(Continued?) 

\  \X/E  have  seen  that  the  mechanical  laws 
V  V  are  not  a  mere  development  and 
complication  of  mathematics ;  in  reality, 
they  imply  a  new  element  which  cannot  be  i^ 
reduced  to  mathematical  intuition,  viz.  the 
solidarity  of  fact,  the  regular,  constant  depen- 
dence, empirically  given  and  unknowable  d 
priori,  between  two  different  magnitudes.  \, 
We  have  shown  that  these  laws  are  not  purely 
experimental  truths  either.  They  result  from 
the  collaboration  of  mind  and  things ;  they 
are  products  of  mental  activity  and  apply 
to  extraneous  matter ;  they  represent  the 
effort  which  the  mind  makes  to  set  up  a  coin- 
cidence between  things  and  itself.  Now  we 
must  inquire  in  what  way  the  mechanical 
laws  may  be  regarded  as  realized  in  nature. 
The  first  step  taken  by  the  creators  of 
61 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

scientific  mechanism  was  to  grant  objective 
existence  to  those  laws  that  enable  us  to 
explain  things  in  so  rigorous  a  fashion,  and 
the  first  doctrine  we  find  on  this  subject 
is  dogmatism.  According  to  this  doctrine, 
the  mechanical  laws,  as  such,  are  inherent 
in  things  considered  per  se,  apart  from 
the  mind  at  work  upon  them.  Descartes 
teaches  this  metaphysical  mechanism ;  he 
regards  matter  and  motion,  which  are  them- 
selves capable  of  expression  in  terms  of  space, 
as  representing  the  entire  essence  of  things 
other  than  mind,  and  so  the  mechanical  laws 
exist  as  such  in  nature  ;  more  than  this,  they 
are  the  fundamental  laws  of  the  whole  of 
nature. 

Still,  Cartesianism  lends  itself  to  serious 
objections.  On  what  is  it  grounded  ?  On 
the  clearness  peculiar  to  the  idea  of  extension. 
But,  given  that  clearness  of  the  idea  of 
extension,  does  it  follow  that  extension  is 
the  essence  of  matter,  as  Descartes  states 
it  to  be  ?  Descartes  himself  succeeds  only 
by  having  recourse  to  divine  truth,  as  to 
some  deus  ex  machina.  But  how  are  we  to 
see  in  motion  a  thing  that  exists  per  se  ? 
Motion  is  not  self-sufficient.  Common  sense 

62 


THE  MECHANICAL  LAWS 

tells  us  that  it  presupposes  something  that 
moves,  and  common  sense  is  right.  To  estab- 
lish a  connexion  between  the  different  posi- 
tions of  which  motion  consists,  we  must  have 
either  a  permanent  subject  such  as  matter, 
or  a  mind  that  contains  the  representations  of 
these  positions  in  one  and  the  same  con- 
sciousness. In  a  word,  motion,  of  itself,  does 
not  involve  the  principle  of  unity,  of  which 
it  stands  in  need  in  order  to  be  real. 
L  Newt  on  corrected  Descartes'  mechanism, 
though  he  remained  dogmatic.  When  he  says 
Hypotheses  non  fingo,  he  means  that  he  is  not 
satisfied,  as  Descartes  is,  with  merely  possi- 
ble explanations,  but  that  he  aspires  to  find 
out  the  real,  effective  causes  of  things,  the 
laws  which  God  himself  had  in  mind  when  he 
created  and  planned  the  universe.  Newton 
introduces  into  nature  that  material  subject 
which  was  lacking  in  Cartesian  mechanism ; 
he  admits  of  bodies,  endowed  with  forces,  as 
a  condition  of  motion,  and  thereby  thinks  he 
is  securing,  far  better  than  Cartesianism  did, 
the  objectivity  of  the  mechanical  laws.^  And 
so  he  acknowledges  the  existence  of  real 
motion,  whereas,  according  to  Descartes, 
there  existed  only  relative  motions.  We  must 

63 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

[^carefully  distinguish  between  Newtonianism 
as  science  and  Newtonianism  as  metaphysics. 
Newtonianism  as  science  is  satisfied,  as  far, 
almost,  as  the  human  mind  can  be,  with  ex- 
perimental or  mathematical  notions.  But  if 
we  would  convert  this  science  into  a  knowledge 
of  nature  as  existing  per  se,  we  must  realize 
space,  mechanical  causality,  force,  atoms,  and 
even  attraction,  or  any  other  mode  in  which 
the  cause  of  motion  operates.  And  here 
arise  the  difficulties  so  well  demonstrated  by 
Berkeley,  whose  system,  from  the  very  outset, 
is  a  refutation  of  Newtonianism  regarded 
j  as  metaphysics^  If  space,  matter,  atoms, 
mechanical  causality,  force,  attraction  and 
repulsion,  says  Berkeley,  are  looked  upon  as 
objective  realities,  we  must  first  acknowledge 
that  they  are  things  which  the  human  mind 
is  incapable  of  knowing.  It  is  only  by 
a  process  of  artificial  abstraction  that  we 
detach  them  from  the  sensations  of  which  we 
are  conscious.  They  are  never  presented  to 
us  in  themselves ;  they  cannot  be.  Nor  is 
this  all.  Not  only  are  such  things,  for 
us,  if  they  exist,  as  though  they  were  not, 
but  we  cannot  even  conceive  that  they 
do  exist,  in  themselves.  In  fact,  these  con- 

64 


THE     MECHANICAL  LAWS 

cepts,  set  up  as  things  per  se,  become 
contradictory.  Infinite  and  homogeneous 
space  devoid  of  quality,  the  extended,  indi- 
visible atom,  mechanical  causality,  wherein 
that  which  is  powerless  over  itself,  possesses 
power  over  something  else,  resulting  in  pro- 
gression ad  infinitum,  the  action  of  one  crude 
body  upon  another,  in  whatever  way  this 
action  is  brought  before  the  mind :  all  these 
symbols,  taken  as  absolute  realities,  become 
unintelligible ;  nor  need  we  be  surprised  if 
we  remember  that  these  concepts,  when 
analysed,  present  elements  with  which  thought 
cannot  deal. 

A  third  form  of  dogmatism  is  that  pro- 
fessed by  Leibnitz.  According  to  him,  there 
is  everywhere  at  the  same  time  both  the 
mechanical  and  the  metaphysical ;  the  me- 
chanical laws  exist,  though  not  separately  and 
in  themselves,  as  the  mechanician  conceives 
them.  Their  reality  consists  in  the  fact  that 
they  are  well  founded,  i.e.  supported  by  a 
reality  distinct  from  themselves,  but  one  that 
really  exists  and  contains  the  requisita  of 
mechanical  action.  This  subject  of  mechani- 
cal phenomena  is  force,  i.e.  a  metaphysical 
essence  which,  at  bottom,  offers  a  certain 

65  E 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

analogy  with  our  souls.  But  this  system 
also  raises  difficulties.  LThe  mathematical 
formulae  of  the  mechanicians,  from  the  time 
of  Descartes  right  on  to  our  own,  have  been 
so  purged  of  all  psychological  or  metaphysical 
content,  that  we  no  longer  see  any  connexion1 
between  force  as  metaphysics  understands  it 
and  force  as  assumed  by  science.  The  latter  is 
nothing  but  a  measure  of  motions.  It  might 
with  equal  justice  be  conceived  both  as  a  con- 
sequence and  as  a  condition  of  motion.  The 
transition,  then,  from  scientific  to  metaphysi- 
cal force  is  lacking.  Leibnitz's  metaphysics 
is  superimposed  from  without  upon  science 
strictly  so  called.  True  or  false,  it  is  no 
longer  scientific  mechanism  that  it  sets  up 
as  a  reality .J 

The  mechanical  laws,  therefore,  cannot  be 
considered  realized,  as  such,  in  the  nature  of 
things.  The  concepts  of  which  they  are 
constituted  become  unintelligible  when  con- 
erted into  beings.  Must  they  therefore  be 
denied  all  genuine  reality,  and  regarded,  along 
with  idealism,  as  nothing  else  than  a  symbolical 
expression,  a  projection  of  the  laws  of  mind 
iself  ? 

Interpreted  idealistically,  the  concepts  of 
66 


THE  MECHANICAL  LAWS 

which  the  mechanical  laws  consist,  avoid  the 
contradictions  that  appear  when  they  are 
interpreted  realistically.  Thus,  space,  a 
form  of  sensibility,  is  no  longer  contradictory, 
like  space  that  exists  per  se.  Mechanical 
causality,  connecting  representations  with  one 
another,  no  longer  lends  itself  to  the  objections 
raised  by  this  causality,  conceived  as  con- 
necting things.  [jBut  idealism  is  unable  to 
stand  its  ground;  and,  the  more  closely  it 
pursues  the  problem,  the  more  it  is  compelled 
to  recognize  destructive  elements  within 
itself.  As  a  principle,  idealism  consists  in 
explaining  the  unconscious  by  the  conscious, 
things  by  thought.  But  the  history  of  philo- 
sophy shows  us  that,  in  order  to  explain  the 
given,  idealism  is  forced  to  appeal  to  the 
unconscious  and  allot  this  latter  a  place  along- 
side of — or  even  above — the  conscious.  In 
the  case  of  Kant,  deep  within  the  mind  appears 
the  synthetic  judgment  d  priori,  which  the 
intellect  is  compelled  to  accept  as  a  sort 
of  metaphysical  fact,  without  really  under- 
standing it.  Beneath  the  conscious  self,  Fichte 
places  the  absolute  self,  the  activity  of  which 
precedes  the  intellect,  and  it  is  this  activity 
which,  when  subjected  to  an  inexplicable 

67  / 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

impact,  explains  the  self  as  the  not-self.  In 
Schelling,  the  absolute  becomes  the  identity  of 
the  self  and  the  not-self  ;  in  Hegel,  it  becomes 
the  identity  of  the  contradictories,  that  offence 
and  stumbling-block  to  thought.  Thus  the 
self  is  more  and  more  driven  to  leave  itself 
and  have  recourse  to  some  heterogeneous 
principle ;  idealism  more  and  more  abjures 

^   itself  and  approaches  realism/) 

If  then  the  mechanical  laws  do  not  exist 
objectively,  neither  are  they  mere  projections 
of  the  conscious  mind.  They  witness  to 
the  existence  of  something  different  from 
mind,  and  yet  which  must  not  be  altogether 

j  separated  from  it.  £lWe  are  foiled  when  we 
try  to  determine  the  substantial  nature  of 
things  ;  all  the  same,  we  cannot  abolish  them. 

JA11  we  can  say  is  that,  in  things,  there  is  a 
mode  of  being  which  suggests  to  our  minds 
the  invention  of  the  mechanical  laws.  In 
reality,  how  do  things  act  in  nature  ?  We  can 
form  a  conjecture  of  this  only  by  analogy,  when 
/  we  consider  what  takes  place  within  ourselves] 
In  short,  consciousness  is  the  only  sense  of 
being  that  we  have  at  our  disposal.  Now,  the 
phenomena  which,  in  man,  affect  the  mind  in 
its  most  intimate  union  with  the  body,  are  the 

68 


THE  MECHANICAL  LAWS 

phenomena  of  habit,  and  it  would  really  seem 
as  though  its  effects  bore  a  certain  resemblance 
to  mechanical  causality.  (TTt  first  we  have 
mental  activity,  in  certain  cases,  at  all  events  ; 
actions  are  related  to  thought,  as  their 
generating  cause.  By  degrees,  they  fall  away 
from  thought,  and  jostle  one  another,  as  it 
were.  Thus,  in  certain  cases  and  with  certain 
men,  words  follow  one  another  without  being 
determined  by  thought ;  and  so  we  find 
inertia  and  mechanical  force  in  the  persistence 
of  our  states  of  consciousness  and  in  their 
mutual  influence.  This  view  may  not  follow 
from  an  induction  based  on  the  results  of 
science,  it  is  but  a  simple  analogy ;  still,  it 
constitutes  the  only  way  in  which  we  can 
point  to  the  reality  of  mechanical  action.  1  To 
our  mind,  it  is  the  degradation  of  true  action, 
it  is  activity  as  represented  by  a  link  between 
its  products,  and  thereby  released  and  set 
free  for  new  tasks.  If  such  actions  exist,  the 
mechanical  laws  are  the  form  we  attribute  to 
them,  for  the  purpose  of  subjecting  them 
to  mathematical  calculation.  And  so  we  se 
that  the  scientist  can  nowhere  find  the 
conditions  of  science  accurately  realized  in 
phenomena. 

69 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

One  final  question  :  do  the  mechanical  laws 
establish  an  absolute  determinism  ? 

I  There  are  few  men,  even  amongst  meta- 
physicians, who  accept  mechanical  deter- 
minism as  absolute.  It  is  generally  believed 
that  man  can  produce  movements  in  con- 
formity with  his  volitions.  In  the  very 
countries  where  determinism  is  professed  by 
eminent  philosophers,  teachers  and  all  who 
appeal  to  conscience  and  claim  to  regulate 
conduct,  affirm  the  existence  of  free-will 
and  of  its  power  over  things.  We  find  this 
the  case  in  England  as  well  as  in  Germany. 
Lit  is  more  difficult,  however,  to  prove  one's 
opinion,  than  to  convince  oneself  of  its  correct- 
ness.^ 

How -do  we  reason  when  we  attempt  to  lay 
aside  mechanical  necessity  ?  Common  sense 
acknowledges  that  the  soul  is  capable  of 
producing  movements ;  but  that  is  simply 
appearance  which  will  not  bear  investi- 
gation. I  The  soul,  it  is  said,  is  a  force  ; 
but  this  is  a  much  abused  word.  We  pass — 
without  saying  what  right  we  have  to  do  so — 
from  the  notion  of  moral  or  metaphysical 
force  to  that  of  mechanical  forceTf  If  the  soul 
is  a  force,  in  the  sense  in  which  it  must  be  for 

70 


THE  MECHANICAL  LAWS 

imparting  motion  to  a  body  by  virtue  of 
the  principle  of  inertia,  it  must  modify  the 
quantity  of  force  wherever  it  intervenes. 
But  this  in  itself  is  strange  and  contrary  to 
experience  and  induction,  which  show  us 
that  the  quantity  of  force  in  nature  is  constant. 
Are  we  to  say  that  the  soul  cancels  a  quantity 
of  force  exactly  equal  to  that  it  produces  ? 
Such  a  conception  would  appear  an  entirely 
arbitrary  one. 

We  find  philosophers  offering  us  a  subtler 
explanation  :  that  the  action  of  the  soul  upon 
the  body  is  real,  although  of  a  metaphysical, 
not  a  mechanical  nature.  Descartes  acknow- 
ledges that  the  quantity  of  motion  remains 
constant  throughout  nature,  but  that  the 
soul  may  change  the  direction  of  the  motion. 
The  mechanical  laws  remain  secure,  since, 
according  to  Descartes,  they  do  not  determine 
direction,  which  latter  must  come  from  some 
other  source.  In  spite  of  the  objections  of 
Leibnitz,  which  in  all  probability  are  not 
decisive,  this  expedient,  interpreted  in  more 
or  less  complicated  ways,  has  frequently  been 
reproduced.  Of  recent  years,  M.  Cournot, 
ascertaining  that  the  amount  of  power 
necessary  for  the  starting  of  a  machine  may 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

be  indefinitely  diminished,  recognizes  a  limit 
where  this  power  would  be  nil.  Then  it 
would  be  replaced  by  a  guiding  force,  belong- 
ing, for  instance,  to  organisms  or  to  thought. 
M.  Boussinesq  admitted  that  there  were 
cases  in  which  the  initial  state  of  a  system 
does  not  wholly  determine  the  course  which  the 
phenomenon  must  take.  There  would  then 
be  a  greater  or  less  number  of  bifurcations, 
making  possible  the  intervention  of  a  guiding 
force.  Here  the  action  attributed  by  Claude 
Bernard  to  life  as  a  guiding  idea,  would  find  a 
place ;  life  does  not  violate  the  mechanical 
laws,  but  it  communicates  to  movements  a 
direction  they  would  not  of  themselves  have 
taken. 

This  extremely  seductive  theory  was  up- 
held, as  we  see,  by  scientists  of  the  first  rank. 
It  cannot  be  said,  however,  that  it  succeeded 
in  becoming  adopted.  As  regards  passing  to 
the  limit,  that  is  an  expedient  which  offends 
the  reason,  and  one  which,  in  spite  of  appear- 
ances, does  not  seem  to  be  authorized  by 
mathematics.  This  latter  declares  A  equal  to 
B — in  so  far  as  their  difference  may  be  made 
smaller  than  any  given  quantity — only  when  A 
and  B  are  both  given  as  fixed,  determinate 

72 


THE  MECHANICAL  LAWS 

quantities.  A  distinction  is  made  between 
the  true  and  the  false  use  of  the  method  of 
limits.  Now,  however  small  the  force  neces- 
sary for  starting  a  machine  may  be  conceived 
as  being,  this  force  is  always  required,  it 
never  becomes  nil.  The  strange  solutions 
of  M.  Boussinesq  have  been  disputed  by 
several  mathematicians,  and  it  would  seem 
rash  to  regard  the  efficacy  of  freewill  as 
depending  upon  speculations  the  proof  of 
which  is  not  perfectly  evident. 

An  important  distinction,  however,  appears 
to  dominate  the  whole  question.  As  long 
as,  with  Descartes  and  even  Leibnitz,  we 
confine  ourselves  to  laying  down  laws  of 
invariability  or  constancy  regarding  quantity 
in  general,  there  is  necessarily  room  for 
indetermination.  The  constant  as  a  rule 
may  always  be  secured  in  several  ways. 
Newton,  however,  looked  upon  the  me- 
chanical laws  as  eliminating  this  element 
of  indetermination.  pFndeed,  Newton  is  not 
satisfied  with  an  abstract  law,  he  deter- 
mines the  quantity  and  direction  of  the 
motion  which  is  to  be  realized  in  each  case.] 
He  envelops  the  law  of  conservation  in  a 
concrete  law  which  indicates  the  mode  of  its 

73 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

application.  If  motion,  then,  is  modified, 
it  can  only  be  by  a  formal  derogation  of  law, 
by  a  miracle. 

There  is  a  particularly  metaphysical  way  of 
escaping  mechanical  determinism,  and  that 
consists — whilst  admitting  this  determinism 
for  external  phenomena — in  breaking  the 
bond  which  links  to  these  phenomena  the 
higher  forms  of  existence.  We  are  given  a 
relation  between  organic  movements  and 
intellectual  states.  Now,  if  a  determinate 
movement  corresponds  with  each  thought,  and 
if  movements  are  necessarily  linked  to  one 
another,  the  consequence  is  that  thoughts 
also  are  necessarily  linked  to  one  another.  It 
is  this  dependence  of  thought  as  regards 
movement  that  certain  philosophers  endeavour 
to  weaken  or  to  destroy  altogether.  Accord- 
ing to  this  view,  Descartes  acknowledged  that 
when  a  passion  is  brought  into  being  within  us 
as  the  result  of  some  external  action,  we  are 
not  condemned  to  become  wedded  to  the 
thoughts  called  up  by  this  passion.  He 
maintained  that  we  have  the  power  to  summon 
before  the  mind  different  thoughts,  and  to 
hold  them  there  by  means  of  attention.  For 
instance,  when  the  physical  body  impresses 

74 


THE  MECHANICAL   LAWS 

on  us  an  impulse  of  anger,  we  can  summon 
before  the  mind  ideas  of  justice,  moderation  and 
duty,  to  replace  ideas  of  vengeance.  Thought, 
then,  is  not  indissolubly  connected  with  the 
physical  organism.  In  one  sense,  Leibnitz 
goes  much  farther  than  Descartes  ;  he  breaks 
off  all  communication  between  body  and 
soul,  and  maintains  that  the  life  of  souls  would 
remain  the  same  even  if  all  bodies  were 
annihilated.  On  the  other  hand,  he  recog- 
nizes that  there  exists  pre-established  harmony 
and  exact  parallelism  between  bodies  and 
minds.  The  mind,  however,  is  not  therefore 
made  dependent  on  the  body.  It  is  the 
contrary  to  this  that  Leibnitz  has  in  view, 
for  he  regards  efficient  causes  as  dependent 
on  final  causes.  Kant  simply  abolishes 
all  connexion  between  the  moral  subject 
and  the  world  of  motion ;  he  regards  the 
noumenon,  which  is  entirely  free  from  the 
fetters  of  mechanism,  as  having  power  to 
determine  itself  in  an  absolutely  autonomous 
fashion. 

These  various  theories  are  either  ingeni- 
ous or  profound,  still,  hypothesis  has  a 
large  share  in  them.  In  the  first  place, 
how  is  it  known  that  the  bond  between 

75 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

the  mechanical  order  and  the  higher  orders 
is  loose,  or  liable  to  be  broken  ?  Then, 
too,  who  is  to  guarantee  that  the  orders  of 
things,  thus  superimposed  on  the  mechanical 
order,  will  not  themselves  also  be  deter- 
minisms, different,  it  may  be,  but  equally 
inflexible  ?  Still,  even  though  this  system 
were  admitted,  it  would  give  us  but  little 
satisfaction,  for  it  would  leave  quite  out  of 
our  control  the  world  of  motion  in  space,  i.e. 
the  world  in  which  we  are  living,  after  all, 
and  on  which  it  is  primarily  important  that 
we  should  be  able  to  act. 

Mechanical  conjunction,  it  must  be  recog- 
nized, is  the  most  perfect  form  of  determin- 
ism, for  it  represents  the  coincidence  of  experi- 
mental reality  with  mathematics.  But  what 
we  have  to  discover  is  whether  this  deter- 
minism should  be  transferred  from  the  explan- 
ation of  the  phenomena  it  governs  to  the  very 
beings  whose  manifestations  we  are  endea- 
vouring to  systematize.  When  we  ask  our- 
selves if  the  mode  in  which  bodies  act  on  one 
another  compromises  our  freedom,  we  are  mis- 
stating the  question.  Bodies  do  not  act  on 
one  another.  It  is  by  a  process  of  artificial 
construction  and  abstraction  that  we  isolate 

76 


THE  MECHANICAL  LAWS 

a  world  of  atoms  and  mechanical  forces,  and 
regard  it  as  self-sufficient.  In  reality,  this 
world  is  not  self-sufficient.  Not  only  cannot 
atoms  and  mechanical  causality  be  conceived 
without  a  mind  to  think  them,  but  mechanical 
movements  themselves  cannot  be  isolated  from 
the  physical  and  organic  phenomena  that  exist 
in  nature.  Do  we  know  whether  the  mechan- 
ical laws  are  the  cause  or  the  consequence 
of  the  other  laws  ?  If,  by  chance,  they  were 
the  consequence,  could  we  still  affirm  that  they 
are  rigorous  and  immutable  ?  If  there  really 
are  activities  in  nature,  they  are  quite 
different  from  the  so-called  action  of  one  body 
on  another,  which  is  nothing  but  a  numerical 
relation.  And  as  there  is  nothing  to  prove 
that  the  real  support  of  so-called  mechanical 
phenomena  is  itself  mechanical  and  subject  to 
determinism,  there  is  no  chain  to  be  broken  in 
order  to  enable  a  moral  influence  to  permeate 
what  is  called  the  world  of  matter  and  motion. 
Bodies,  in  their  reality,  resemble  us  already, 
otherwise  they  are  not  for  us.  The  distinc- 
tion between  laws  or  relations  and  phenomena 
or  elements,  copied  from  that  between  precepts 
will,  is  a  mental  artifice  for  the  reduction 
77 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

to  ideas  of  the  greatest  possible  amount  of 
given  reality.  In  being  itself,  this  distinction 
disappears,  and  with  it  the  determinism 
which  implies  it. 


78 


\/ 


VI 
THE   PHYSICAL   LAWS 

\X  7E  have  seen  that  experience  inter- 
V  V  venes,  as  an  essential  element,  in  the 
establishing  of  the  mechanical  laws.  And 
yet  these  laws  have  a  strictly  mathematical 
form.  1  If  they  could  exactly  realize,  without 
any  sacrifice  on  either  side,  the  synthesis 
of  the  rational  and  the  experimental,  they 
would  express  a  really  necessary  determinism. 
The  two  elements,  however,  are  not  so 
much  blended  with,  as  set  alongside  of,  each 
other  :  the  mathematical  element  in  the 
mechanical  laws  does  not  apply  exactly  to 
reality,  and  the  experimental  element  in 
them  remains  unknown  as  regards  its  nature 
and  cause.  Anyhow,  I  the"  harmony  between 
mathematics  and  the  experimental  borders 
near  enough  on  coincidence,  in  the  mechanical 
laws,  for  these  latter  to  be,  in  practice,  the 
most  perfect  model  we  possess  of  necessary 

79 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

determination.     We  will  now  look  into  the 

< 

nature  of  the  physical  laws,  and  see  whether 
they    are    but    one    particular    instance    of 
t  mechanical    determination,    or    possess    an 
1  originality  and  meaning  of  their  ownj 

Man's  first  feeling  was  a  consideration  of 
the  physical  qualities  which  our  senses  reveal 
as  inherent  in  bodies  themselves ;  evidently, 
when  thus  regarded,  physical  phenomena 
cannot  be  reduced  to  mechanical  phenomena. 
From  this  point  of  view,  change  implies  a 
destruction  and  a  production  of  substantial 
forms  that  is  opposed  to  the  homogeneity 
and  continuity  of  strictly  mechanical  pheno- 
mena. This  method  of  enquiry,  however,  is 
very  unfavourable  to  science  ;  for  things,  when 
envisaged  in  this  light,  lend  themselves  but 
feebly  to  the  application  of  mathematics. 
[Consequently,  the  revolution  that  Descartes 
effected  was  useful  in  that  it  divested  things  of 
sensible  qualities,  which  latter  it  attributed  to 
the  knowing  sub j  ect .  Descartes  regarded  clear- 
ness of  ideas  as  indicative  of  their  truth. f  Now, 
sensible  quality  is  not  an  object  of  clear  ideas ; 
consequently,  it  cannot  exist  as  it  appears  to 
us.  On  the  other  hand,  extension  and  mo- 
tion are  objects  of  clear  ideas.  Besides,  we 

80 


THE  PHYSICAL  LAWS 

have  a  natural  tendency  to  refer  our  sensa- 
tions to  things  in  extension  as  being  their 
cause.  In  virtue,  then,  of  divine  truth, 
this  tendency  must  be  a  law  unto  us,  and 
so  we  will  affirm,  d  priori,  that  exten- 
sion and  motion  must  suffice  to  explain 
all  the  phenomena  of  nature.  Physics  is 
thus  nothing  more  than  a  continuation  of 
mechanics. 

This  theory  could  not  be  applied  off-hand 
to  facts ;  and  so,  in  the  eighteenth  century, 
special  physical  agents  were  superimposed  on 
motion.  Electricity  was  explained  by  two 
contrary  fluids ;  light,  heat,  and  magnetism 
were  explained  by  distinct,  separate  fluids. 
[Still,  the  Cartesian  principle  was  never  alto- 
gether abandoned  :  it  continued  to  indicate 
the  ideal  of  perfect  science. 

At  the  present  time,  we  are  once  again 
tending  to  eliminate  qualities  and  reduce  the 
physical  to  the  mechanical.  This  is  proved 
by  the  mechanical  theory  of  heat.  In  con- 
formity with  the  Cartesian  tradition,  many 
scientists  regard  motion  as  an  all-sufficient 
explanation  of  every  physical  phenomenon ; 
as  Tyndall  said  :  heat  is  motion.  Still,  the 
most  recent  works  of  contemporary  physicists 

81  F  ^ 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

/  show  a  certain  mistrust  of  this  theory.  The 
reproach  is  made  that  it  leads  the  scientist 
too  much  to  reason  deductively  and  to  be  too 
/  metaphysical^  When  we  say  that  heat  is 
motion,  are  we  not  actually  pronouncing  on 
the  very  nature  of  heat  ?  Recognizing 
this,  Lippmann  was  careful  to  substitute 
for  the  expression  "mechanical  theory  of 
heat/'  that  of  "  thermodynamics,"  which 
does  not  forejudge  the  nature  of  heat; 
he  also  endeavoured  to  discover,  not  the 
essence  of  calorific  phenomena,  but  simply 
their  laws.  We  ought,  then,  to  enquire 
whether,  in  accordance  with  the  conclusions 
of  modern  science,  there  would  appear  to  be 
in  physics  some  element  that  cannot  be  re- 
duced to  mechanics,  or  whether,  in  the  object 
of  these  two  sciences,  there  is  anything  more 
than  a  difference  in  complexity  and  degree. 
The  essential  character  of  a  mechanical 
phenomenon  is  reversibility.  In  abstract 
or  theoretical  mechanics,  a  moving  body 
which  has  just  gone  over  the  path  A  B  must 
return  exactly  along  the  same  positions, 
from  B  to  A,  if  the  direction  of  the  motion 
is  changed.  The  conditions  of  abstract 
mechanics  being  sensibly  realized  in  celestial 

82 


THE  PHYSICAL  LAWS 

mechanics,  it  is  possible  to  say  that  if  the 
direction  in  which  a  heavenly  body  moves 
were  to  be  changed,  this  heavenly  body  would 
return  exactly  along  the  same  points ;  it 
would  describe,  for  instance,  an  identical 
ellipse.  But  in  concrete  mechanics,  which  is 
actually  physics,  since  all  power  generates 
heat,  reversibility  is  hindered  or  impeded  by 
friction.  Now,  this  difference  is  a  general 
one  :  no  physical  phenomenon  can  be  repro- 
duced in  identical  fashion  if  its  direction  is 
changed.  For  instance,  in  the  ordinary 
atmosphere,  a  pendulum  going  from  A  to  B, 
will  have  a  certain  resistance  to  overcome  ; 
to  do  this,  it  will  have  to  produce  power ; 
in  producing  power,  it  will  lose  a  portion  of 
its  energy.  If,  then,  the  direction  of  the 
motion  is  changed,  this  moving  body  will  not 
return  to  the  starting-point,  since  it  has 
already  lost  energy  on  the  outward  track 
and  will  again  lose  energy  on  the  return 
track.  It  may  be  set  down  as  a  rule  without 
exception,  that  wherever  there  is  expenditure 
of  effort,  there  is  both  production  of  heat  and 
irreparable  loss  of  the  original  condition. 
This  law  introduces  into  physics  an  element 
quite  different  from  those  of  mechanics.  In 

83 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

mechanics,  we  are  considering  a  force  which 
always  maintains  the  same  nature  and  the 
same  quality  ;  in  physics,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  quality  is  different :  the  expenditure  of 
effort  is  higher  in  quality  than  heat,  heat  at 
100°  is  higher  in  quality  than  heat  at  99°. 
Heat  never  wholly  reconstitutes  the  expendi- 
ture of  effort  which  gave  birth  to  it ;  the 
amount  of  energy  is  continually  decreasing, 
according  to  the  principle  of  Clausius ;  the 
phenomena  are  irreversible,  the  ultimate 
result  is  always  a  falling  off.  What  does  all 
this  mean,  if  not  that  physics  cannot  leave 
quality  out  of  account,  quality  as  thus 
understood,  at  all  events  ?  This  was  Cornu's 
maxim  :  in  physics,  he  said,  we  have  to 
consider  not  only  the  quantity  of  energy,  but 
also  its  quality.  The  physical  laws,  then, 
cannot  be  reduced  to  the  mechanical  laws ; 
a  new  element  intervenes ;  quality.  Of 
course,  this  is  no  longer  scholastic  quality ; 
still,  it  is  an  element  of  differentiation  and 
heterogeneity. 

Let  us  now  try  to  discover  what  it  is,  in 
reality,  that  corresponds  to  the  physical 
laws,  and  how  far  we  may  regard  them  as 
existing  objectively. 


THE   PHYSICAL  LAWS 

When  the  mechanical  theory  of  heat  was 
established  in  science,  philosophers  thought 
they  could  turn  it  to  considerable  account. 
The  law  of  the  equivalence  of  effort-expendi- 
ture and  heat  was  regarded  as  an  instance  of 
the  general  law  governing  the  transformation  of 
natural  forces.  They  thought  it  would  estab- 
lish continuity  between  the  most  seemingly 
heterogeneous  things.  f~ Indeed,  if  motion  can 
be  changed  into  heat,  why  should  heat  not 
be  changed  into  vital  force,  and  this  latter 
into  thought  ?  All  can  be  changed  into  all, 
and  the  dream  of  Heraclitus  is  realized ; 
transmutation,  which  the  alchemists  sought 
after  in  metals  alone,  becomes  the  universal 

^^ 

law  of  nature. 

Renouvier,  'with  considerable  precision, 
showed  the  superficiality  of  this  interpreta- 
tion. The  law  in  question,  instead  of  prov- 
ing the  possibility  of  transformations,  ex- 
cludes them.  Indeed,  it  is  obtained  only  by 
eliminating  the  heterogeneous  and  consider- 
ing the  homogeneous  side  of  things.  The 
physicist  lays  aside  the  best  part  of  the 
essence  of  physical  phenomena,  leaving  it 
to  the  physiologist,  the  psychologist  or 
the  metaphysician ;  the  laws  he  positsdeal 

85 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

only  with  the  quantitative  relations  which- 
may  be  found  on  the  surface  of  these 
phenomena.  Instead  of  there  being  any 
transformation  in  physical  production,  as 
the  scientist  considers  to  be  the  case,  there 
is  a  passing  from  the  same  to  the  same,  a 
passing  from  one  distribution  of  energy  to 
another  equivalent  distribution. 

^  [~Ajid  ye*>  what  is  it  that  is  conserved  in 
nature  if  not  a  force  capable  of  assuming 
all  kinds  of  forms  ?  Spencer  regarded  the 
reality  of  such  a  force  as  no  less  assured  than 
the  impossibility  of  becoming  acquainted 
with  its  essence ;  to  establish  this  dual 
characteristic  of  universal  force,  he  invoked 
the  conditions  of  our  consciousness  and  mental 
constitution.  The  force  of  which  we  assert 
persistence  is  that  Absolute  Force  we  are 
obliged  to  postulate  as  the  necessary  correlative 
of  the  force  we  are  conscious  of.  .  .  .  In 
asserting  it,  we  assert  an  Unconditioned 
Reality,  without  beginning  or  end.  Thus, 
quite  unexpectedly,  we  come  down  once  more 
to  ...  the  continued  existence  of  an  Unknow- 
able as  the  necessary  correlative  of  the  Know- 

/  able  (First  Principles,  §  62,  etc.).  j  But  then,  as 
Dauriac  stated  in  his  remarkable  work  Des 

86 


THE  PHYSICAL  LAWS 

notions  de  mati&re  et  de  force  dans  les  sciences 
de  la  nature,  if  that  which  is  conserved  is 
unknowable,  how  do  we  know  that  it  persists  ? 
Either  this  transcendent  principle  has  no- 
thing in  common  with  the  forces  with  which 
science  deals,  and  its  so-called  persistence 
explains  nothing ;  or  else  it  is  the  substance 
of  the  forces  with  which  we  are  acquainted, 
and,  in  affirming  its  persistence,  we  are  really 
affirming  that  transmutation  of  forces  which 
there  is  nothing  in  science  to  warrant  us  in 
admitting. 

According  to  Renouvier,  that  which  is 
conserved  is,  strictly  speaking,  kinetic  energy. 
But  then,  as  we  have  seen,  physicists  nowa- 
days are  diffident  of  reducing  phenomena  to 
motion.  There  are  even  mathematicians 
who  consider  the  two  principles  of  thermo- 
dynamics as  incompatible  with  mechanism. 
The  energy,  that  is  conserved,  at  the  same 
time  changes  its  nature,  and  its  quality  is 
continually  diminishing.  In  reality,  the 
principle  of  the  conservation  of  energy  is 
rather  a  mould  or  matrix  of  law  than  a 
single,  determinate  law.  Whenever  we  con- 
sider a  "  closed-in  ".  system,  there  is  some- 
thing conserved  in  it.  This  something  will 

87 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

vary,  according  as  the  system  is  conceived  as 
being  formed  of  mechanical,  of  physical  or 
of  chemical  forces. 

There  remains  to  be  explained  the  concept 
of  permanence.  In  this  connexion,  Helm- 
holtz  says  that  the  question  is  not  whether 
all  the  facts  can  really  be  reduced  to  constant 
causes,  but  rather  that  science,  in  so  far  as  it 
insists  on  conceiving  nature  to  be  intelligible, 
must  admit  the  possibility  of  such  reduction, 
if  only  in  order  to  acquire  the  unexception- 
able certainty  that  our  knowledge  is  limited 
(Mem.  sur  la  conservation  de  la  force,  Introd.). 
The  principle  of  the  conservation  of  force, 
therefore,  is,  for  science,  a  guiding  idea, 
necessary  in  a  way.  But  there  is  nothing  to 
warrant  that  this  law,  as  such,  is  inherent 
in  the  nature  of  things.  In  its  profitable 
form,  *it  is  not  known  A  priori,  nor  does  it 
obtrude  upon  the  mind.  It  was  discovered  by 
means  of  experiments  and  analyses,  and  conse- 
quently is  essentially  experimental  and  induc- 
tive. :There  is  something  artificial  about  it,  like  \/ 
all  induction,  and  it  is  difficult  to  conceive 
of  it  as  being  absolute.  Indeed,  given  an 
ensemble  of  forces,  either  this  system  offers 
solutions  of  continuity,  or  it  is  shut  in  on  all 

88  »  . 


THE   PHYSICAL  LAWS 

sides.  If  it  is  open  to  external  influences, 
these  may  thwart  the  law,  which,  in  that 
case,  will  be  realized  only  in  so  far  as  the 
external  influences  are  feeble  and  negligible. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  system  is  "  closed- 
in,"  the  law  of  conservation  is  conceived  only 
as  co-existing  with  some  cause  of  change. 
In  order  that  energy  may  be  conserved 
through  the  changes,  then  changes  must 
take  place.  And  if  we  would  conceive  things 
in  their  reality,  we  cannot  separate  conserva- 
tion and  change  from  each  other,  as  we  do 
the  ingredients  of  a  purely  physical  mixture. 
True,  along  with  the  laws  of  conservation  we 
have  laws  of  change,  such  as  the  principle 
of  Clausius.  These  laws,  however,  are  neither 
reducible  to  the  law  of  conservation  nor 
adequate  for  determining  the  phenomena  with 
any  degree  of  precision.  The  negative  form 
of  the  principle  of  Clausius  actually  prevents 
this  principle  from  generating  a  complete 
determination. 

What,  in  short,  as  regards  the  problem  of 
necessity,  is  the  meaning  of  the  physical 
laws  ?  To  answer  this  question,  let  us  return 
to  the  distinction  drawn  between  the  laws  of 
conservation  and  those  of  change.  The  for- 

89 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

mer  are  built  up  on  the  type  of  the  mathema- 
tical laws ;  they  are  absolute,  they  set  forth 
precise  conditions,  they  are  or  they  are  not. 
They  establish  only  a  negative  necessity, 
however.  They  are,  in  our  opinion,  barriers 
analogous  to  those  formed  by  the  logical  laws, 
only  closer  and  nearer  to  things  :  they  leave  the 
phenomena  partially  indeterminate.  Indeed, 
we  must  guard  against  confusing  determinism 
with  necessity :  necessity  expresses  the  im- 
J  possibility  of  a  thing  being  different  from  what 
it  is ;  determinism  expresses  the  sum  total 
of  the  conditions  which  make  it  necessary 
for  the  phenomenon  to  be  stated  just  as 
it  is,  with  all  its  modes  of  being.  The  law 
of  conservation  is  one  of  abstract  necessity, 
not  a  law  of  determinism ;  on  the  other 
hand,  any  law  which,  like  the  principle  of 
Clausius,  governs  the  distribution  of  force, 
is  really  a  law  of  determinism,  though  it  is 
and  remains  exclusively  experimental.  Such 
a  law  is  no  longer,  like  the  law  of  conserva- 
/  tion,  a  condition  of  intelligibility.  (""There 
would  be  nothing  shocking  to  the  mind  if 
bodies  were  to  attract  one  another  in  inverse 
ratio  to  their  distance,  instead  of  doing  this 
in  inverse  ratio  to  the  square  of  the  distance.  j 

9° 


THE    PHYSICAL  LAWS 

The  laws  of  determinism,  purely  experi- 
mental as  they  are,  do  not  claim  to  be  abso- 
lutely exact  and  rigid.  Of  themselves,  they 
cannot  denote  a  necessary  concatenation. 
They  would  become  laws  of  necessity  only  if 
they  were  reducible  to  the  laws  of  conserva- 
tion, and  finally  to  the  formula  A  is  A  ;  or, 
at  all  events,  if  we  had  solid  grounds  for 
believing  that  they  could,  by  right,  be  reduced 
thereto.  This  reduction,  however,  to  unity, 
of  the  experimental  and  the  logical,  we  find 
impossible.  Either  necessity  without  deter- 
minism or  determinism  without  necessity ; 
such  is  the  dilemma  confronting  us. 

Still,  it  will  be  urged,  since  our  laws  can  be 
verified,  it  is  at  least  natural  and  morally 
necessary  to  regard  them  as  immutable. 
Such  a  conclusion,  most  certainly,  super- 
sedes experience.  We  do  not  know 
whether  the  physical  laws  are  fundamental  V 
and  primal  or  whether  they  are  merely  resul- 
tants. When  questioned  on  this  point,  the 
physicists  would  either  refuse  to  answer  or 
would  incline  to  the  latter  view.  The  very 
law  of  gravitation  itself  was  not  regarded  by 
Newton  as  a  primary  law.  He  refused, 
however,  to  investigate  its  causes,  alleging 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

that  he  had  no  hypotheses  to  set  up.  We 
isolate  these  laws  for  convenience  of  study, 
and  because  experience  obviously  authorizes 
us  to  do  so.  But  how  are  we  to  know  that 
they  form  an  absolute,  that  thus  we  have  a 
self-sufficient  side  of  nature,  one  that  is  not 
influenced  by  the  rest  ?  Are  all  these  ele- 
ments of  reality,  the  qualities  and  forms  of 
being,  which  have  had  to  be  eliminated  in 
establishing  physics  as  a  science,  really 
inactive,  high  above  the  measurable  magni- 
tudes isolated  by  science,  like  the  gods  of 
Epicurus,  far  above  this  world  of  ours  ?  Does 
not  thought,  as  well  as  the  sense  of  reality, 
require  that  the  different  elements  of  the 
world  should  condition  one  another,  for  the 
world  to  be  a  unity  ?  And  if,  in  reality,  the 
physical  laws  are  not  independent  of  the 
other  laws  that  may  lie  concealed  in  nature, 
how  can  we  affirm  that  they  are  immutable 
and  inflexible  ?  Possibly  they  are  formed  by 
evolution,  as  is  said  nowadays  regarding  animal 
species ;  possibly  their  fixity  is  a  contingent 
state  of  things,  not  a  necessity.  It  is  not  legiti- 
mate to  take  literally  this  determinism,  which 
recognizes  no  cause  for  a  physical  phenomenon, 
other  than  some  equally  physical  phenomenon, 

92 


THE   PHYSICAL  LAWS 

since  such  phenomena  are  but  abstractions, 
and  true  action,  if  it  does  exist  in  nature,  is 
something  very  much  more  complex. 

To  sum  up,  consideration  of  the  physic* 
laws,  when  compared  with  that  of  the  purel] 
mechanical  laws,  marks  a  certain  pr ogres 
in  determinism,  in  the  sense  that  modes  oi 
being  which  mechanics  left  indeterminate, 
are  now  explained  according  to  laws.  In 
becoming  narrower,  however,  determinism 
becomes  more  complex  and  obscure,  and  less 
reducible  to  that  analytical  relationship  which 
alone  would  appear  to  constitute  necessity. 


93 


VII 
THE   CHEMICAL   LAWS 

THE  sciences  with  which  we  have  hitherto 
dealt  had  all,  though  in  differing  de- 
grees, an  abstract  object ;  they  considered 
existing  properties,  but  not  beings  of  nature. 
Chemistry,  on  the  other  hand,  takes  account 
of  concrete  bodies  existing  in  themselves. 
The  result  would  seem  to  be  that  this  science, 
from  the  philosophical  point  of  view,  has  a 
wider  range  than  the  former  ones,  and  that 
the  determinism  of  the  chemical  laws  pene- 
trates more  deeply  into  the  essence  of  things. 
Let  us  now  see  if  this  is  really  so. 

Chemistry  is  a  comparatively  recent 
science.  As  shown  in  the  profound  and 
learned  work  of  Berthelot  on  Les  Origines 
de  I'Alchimie,  the  transformations  of  bodies 
were  first  explained  by  the  spontaneous 
action,  either  of  supernatural  powers,  or  of 
a  (f)utrt9  which  again  was  a  kind  of  divine 
instinct,  working  apart  from  the  mechanical 

94 


THE  CHEMICAL  LAWS 

laws.  We  find  alchemy  intervening  between 
this  more  or  less  theological  period  and 
the  present  scientific  period.  According  to 
the  alchemists,  man  must  be  permitted,  by 
every  human  and  divine  law,  to  utilize  the 
forces  of  nature,  and  this  is  possible  for  him. 
The  way  to  do  it  is  to  rely  on  nature  her- 
self :  Natum  a  natura  vincitur.  Their  theory 
is  as  follows.  On  the  one  hand,  the  corporeal 
elements  are  susceptible  of  transmutation ; 
on  the  other,  this  transmutation  admits  of 
rotation,  a  circular  process  which  returns  to 
its  starting-point.  A  serpent  biting  its  tail 
is  the  symbol  adopted  by  the  alchemists. 
The  former  of  these  two  principles  may  be 
confirmed  by  immediate  experience ;  in  a 
chemical  transformation,  we  note  a  complete 
change  of  qualitative  properties.  /"But  the 
alchemists,  confining  themselves  to  immediate 
observation,  were  mistaken  as  regards  the 
simple  and  the  compound.  They  looked  upon 
the  simple  as  that  which  is  given,  and  the 
compound  as  that  which  is  formed  from  the 
given.  This  identification  of  the  given  with 
the  simple  is  an  error  identical  to  that  which  we 
find  in  the  philosophy  of  Locke,  for  whom 
the  simple  was  the  given  sensation,  and  the 

95 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

compound  the  idea  resulting  from  it.  The 
second  principle  of  the  alchemists  also  con- 
forms with  crude  experience.  Indeed,  start- 
ing with  metallic  oxide,  metal  can  be  ob- 
tained ;  and,  in  the  same  way,  if  we  heat  the 
metal,  the  latter  becomes  an  oxide  once  again.] 
It  was  Lavoisier  who,  when  tracing  the 
real  principles  of  chemistry,  brought  this 
science  to  its  present  condition  (see  Berthe- 
lot's  Notice  historique  sur  Lavoisier').  In  the 
first  place,  he  established  the  fact  that,  in 
chemical  transformations,  not  only  does 
matter  generally  remain  constant  in  quantity, 
but  that  even  the  special  bodies  on  which  the 
chemist  operates  remain  unchanged  in  weight. 
(Showing  that  the  calcination  of  metals  re- 
sulted from  the  union  of  the  metal  with  a  por- 
tion of  the  surrounding  air,  and  not  from  a  loss 
of  phlogiston,  he  proved  the  metal  to  be  the 
simple  and  the  oxide  the  compound,  thus 
changing  the  very  foundations  of  the  science. 
And  in  the  second  place,  according  to  Lavoi- 
sier, special  simple  bodies,  defined  by  their 
weight,  must  suffice  to  explain  the  forma- 
tion of  compounds.  He  offered  a  notable 
instance  of  this,  explaining  the  composition 
of  water  by  the  combination  of  hydrogen 

96  / 


THE   CHEMICAL  LAWS 

and  oxygen.  Such  mysterious  substances 
as  phlogiston  were  altogether  eliminated. 
Thus,  the  so-called  simple  bodies  set  a 
limit  on  the  decomposition  and  suffice  for  the 
reconstitution  of  the  given  bodies."!  And  so 
chemistry  transfers  to  the  species  of  bodies 
that  permanence  which  mechanics  attributed 
only  to  force  considered  generally. 

The  result  is  a  most  important  difference 
between  physics  and  chemistry.  Is  this  irre- 
ducibility  an  absolute  one  ?  The  different 
theories  aim  at  lessening  it  as  much  as 
possible.  According  to  the  atomic  theory, 
atoms,  differing  simply  in  weight,  form  and 
valence,  by  their  various  arrangements 
suffice  to  account  for  chemical  phenomena. 
But  these  differences,  especially  that  of 
valence,  still  constitute  specific  differences. 
This  latter  difference,  which  concerns  the 
number  of  atoms  susceptible  of  associating  to 
form  a  molecule,  cannot  be  reduced  to  physical 
or  mechanical  properties.  For  instance,  in 
gravitation,  a  mechanical  force,  mass  and  dis- 
tance alone  enter  into  account.  Moreover, 
the  atomic  theory  of  itself  is  powerless  to 
reproduce  the  variety  and  complication  of 
nature.  Its  complications  are  all  to  no  pur- 

97  G 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

pose  :  the  possibility  of  atoms  exchanging 
semi-valences  with  one  another,  of  atoms 
possessing  four  dimensions  (that  of  azote, 
for  instance),  the  mutual  incommensurability 
of  their  weights.  There  is  continually  hover- 
ing above  the  atomic  theory  that  dim  mist 
of  approximation  which,  according  to  Berthe- 
lot,  casts  a  shadow  over  the  whole  system. 
For  the  present,  we  may  conclude  that  chemis- 
try is  really  distinct  from  physics,  in  so  far 
as  it  admits  of  distinct  species  of  bodies,  the 
substratum  of  that  profound  chemical  change 
which  observation  distinguishes  from  mere 
physical  change. 

What  is  the  objective  value  of  the  chemical 
laws  ?  If  some  day  chemistry  comes  to  be 
wholly  reducible  to  physics,  the  reproach  to 
which  this  latter  lays  itself  open,  that  it  is  an 
abstract  science  when  regarded  as  a  science 
of  being,  will  be  brought  against  the  former 
also.  But  the  atomic  theory  claims,  as 
interpreted  by  some  philosophers  who  have 
adopted  it,  to  explain,  as  regards  its  general 
form,  the  real  constitution  of  matter.  Let  us 
examine  if  such  a  claim  can  be  made  for  it. 

Modern  atomists  take  for  their  starting-point 
Newton's  principle  :  "  By  effects  to  come  to  know 

98 


THE   CHEMICAL  LAWS 

causes,"  and,  basing  their  conclusions  on  ex- 
perience and  induction,  they  think  they  can 
proceed  from  phenomena  to  being.  But  then, 
the  atomic  theory  would  first  have  to  be  pre- 
cise and  homogeneous  for  it  to  be  capable  of 
being  regarded  as  a  doctrine  of  being  itself. 
Now,  the  difficulties  we  have  mentioned  above, 
especially  as  regards  valence,  show  that  the 
very  idea  of  atom  has  not  been  definitely 
established.  Stallo,  the  author  of  a  learned 
work  on  La  matiere  et  la  physique  moderne, 
shows  that  chemists  cannot  guarantee  the 
homogeneity,  hardness  and  inertia  of  the 
atom,  though  these  are  all  essential  elements 
in  its  definition.  Chemists  also  tell  us  of  an 
energy  of  position,  distinct  from  kinetic  energy, 
and  the  reality  of  which  it  is  no  easy  matter  to 
reconcile  with  the  principles  of  atomism.  The 
truth  would  appear  to  be  that  this  theory 
has  been  of  great  service,  that  it  is  valuable 
as  a  symbolic  representation  and  doubtless 
the  best  we  possess,  but  that  it  has  no  claim 
to  determine  metaphysically  the  nature  of 
things. 

We  may  go  further  and  say  :  even  were 
there  a  more  complete  coincidence  between 
facts  and  theory,  we  should  still  have  no  right 

99 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

to  regard  atomism  as  a  theory  of  being.  In- 
deed, the  principle  ab  effectibus  ad  causas 
never  offers  anything  but  a  subjective  expla- 
nation. The  atom  cannot  be  known  by  the 
senses  :  it  is  conceived  of  only  by  the  aid  of 
hypothetical  reasoning.  Now,  such  reasoning 
never  attains  to  anything  more  than  pos- 
sibility, the  sufficient,  or  apparently  sufficient 
condition,  given  the  facts  at  our  disposal ;  it 
never  reaches  the  necessary  condition.  Speak- 
ing of  the  objections  to  which  the  atomic 
theory  may  give  rise,  M.  Friedel  alleges  that 
no  physicist  is  as  yet  disposed  to  throw  over- 
board the  undulatory  theory  of  light,  on 
account  of  the  grave  difficulties,  and  even  con- 
tradictions, which  the  conception  of  luminous 
ether  offers.  In  the  same  way,  he  said,  it  is 
better  to  continue  to  use  a  theory  which  has 
enabled  a  vast  number  of  facts  to  be  grouped 
together,  and  which  daily  leads  to  the  discovery 
of  fresh  ones.  Such  language  is  a  tolerably 
clear  indication  that  there  is  no  intention,  in 
the  name  of  science,  of  setting  up  atomism  as 
absolute  truth. 

Metaphysics,  however,  supports  this  theory, 
and  claims  to  bring  it  the  aid  which  science 
neither  can  nor  will  afford.  In  a  general 

100 


THE  CHEMICAL  LAWS 

way,  it  is  maintained  that  the  atom  is  the 
element  which  unites  reality  and  intel- 
ligibility in  the  highest  possible  degree. 
The  atom,  it  is  said,  is  real,  for  it  is  determi- 
nate, both  in  bulk,  in  magnitude  and  in 
shape  ;  it  is  intelligible,  for  it  is  defined  by 
the  qualities  we  conceive  most  clearly  :  the 
geometrical  qualities.  Moreover,  we  need  only 
conceive  of  the  sensible  qualities  as  connected 
with  the  properties  of  atoms,  to  explain,  by 
means  of  these  latter,  the  changes  which 
seem  to  be  effected  in  the  nature  of  bodies. 
The  atom,  then,  is  both  intelligible  and  a 
principle  of  intelligibility. 

But  these  affirmations  are  open  to  criti- 
cism. First  of  all,  we  cannot  explain  the 
endless  variety  of  things  by  means'  of  the 
atom,  without  making  of  this  latter  a  more 
or  less  extra-scientific  notion.  Thus,  some 
scientists  consider  that  the  extended  atom 
cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  centrifugal 
force  implied  in  the  relations  between  atoms 
at  short  distances  from  one  another ;  they 
reduce  the  atom  to  nothing  more  than  a 
centre  of  force,  devoid  of  extension  and  yet 
situated  in  space.  Such  was  the  hypothesis  of 
Boscovich,  revived  by  scientists  like  Ampere, 

10 1 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

Cauchy  and  Carnot  (see  Pillon's  fine  article 
on  "  I'Evolution  historique  de  Tatomisme/'  in 
the  Annee  philosophique  for  1891).  On  the 
other  hand,  in  order  to  explain  by  the  combi- 
nation of  atoms  the  phenomena  of  sensation 
and  thought,  certain  metaphysicians  endow 
the  atom  with  psychic  as  well  as  with  mechani- 
cal and  physical  properties.  For  instance,  in 
the  system  of  Epicurus,  we  find  the  clinamen, 
which,  after  all,  is  no  more  than  an  ebauche 
of  free-will.  In  modern  times,  atomism 
entered  on  a  new  phase  with  Locke,  as  Pillon 
has  shown  in  the  above-mentioned  article. 
God  is  omnipotent,  says  Locke,  and  therefore, 
without  contradicting  himself,  he  can  endow 
the  atom  with  both  extension  and  thought. 
Following  the  lead  that  Locke  gave  to 
atomism,  Maupertuis  attributes  to  the  atom 
a  rudiment  of  sensibility  and  thought,  apart 
from  physical  qualities.  This  point  of  view 
is  also  seen  in  a  scientist  like  Haeckel,  who 
regards  the  atom  as  animated,  and  looks 
upon  the  elective  affinity  of  bodies  as  a 
manifestation  of  tendencies,  sensations  and 
volitions. 

And  so,  by  varying  at  will  our  idea  of  the 
atom,  we  have  come  to  regard  it  as  explain- 

102 


THE  CHEMICAL   LAWS 

ing  everything ;  though  at  the  same  time  we 
have  made  this  explanation  anything  but  con- 
vincing. ["Speaking  generally,  atomism  can 
give  a  reason  for  everything,  provided  it  endow 
the  atom  with  the  very  thing  that  has  to  be 
explained!]  Now,  this  way  of  developing  ato- 
mism contradicts  its  principle,  which  is  essen- 
tially one  of  economy,  in  more  precise  terms, 
the  idea  of  explaining  the  higher  by  the  lower, 
the  appearance  of  finality  by  mechanism, 
mind  by  matter. 

To  return  to  atomism  strictly  so  called, 
i.e.  to  geometrical  atomism,  are  we  certain 
that  it  reconciles  intelligibility  with  reality  ? 

The  starting-point  of  modern  atomism  is 
the  Newtonian  distinction  between  space  and 
bodies.  Space  is  nothing  else  than  a  vacuum, 
and  a  vacuum  is  unthinkable.  Bodies  are 
magnitudes,  but  they  cannot  be  measured 
absolutely,  for  we  have  no  absolute  unit  of 
measurement  and  we  cannot  compare  the 
atom  with  the  point  in  mathematics,  without 
falling  into  the  insuperable  difficulties  of  the 
infinite.  Extension  is  never  anything  but  a 
relation.  It  is  the  same  with  weight :  weight 
is  a  relation  depending  on  terrestrial  attrac- 
tion. In  a  general  way,  we  only  make  use  of 

103 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

experience  in  order  to  determine  the  size  or 
the  mass  of  atoms.   Now,  experience  can  offer 
us  no  more  than  the  relative.     Thus,  doubt- 
less, the  notion  of  the  atom  is  clear  and  evi- 
dent,  so  long  as  we   are   dealing  with    the 
abstract,  but  when  we  wish  to  determine  the 
atom  with  reference  to  its  location  in  space, 
its  form,  extension  or  weight,  thought  finds 
itself  faced  with  a  mere  relationship,   pro- 
ceeding from  an  insuperable  indetermination. 
f     After  all,  the  atomic  theory  offers  us  no- 
thing else  than  the  imaginative  scheme  of 
the  notion  of  law,  just  as  a  curve  represents 
to  the  eye  the  variations  in  temperature  or 
the  increase  or    diminution  of  the  popula- 
tion.    By  definition,  a  natural  law  is  a  con- 
stant relation  between  two  definite,  immu- 
table terms  ;  a  couple  of  atoms  whose  mutual 
action  depends  solely  on  their  distance  well 
represents  this    relation.     Adequately  deter- 
mined, the  atom  supplies  schemes  that  cor- 
respond to  the  physical  and  chemical  laws, 
which  are  conceived  after  the  model  of  the 
mechanical  laws.   This  representation  is  a  very 
natural  and  convenient  one,   though  relative 
to  our  imagination,  for  which  it  has   been 
constructed.     A  metaphor  is  not  a  being. 

104 


THE  CHEMICAL  LAWS 

What,  in  short,  is  the  meaning  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  chemistry  as  regards  determinism  ? 
It  is  noteworthy  that,  in  antiquity,  atomism 
was  a  doctrine  of  atheism,  or,  at  all  events, 
of  the  non-intervention  of  the  gods  ;  whereas, 
in  the  case  of  the  moderns,  it  does  not,  as 
a  rule,  exclude  religious  beliefs.  Newton 
closely  connects  the  idea  of  God  with  the 
nature  of  space  and  of  the  mechanical  laws  of 
the  universe.  Boscovich  is  a  spiritualist ; 
he  subordinates  the  existence  of  the  world, 
which  he  regards  as  contingent,  to  the  will 
or  arbitrament  of  an  infinite  power.  This 
difference  would  appear  to  result  from  the 
notion  that  has  been  formed  of  inertia.  iTn- 
deed,  the  atomists  of  old  admitted  that  matter 
possesses  within  itself  a  principle  of  motion  : 
therefore  they  had  no  need  of  the  workings 
of  a  God.  The  moderns,  on  the  other  hand, 
consider  mass  and  motion  separately,  and 
look  upon  them  as  independent  of  each  other. 
Therefore  their  union  may  seem  to  require 
the  intervention  of  a  supernatural  power. 
A  God  is  needed  to  give  a  start,  an  impetus/] 

In  spite  of  numerous  examples  of  recon- 
ciliation between  atomism  and  religious  be- 
liefs, it  seems  correct  to  say  that  atomism, 

105 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

speaking  generally,  remains  hostile  to 
ideas  of  providence  and  freedom.  Indeed, 
its  tendency  is  to  explain  the  more  by  the 
less  ;  and  so  it  endows  atoms  with  the  fewest 
possible  qualities,  those,  too,  that  are  farthest 
removed  from  mind  ;  and  in  this  philosophy, 
even  when  it  is  thought  that  God  must  be 
appealed  to  for  an  explanation  of  the  exis- 
tence of  atoms,  divine  action  is  reduced  to  a 
minimum  ;  it  is  admitted  only  in  so  far  as  it 
cannot  be  dispensed  with. 

Still,  let  us  consider  not  atomism  but 
simply  the  general  idea  of  the  chemical  laws, 
to  wit,  the  principle  of  the  permanence  of  the 
\weight  of  bodies.  Physics  and  chemistry 
Jshow  us  everything  seemingly  permanent  in 
i  nature,  mass  and  energy  alike.  What  is 
this  permanence  ?  We  are  inclined  to  think 
that  everything  we  attribute  to  permanence 
we  withdraw  from  contingence  and  free- 
dom. But  this  may  be  no  more  than  a  pre- 
judice, the  origin  of  which  would  seem  to 
date  back  to  antiquity.  The  ancients  re- 
garded fixity,  immutability,  as  the  ideal. 
Epicurus  considers  the  gods  as  being  eternally 
unoccupied,  for  work  is  a  change  of  state,  it 
implies  fatigue.  But  these  ideas  are  not  so 

106 


THE  CHEMICAL  LAWS 

current  amongst  the  moderns  as  they  were 
amongst  the  ancients.  Many  of  us  look 
upon  motion  as  superior  to  repose.  For 
aesthetic  and  moral  reasons,  perhaps,  as 
well  as  scientific,  our  conception  of  being  and 
of  the  ideal  has  changed ;  nowadays,  it 
admits  of — even  if  it  does  not  exact — pro- 
gress, improvement,  flexibility.  And  there- 
fore immutability  is  no  longer  the  mark  of 
the  absolute,  but  rather  of  the  relative. 
Mass  and  energy  are  immutable,  therefore 
they  are  only  phenomena.  We  conceive  of 
permanence  either  as  a  state  or  as  a  limit, 
no  longer  as  a  necessity  inherent  in  being. 
Moreover,  we  may  note  that  determinism 
becomes  obscure  the  more  it  contracts. 
Mechanics  has  actually  had  to  substitute 
for  mathematical  intuition  a  relation  of 
simple  phenomenal  causality,  incapable  of 
being  reduced  to  this  intuition.  Physics 
has  complicated  this  relation  by  introduc- 
ing a  notion  of  quality,  that  of  energy. 
Chemistry  adds  the  idea  of  special  bodies, 
relatively  permanent  in  nature.  Progress 
takes  place  from  the  homogeneous  to  the 
heterogeneous,  consequently  from  the  intel- 
ligible to  the  obscure. 

107 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

On  the  other  hand,  every  one  admits  that 
physico-chemical  determinism  may  act  upon 
mechanical  determinism  without  the  former 
being  reducible  to  the  latter.  A  priori, 
then,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  physico- 
chemical  determinism,  in  its  turn,  from  ad- 
mitting of  the  intervention  of  some  superior 
determinism,  biological  determinism,  for  in- 
stance, if  it  were  to  happen  that  it  could  not 
be  reduced  to  physico-chemical  determinism. 


108 


VIII 
THE   BIOLOGICAL   LAWS 

IN  his  Nouveaux  Elements  de  Physiologic 
humaine,  M.  Beaunis  reduces  the  biological 
laws  to  two  principles  :  first,  the  correlation 
of  physical  with  vital  movements ;  second, 
the  evolution  of  living  beings.  Conformably 
with  this  division,  we  will  now  study  the 
relations  between  physiology  and  physics ; 
and,  in  the  next  chapter,  take  up  the  rela- 
tions of  species  with  one  another,  and  the 
question  of  evolution. 

Are  the  general  laws  of  life  reducible  to 
the  physico-chemical  laws  ?  Let  us  first 
examine  the  matter  from  the  historical  point 
of  view. 

Descartes  declared  that  every  science,  the 
science  of  life  as  well  as  those  of  matter, 
must  be  reducible  to  mechanics ;  he  him- 
self made  attempts  in  physiology,  along 

109 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

these  lines.  Modern  science,  however,  did  not 
originate  immediately  in  this  synthetic  view. 
M.  Gley *  dates  the  beginnings  of  modern 
physiology  from  the  English  doctor,  Glisson. 
Now,  the  latter  bases  this  science  on  the 
notion  of  irritability,  which  he  regards  not  as 
reducible  to  mechanism,  but  as  a  special 
property,  peculiar  to  living  beings ;  a  lower  ^' 
form  of  the  very  faculties  that  constitute 
the  human  mind :  appetition  and  per- 
ception. In  a  second  period,  comprising 
Haller  and  Bichat,  vital  phenomena  are 
clearly  distinguished  from  physical  ones,  but 
more  attention  is  bestowed  on  their  analysis 
and  division  into  categories  than  on  the 
inquiry  as  to  whether  or  not  they  have  any 
special  basis.  This  analytical  period  offers 
a  striking  analogy  with  the  psychological 
period  mainly  represented  by  Jouffroy.  A 
third  period  begins  with  Broussais :  its 
main  representative  is  Claude  Bernard. 
We  work  up  from  phenomena  to  their  prin- 
ciples ;  we  ascend  from  vital  faculties  to 
irritability,  doing  away,  however,  with  the 
idea  of  mysterious  powers  and  attempting 

1  Dictionnaire  encyclopedique  des  sciences  medicates, 
article  on  "  Irritabilit6." 

no 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

to  reduce  this  very  irritability  to  mechanism, 
in  accordance  with  the  Cartesian  principle. 
Thus  we  introduce  a  strict  determinism  into 
physiology.  In  examining  what  this  reduc- 
tion consists  of  essentially,  we  will  base  our 
argument  on  the  Elements  de  Physiologie  of 
M.  Beaunis  and  on  Dr.  Gley's  remarkable 
article  just  mentioned. 

Present-day  science  teaches  that  in  the 
living  being :  i,  there  is  no  spontaneity ; 
2,  reaction  is  equal  to  action.  Protoplasm 
is  the  common  element  of  all  tissues.  It 
enters  into  motion  only  when  subjected  to 
some  particular  mechanical,  physical  or  chem- 
ical excitant.  What  is  true  of  the  element 
must  be  true  of  the  compounds.  Again,  in 
living  beings  and  in  the  organic  world  alike, 
there  is  equality  between  action  and  reaction. 
Of  this  we  become  more  and  more  conscious,*/ 
as  we  consider,  with  increasing  precision, 
the  amount  of  material  supplied  and  of  effort 
and  heat  expended,  in  the  case  of  living  beings. 
The  law  of  the  mechanical  equivalent  of 
heat  applies  to  living  beings.  The  reason 
they  appear  to  expend  more  force  than  they 
receive  is  that  they  have  reserve  forces  of 
tension  which  are  suddenly  released  beneath 

in 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

the  influence  of  the  exciting  agent.  Strictly 
speaking,  they  are  machines  capable  of  stor- 
ing force.  No  doubt  every  kind  of  tissue 
appears  to  have  special  irritability,  but  this 
difference  in  manifestation  results  from  the 
complexity  of  the  tissues  and  the  different 
way  in  which  their  cells  are  arranged. 
The  final  reason  for  irritability  lies  in  the 
nature  of  the  substances  which  compose 
protoplasm ;  these  admit  of  a  great  variety 
of  combinations  :  carbon,  for  instance,  which 
is  tetravalent.  Impermanence  of  protoplas- 
mic substance  is  the  essential  condition  of 
irritability.  And  the  progress  of  organization! 
is  nothing  but  the  increase  of  this  very  im-  \ 
permanence.  It  would  thus  appear  that  the  * 
reduction  of  physiology  to  physico-chemis- 
try,  if  not  actually  effected  in  detail,  is  at 
all  events  certain  in  principle  and  assured 
in  the  future. 

Still,  if  we  consider  the  usual  language  of 
the  physiologists  who  are  labouring  to  justify 
this  induction,  it  would  seem  that  results 
have  not  yet  come  up  to  intentions.  Claude 
Bernard  wrote  :  "  It  is  clear  that  this  evolu- 
tive property  of  the  egg,  which  will  produce 
a  mammifer,  a  bird  or  a  fish,  belongs  neither 

112 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

to  physics  nor  to  chemistry. "  *  And  M. 
Beaunis  said  :  "  There  is  always  a  certain 
constancy  in  the  outer  form  of  living  beings. 
Each  organism  is  built  up  according  to  a 
morphological  type,  from  which,  in  the 
course  of  its  existence,  it  can  only  deviate 
within  restricted  limits." 2  M.  Gley  said :  "  Not 
only  does  the  being  or  the  tissue  react,  when  V 
affected  by  an  excitation  in  its  environment, 
but  it  appropriates  its  elements  to  this  reac- 
tion ;  for,  under  penalty  of  deposition,  perhaps 
of  death,  it  is  compelled  to  adapt  its  physical 
nature  and  chemical  constitution  to  this 
change  in  the  conditions  of  existence."  3 
jDo  not  such  words  as  these  seem  to  indicate 
s  that  the  living  element  tends  to  subsist  in 
its  individuality  and  employs  the  appro- 
priate means  of  realizing  this  end  ?  Still, 
it  is  quite  possible  that  these  scientists 
merely  continue,  as  a  matter  of  habit,  to 
use  ordinary  language,  just  as  the  astronomer 
speaks  of  the  sun's  motion  round  the  earth, 
or  of  its  rising  and  setting.  Let  us  consider 
things  in  themselves. 

1  Claude  Bernard,  La   science  experimentale,  p.  210 ; 
Gley,  art.  "  Irritability"  p.  487. 

2  Beaunis,  Tvaite  de  Physiologie,  2nd  ed.,  17. 

3  Gley,  article  on  "  Irritabilite,"  p.  489. 

113  H 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

It   cannot   be   doubted  but    that    life,  to 

Claude     Bernard,   is    really    a   "  controlling 

idea/'  distinct  from  mechanism.  He  regards 
this  theory  as  playing  too  important  a  role 
for  it  to  be  looked  upon  as  only  a  metaphor, 
a  way  of  speaking.  Claude  Bernard  attri- 
butes to  living  beings,  in  their  own  right, 
the  following  characteristics  :  organization,  v 
generation,  evolution,  nutrition,  decay,  sick-  \* 
ness  and  death.  These  phenomena  he  regards 
as  inexplicable  apart  from  life  as  a  special 
principle.  "  Vital  force/'  he  says,  "  con- 
trols phenomena  which  it  does  not  produce  ; 
physical  agents  produce  phenomena  which 
they  do  not  control."  *  M.  Marey  writes  : 
"  For  myself,  I  am  not  acquainted  with  the 
phenomena  of  life  ;  I  acknowledge  only  two 
kinds  of  manifestations  of  life  :  those  intelli- 
gible to  us,  which  are  all  of  a  physical 
or  chemical  order ;  and  those  that  are 
unintelligible/'  2  There  are  gaps,  then,  in 
mechanism ;  certain  aspects  of  the  living 
being,  in  the  present  state  of  science,  appear 
to  be  unintelligible,  i.e.  irreducible  to  physico- 

1  Claude  Bernard,  Lepon  sur  Us  phenomtnes  de  la 
vie,  i.  51. 

*  Marey,  Du  mouvement  dans  les  fonctions  de  la  vie, 
3rd  lesson. — Gley,  article  on  "  Irritability"  p.  486. 

114 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

chemical  forces.  What  is  it  that  shrinks  from 
mechanical  explanation  in  this  way  ?  It  would 
seem  to  be  a  principle  of  finality,  inherent,  in 
spite  of  everything,  in  the  most  elementary 
vital  phenomenon.  The  living  being  is  re- 
duced to  protoplasm,  whose  function  it  is 
to  react  under  the  influence  of  external 
activities.  In  it,  we  say,  spontaneity  is  nil, 
reaction  is  equal  to  action.  But,  it  may  be 
remarked,  this  reaction  is  not  any  kind  of  a 
reaction ;  it  is  incompletely  characterized 
when  defined  from  the  sole  standpoint  of 
quantity,  for  it  possesses  the  unexpected 
property  of  favouring  not  only  the  conserva- 
tion, but  also  the  development  and  propaga- 
tion of  the  very  individual  that  reacts.  The 
exercise  of  irritability  is  expressed  by  losses ; 
now,  organic  matter  reacts  exactly  in  such 
a  way  as  to  make  good  these  losses.  Besides, 
it  reacts  so  as  to  adapt  itself  to  environment, 
to  make  life  possible  for  itself  in  the  various 
conditions  in  which  it  happens  to  be  placed. 
In  short,  by  a  process  of  reproduction,  it  en-  v 
sures  the  perpetuity  of  the  form  it  represents. 
It  has  frequently  been  said  that  life  is  essen- 
tially a  vicious  circle.  The^  organjnakes  the 
function  possible,  and  the  function  is  the 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 


organ  ;  muscular  contraction 
accelerates  the  circulation  of  the  blood,  and 
the  circulation  of  the  blood  keeps  up  muscular 
contraction.  In  every  important  physiological 
phenomenon  we  find  the  vicious  circle.  In  the 
living  being,  then,  there  would  appear  to  be 
an  internal  finality.  The  living  being,  re- 
garded as  an  individual,  makes  use  of  that 
which  is  around  it  to  ensure  its  own  subsis- 
tence. The  reflex  action  that  characterizes 
it  offers  two  aspects  :  the  one,  which  con- 
cerns physics  and  chemistry  ;  the  other, 
which  has  no  analogy  in  the  objects  of  these 
sciences. 

There  is  one  phenomenon  which  emphasizes 
this  difference,  and  that  is  death.  Death 
finds  no  explanation  in  mechanism  :  this 
was  why  Descartes  dreamt  of  an  indefinite 
development  of  human  life  ;  and  those  who 
maintained  the  theory  of  mechanism,  for 
the  most  part,  saw  no  radical  impossibility 
in  the  immortality  of  the  living  being,  repara- 
tion always  exactly  making  up  for  the  wear- 
ing away  of  tissue.  M.  Sabatier  *  thinks 
that  death  is  intimately  connected  with  the 

1  Essai  sur  la  vie  et  la  mort  ;  1892. 
116 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

use  made,  by  the  living  being,  of  the  cells 
of  which  it  consists.  At  first,  the  living 
being  had  no  other  function  than  to  continue 
to  live.  It  was  then  very  slightly  differ- 
entiated. To  render  higher  faculties  possi- 
ble, the  cells  have  become  differentiated  and 
have  acquired  complicated  structures.  Loss 
of  their  potential  immortality  has  been  the 
consequence  of  this  progress.  At  the  pre- 
sent time,  only  the  reproductive  cells,  which 
are  relatively  simple,  retain  comparative 
immortality,  which  is  realized  either  imme- 
diately by  scissiparity  and  gemmation  ;  or  in- 
directly, by  way  of  a  plasmocaryogamic  reju- 
venation. The  cause  of  death  is  dual.  There 
is  an  internal  cause,  the  aspiration  to  rise,  to 
supersede  life  pure  and  simple  in  order  to 
attain  to  knowledge  and  feeling  :  it  was  to 
satisfy  this  tendency  that  differentiation  of 
tissues,  the  origin  of  their  mortality,  came 
about.  There  is  also  an  external  cause : 
the  outer  appeals  beneath  the  influence  of 
which  the  tendency  is  realized.  The  biblical 
account  of  how  man  loses  immortality  when 
he  tastes  the  fruit  of  the  tree  of  knowledge 
is,  according  to  M.  Sabatier,  an  exact  sym- 
bol of  the  cause  of  death.  Thus,  when 

117 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

Pascal  proclaimed  that  man  is  greater  than 
nature  because  he  knows  that  he  dies,  he  was 
propounding  a  view  which  was  not  only 
metaphysical  and  moral,  it  was  also  scientific. 
The  best  men  in  a  nation,  said  Renan,  are 
those  it  crucifies.  Martyrdom  is  the  ransom 
of  superiority.  Death,  then,  is  a  witness  to 
the  effort  made  by  the  living  being  to  rise 
above'  the  environment  in  which  he  was 
born.  Defeat  is  the  mark  of  his  greatness. 
All  these  considerations  are  both  poetical 
and  religious ;  and  yet  scientists,  as  well  as 
the  rest  of  mankind,  are  influenced  by 
them.  Then  what  is  the  relation  between 
vital  faculties  and  physico-chemical  proper- 
ties ? 

Can  physiology  be  established,  like  chemis- 
try, by  eliminating  purely  and  simply  every- 
thing that  does  not  appear  susceptible 
of  strictly  scientific  determinations  ?  The 
chemist  does  not  deny  that  there  are  sen- 
sible qualities,  but  he  relegates  them  either  to 
physiology  or  to  metaphysics  :  he  finds  a 
relatively  isolable  object  of  science  in  the 
relations  of  molecular  composition.  In  the 
same  way,  it  may  be  alleged,  when  studying 
living  beings,  we  distinguish,  on  the  one 

118 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

hand,  physico-chemical  phenomena,  and,  on 
the  other,  an  indescribable  something  which 
resembles  finality :  this  latter  element  is 
relegated  to  psychology  or  metaphysics,  or 
even  to  the  unknowable ;  and  physiology 
is  established  as  a  science,  no  account  being 
taken  of  any  but  physico-chemical  manifest- 
ations. 

But  is  the  separation,  that  was  possible 
in  chemistry,  possible  also  in  physiology  ? 
It  would  appear  that  this  triumphant  adap- 
tation to .  the  conditions  of  existence,  this 
choice  of  means  suited  to  ensure  the  persis- 
tence of  the  individual,  this  tendency  to  expand 
and  rise  that  we  have  remarked,  here  form 
one  with  the  object  of  science.  The  amoeba, 
one  of  the  simplest  of  beings,  a  homogeneous 
— and  almost  diffluent — substance,  has  these 
properties  to  a  striking  extent.  If  an  amoeba 
is  plunged  into  a  liquid,  and  it  there  encoun- 
ters a  foreign  body  on  which  it  is  able  to  feed, 
for  instance,  a  particle  of  vegetation,  we  find 
its  prolongations  gradually  extend  around  the 
grain,  finally  surrounding  it  completely  and 
uniting  with  it,  so  that  the  latter  forms  one  with 
its  own  bulk.  Then  follows  a  certain  period 
during  which  digestion  takes  place.  In  the 

119 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

end,  the  useless  portion  of  the  foreign  body 
is  expelled,  by  a  process  the  inverse  of  that 
by  which  it  entered.  This  is  not  a  mere 
chemical  combination.  Still,  the  amoeba 
is  a  very  elementary  organism.  It  is  not 
given  to  us  to  see  the  physico-chemical  pro- 
perties become  vital  properties  by  a  process 
of  simple  particularization. 

Such  is  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge  ; 
but  it  may  seem  as  though  the  future  were 
destined  to  realize  this  exact  reduction,  which 
is,  so  far,  only  an  ideal.  M.  Sabatier,  in  the 
above-mentioned  work,  makes  a  strong  effort 
to  compare  living  substance  with  inorganic 
substances.  He  regards  the  essential  pro- 
perty of  protoplasm,  by  which  it  effects  self- 
restoration  and  communicates  life,  as  being, 
after  all,  only  a  "  baiting "  kind  of  power. 
Now,  we  have  instances  of  similar  powers  in 
inorganic  matter.  Such  is  the  phenomenon 
of  superfusion.  Phosphorus  melts  at  40° 
Centigrade ;  its  temperature  may  gradually 
be  diminished  below  40°  without  any  cessation 
of  its  liquid  state ;  but  if  a  solid  piece  of 
phosphorus  is  introduced,  the  entire  mass 
immediately  becomes  solidified.  We  find  that 
a  similar  thing  happens  in  the  case  of  syn- 

120 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

chronous  oscillations.  If  any  one  string  of 
a  violin  is  set  vibrating  and  a  second  violin 
happens  to  be  near  the  first,  the  correspond- 
ing string  of  the  second  instrument  vibrates 
in  unison.  In  like  fashion,  the  explosion  of  a 
dynamite  cartridge  provokes  the  explosion 
of  other  cartridges  in  the  neighbourhood. 
But  these  are  only  comparisons,  since  living 
matter  must  always  be  presented  as  such. 
And,  in  a  general  way,  the  intercalation  of 
intermediaries  could  not  be  mistaken  for 
proof  of  identity  or  of  causality.  Ascending 
by  shorter  stages  is  by  no  means  a  cessation 
of  ascending. 

In  reality,  there  is  but  one  possible  demons- 
tration of  this  reduction  :  the  artificial  pro- 
duction of  an  organic  substance  from  inorganic 
matter  and  physico-chemical  forces ;  but 
such  a  process  is  still  far  from  being 
realized.  Pasteur  declared  most  emphati- 
cally that  the  living  never  springs  from  any- 
thing but  the  living.  No  doubt  this  refers 
to  the  present  state  of  things.  It  must 
be  considered,  however,  that  in  itself  the 
proof  in  question  is  very  difficult  to  rea- 
lize ;  for  we  must  be  very  certain  that  the 
materials  from  which  we  think  we  see  life 

121 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

emerging  are  really  inorganic.  If  matter, 
says  M.  Sabatier,  produces  life,  then  it  is 
not  matter,  pure  and  simple.  Life  is  every- 
where, he  thinks,  in  so-called  inanimate 
matter  as  well  as  in  living  matter. 

Still,  from  the  philosophical  point  of  view, 
can  we  adhere  to  these  assertions  ?  The  mind 
pursues  the  reduction  to  the  universal  of 
everything  that  appears  as  new  and  hetero- 
geneous. Now,  finality  is  heterogeneous 
to  mechanism.  However  indispensable  it 
seem,  may  not  the  finalistic  point  of  view 
be  relative  to  our  intellectual  constitu- 
tion ?  This  was  the  opinion  of  Kant,  and 
it  is  a  very  tenable  one.  We  must  remark, 
however,  along  with  Kant  himself,  that  the 
extension  of  mechanism  to  everything  that 
is,  is  not  philosophically  imperative.  How 
is  this  extension  brought  about  ?  We  note 
the  extreme  fertility  of  mechanism  which,  by 
degrees,  explains  the  phenomena  for  which, 
moreover,  it  was  thought  right  to  infer  occult 
qualities,  and  we  are  inclined  to  believe  that, 
in  time,  everything  will  have  a  kind  of  mechani- 
cal appearance.  But,  admitting  that  every- 
thing must  some  day  be  reducible  to  unity, 
what  is  there  to  prove  that  absolute  science 

122 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

will  be  only  an  extension  of  mechanical 
science,  and  not  a  superior  science,  into 
which  mechanism  itself  enters,  as  a  species 
into  a  genus  ?  At  bottom,  it  is  here  implied 
that  all  is  in  all,  that  a  given  phenomenon 
contains  all  the  laws  of  nature,  and  that,  if 
there  exists  a  science  whose  form  is  henceforth 
perfect,  that  science  must  contain  all  the  rest  in 
embryo.  Mechanics,  or  the  science  of  motion, 
possesses  this  relatively  perfect  form ;  there- 
fore, it  is  hoped  that  mechanics  will  succeed 
in  explaining  everything.  Our  mechanics, 
however,  is  not  absolutely  intelligible,  as  it 
is  believed  to  be  ;  indeed,  applied  mechanics 
must  be  considered  apart  from  rational 
mechanics.  /  Now,  experience  is  indispen- 
sable in  applied  mechanics,  and,  since  all 
experience  is  limited,  the  results  it  gives  us 
are  nothing  but  approximations.  In  the 
final  analysis,  our  reason  for  believing  in 
universal  mechanism  is,  as  Descartes  saw, 
our  confidence  in  the  truth  of  clear  ideas  and 
in  their  connexion  with  reality.  We  claim 
that  the  mind,  freed  from  the  influence 
of  the  senses,  is  the  standard  by  which  we 
measure  things  ;J  we  also  consider  that,  if 
everything  is  motion,  we  have  power  over 

123 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

everything,  since  we  can  produce  motion. 
But  Descartes  clearly  saw  also  that,  if  we 
would  prove  for  ourselves  the  legitimacy  of  this 
point  of  view,  we  must  fall  back  on  the  idea 
,  of  a  powerful,  benevolent  God,  who  has  pro- 
portioned things  to  our  means  of  knowledge 
and  action. 

And  so,  the  more  we  wish  to  rise  from 
phenomenon  to  being,  the  more  we  are  com- 
pelled to  find  room  for  feeling :  it  has  a 
part  in  the  affirmation  of  universal  mechan- 
ism. But  feeling  also  supplies  us  with  data 
opposed  to  mechanism.  For,  though  con- 
sciousness may  not  have  arrived  at  physico- 
chemical  forces,  it  actually  does  lay  hold  upon 
life.  We  are  conscious  of  living ;  a  purely 
illusory  consciousness,  if  mechanism  is  truth ; 
for,  to  mechanism,  the  elements  alone  exist  and 
their  rapprochement  is  nothing.  Now,  life 
shows  forth  as  the  effective  synthesis  of  an 
extremely  rich  multiplicity.  To  believe  the 
testimony  of  consciousness  on  this  point  is 
to  doubt  the  absolute  value  of  mechan- 
ism. 

But,  it  will  be  urged,  how  are  we  to  look 
upon  the  relation  between  life  and  physico- 
chemical  phenomena  ?  Either  life  will  break 

124 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

the  chain  of  movements,  or  it  will  find  itself 
banished  to  intermundane  spaces.  rWe^seem  * 
to  have  escaped  from  Cartesian  mechanism 
only  to  fall  back  upon  miracles  or  a  state  > 
of  pre-established  harmony^]  It  may  be  that 
this  difficulty  in  our  way  of  representing  life 
and  its  relation  to  mechanism  arises  from 
the  fact  that  the  question  is  imperfectly 
stated.  Life  and  mechanism  are  both  re- 
garded as  being  things  per  se.  Between 
life  and  mechanism  we  endeavour  to  find 
some  relation  which  is  still  mechanical. 
The  two,  however,  have  no  existence  sepa- 
rate from  each  other ;  they  are  artificial 
entities ;  and  the  struggle  which  seems  to 
result  from  their  opposition  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  human  mind  is  incapable  of 
grasping  reality  in  its  unity. 

To  sum  up,  the  laws  of  physiology  appear  to 
be  irreducible.  Physiological  determinism,  con- 
sidered in  itself,  differs  from  physico-chemical 
determinism,  just  as  the  latter  differed  from  a 
purely  mechanical  determinism.  It  is  stricter, 
for  it  governs  phenomena  which  the  physico- 
chemical  laws  left  indeterminate.  It  is  based, 
however,  on  a  more  complex  and  obscure 
idea  of  law  :  the  relation  of  one  fact  not  only 

125 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

to  another,  but  to  a  fact  presented  as  an  end, 
an  object  to  be  realized.  Determinism,  as  it 
contracts,  becomes  more  impenetrable,  more 
irreducible  to  necessity. 


126 


IX 

THE   BIOLOGICAL   LAWS 

(Continued) 

IN  the  last  chapter,  we  saw  that  the  reflex 
act  to  which  contemporary  science 
endeavours  to  reduce  all  physiological  pheno- 
mena is  a  sort  of  dual-faced  phenomenon  :  on 
the  one  hand,  it  comes  within  the  scope  of 
physico-chemistry ;  on  the  other,  presenting 
strictly  the  physiological  aspect,  it  shows  forth 
characteristics  that  are  irreducible.  Each 
order  of  science  thus  implies  postulates  proper 
to  itself.  We  will  now  study,  not  the  living 
being  taken  by  itself,  but  rather  the  re- 
lations which  living  beings  have  with  one 
another,  that  is  to  say,  the  laws  which  bind 
organic  forms  together.  We  will  simply  set 
forth  an  historical  statement  of  the  main 
phases  through  which  zoology  has  passed, 
disentangling  the  philosophical  ideas  that 
have  guided  its  development. 

127 


.' 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

Aristotle  is  the  founder  of  natural  history ; 
and  his  scientific  conceptions  may  be  traced 
back  to  the  general  principles  of  his  philosophy. 
Speaking  generally,  he  made  it  his  business 
to  investigate  the  first  causes  of  order  in  the 
world.  Now,  according  to  the  Aristotelian 
doctrine,  the  world  consists  of  two  elements  : 
jnatter,  whose  distinctive  nature  is  a  lawless 
mobility  ;  and  a  principle  'which  fixes  and 
regulates  this  impermanent,  capricious  matter. 
As  species  present  a  striking  permanence  and 
harmony,  they  must  depend  on  principles 
superior  to  matter.  These  principles  are 
metaphysical  entities,  immutable  types,  per- 
fect forms,  acting  on  matter  as  final  causes, 
as  models  to  be  realized,  in  so  far  as  the  nature 
of  the  elements  permits. 

From  these  principles  result  the  grada- 
tions of  living  beings.  There  is  not  exactly 
amongst  them  unity  of  composition  and  a 
simple  difference  in  degree ;  they  rise  in 
tiers,  so  to  speak,  one  above  the  other,  the 
upper  ones  possessing  more  qualities  and 
greater  perfection  than  the  lower.  The  more 
implies  the  less,  but  it  does  so  by  adding  to  it. 
Thus,  the  lower  orders  of  living  beings  possess 
nutritiveness ;  animals  possess  nutritiveness 

128 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

and  sensibility  ;  man  possesses  nutritiveness, 
sensibility  and  intelligence.  At  the  same 
time,  however,  nature,  through  the  continu- 
ous matter  at  her  disposal,  multiplies  the 
intermediate  stages  between  these  forms  and 
proceeds  from  one  to  the  other  by  scarcely 
perceptible  transitions. 

Are  species  fixed  ?  Not  altogether ;  ideal 
types,  indeed,  neither  are  nor  can  be  exactly 
realized  by  matter  ;  they  represent  models 
round  which  nature  gravitates,  which  she 
tends  to  reach  but  never  perfectly  realizes. 
Fixity  of  species,  then,  is  an  altogether  ideal 
immobility,  permitting  and  even  requiring  a 
real  and  in  a  sense  indefinite  variability, 
whilst  opposed  to  any  being  altogether  over- 
stepping the  limits  of  the  species  to  which  it 
belongs. 

In  this  doctrine,  even  teratological  cases 
can  be  explained  by  natural  causes.  These 
are  extreme  dissimilarities,  the  result  of 
excess  or  defect.  They  are  connected  with 
the  dualism  of  end  and  of  conditions,  and  with 
the  capricious  mobility  of  matter.  Matter 
never  fully  realizes  form  ;  at  times  it  deviates 
considerably  from  it. 

If  this  was  the  doctrine  of  Aristotle,  was  it 
129  T 


1= 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

owing  to  the  fact  that  he  had  no  idea  of  a 
mechanical  explanation  in  zoology  ?  To  con- 
vince ourselves  that  this  was  not  so,  we  need 
only  quote  a  few  lines  from  the  Physics : 

tl  OTTOV  /uiev  ovv  airavra  <rv vefirj..  w&Trep  KO.V  el  eveKa  TOV 
,  Tavra  JULGV  ecrcoOr),  OLTTO  TOV  avrojuLarov  crvarTavra 
iw  oara  §e  /u.q  OI/TCO?,  dirwXeTO  KGU 

rat,  KaOdjrep  'EyUTre^o/cX^f    Xeyet   ra   fiovyevrj  ft 

Trpwpa."  1  (^ere  we  have  the  idea  of  natural 
selection  in  all  its  preciseness.  The  reason 
Aristotle  rejects  it  is  that,  in  nature,  he 
onsiders  order  to  be  the  rule,  not  the  excep- 
tion, and  that  chance  may  well  account  for 
a  few  isolated  cases  of  fitness  and  har- 
mony, though  not  of  a  general,  constant 
order.J 

Thus  we  see  that  Aristotle  regarded  the 
zoological   laws   as   being   of   an   essentially 
teleological  character. 
[  For    Descartes,    science,    in    its    ensemble, 

1  Where  everything  came  about  in  such  fashion  that 
creation  seems  to  have  been  controlled  or  guided  by  inten- 
tion, in  reality,  there  was  nothing  more  than  the  survival 
of  those  beings  which,  by  mere  chance,  were  best  adapted 
to  survive  :  those  that  did  not  possess  this  adaptation 
were  utterly  destroyed  and  perish,  as  Empedocles  says 
was  the  case  with  the  human-faced  beings  that  sprang 
from  oxen. — ARISTOTLE  :  Physics,  viii,  198,  b.  30. 

130 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

assumes  an  altogether  different  aspect.  The 
logical  point  of  view  of  systematization  is 
substituted  for  the  metaphysical  one  of 
explanation  by  generating  causes.  No  longer 
does  Descartes  seek  an  explanation  of  the 
nature  of  things  in  aesthetic  and  moral  ends/]  ^ 
Not  along  these  lines,  he  thinks,  can  a  scienti- 
fic explanation  be  found.  God  is  infinite  and  *~* 
he  transcends  us  infinitely ;  his  ways  are 
inscrutable,  and  therefore  it  would  be  rash 
and  fruitless  to  attempt  to  fathom  them. 
What  is  both  possible  and  profitable,  is  the 
explanation  of  phenomena  by  the  essences  ""~ 
immanent  in  them,  the  accounting  for  nature 
by  exclusively  natural  principles.  Hence, 
nature  appears  as  a  system,  a  structure 
whose  unity  and  explanation  lie  inj&&  _ 
conjunction  of  the  various  parts.  (More- 
over, this  idea  of  logical  systematization  is 
determined  in  two  different  ways,  as  we 
see  in  the  naturalists  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  There  is  the  Cartesian  method, 
which  distinguishes,  separates  and  analyses, 
as  well  as  the  Leibnitzian  method,  which 
tends  to  compare,  to  seek  resemblances  or 
analogies,  to  establish  continuity  .~J  In  one 
way  or  another,  modern  science  no  longer 


-. 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

attempts  to  find  laws  of  finality,  as  did  Aristo- 
telian  science,  but   rather  laws  of   relations 

\  and  of  co-existence.  We  are  no  longer  dealing 
with  metaphysical  origin,  nor  are  we  yet 
dealing  with  historical  origin  ;  our  business 
is  to  analyse  the  present  state  of  things, 
to  attain  to  the  conception  of  it  as  a 
system. 

flFwe  consider  the  development  of  zoology 
in  the  eighteenth  century  and  the  first  part 
of  the  nineteenth,  we  find*  it  dominated  by 
the  ideas  here  indicated.  Linnaeus,  the  cele- 
brated Swedish  naturalist,  takes  as  his  start- 
ing-point the  maxim  of  Leibnitz  :  Natura  non 
facit  saltum.  His  opinion  is  that  the  beings  of 

^  nature  must  form  a  chain,  as  our  thoughts 
do,  and  that  each  species  must  be  exactly 
intermediate  between  two  others.  It  is  the 
object  of  science  to  arrange  beings  so  that 
this  condition  may  be  fulfilled.  Such  a 
classification  is,  of  necessity,  a  unique  one : 
it  is  the  natural  classification,  and  represents 
the  very  thought  of  the  Creator.  Species, 
moreover,  are  fixed  and  distinct/]  They  can- 
not be  classified  with  exactness,  unless  they 
are  clearly  defined.  With  this  end  in  view,  we 
must  take  into  consideration  all  the  character- 

132 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

istics  which  may  be  offered  by  animals : 
external  characteristics,  anatomical  struc- 
ture, faculties,  kind  of  life  ;  and  from  these 
elements  we  must  form  the  irreducible  types 
realized  by  nature. 

The  principle  of  Linnaeus  called  forth  clearly 
determined  investigations,  the  very  progress 
of  which  imperilled  it.  The  number  of 
species  increased  unexpectedly,  and  those 
who  described  them  accused  one  another  of 
exercising  a  fanciful  imagination.  There  had 
to  be  found  for  species  a  definition  which 
was  not  open  to  the  charge  of  being  arbitrary. 
They  fell  back  upon  Aristotle's  definition  : 
interfecundity,  a  crude  fact  rather  than  an 
intelligible  notion. 

Many  philosophers,  however,  both  rational- 
istic and  empirical,  protested  against  the 
claim  to  reduce  the  infinite  variety  of  nature 
to  the  separations  and  oppositions  of  our 
clear  ideas  ;  the  very  difficulties  experienced 
by  the  classifiers  brought  forth  investigations 
conceived  in  a  sense  opposed  to  that  of 
Linnaeus. 

To  Buffon,  there  are  no  species  in  nature  ; 
there  are  only  individuals.  His  watchword 
is  :  "  War  upon  systems,"  that  is  to  say,  upon 

133 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

classifications  within  which  the  mind  thinks 
it  can  confine  the  productions  of  nature. 
Buff  on 's  views,  in  this  respect,  are,  above  all 
else,  negative.  It  was  Etienne  Geoffroy  Saint- 
Hilaire,  who,  combining  the  idea  of  continuity 
with  that  of  order,  substituted  for  classifica- 
tion a  philosophy  based  essentially  on  the 
consideration  of  resemblances.  The  principle 
dominating  his  theories  is  the  unity  of  plan 
on  which  all  organized  beings  are  built  up. 
Nature,  according  to  this  thinker,  has  formed 
all  living  beings  after  a  single  plan,  the  main 
features  of  which  are  essentially  the  same, 
though  its  details  vary  considerably.  Here, 
again,  we  are  dealing  not  with  laws  of  descent, 
but  with  laws  of  co-existence  ;  we  are  not 
seeking  the  cause  which  produces  beings  but 
rather  those  relations  of  resemblance  which 
connect  them  with  one  another.  The  princi- 
pal laws  enunciated  by  Geoffroy  Saint-Hilaire 
may  be  more  or  less  closely  traced  back  to  the 
principle  of  the  unity  of  the  plan  of  composi- 
tion, as  thus  understood.  These  are  (i)  the 
law  of  the  equilibrium  of  organs  :  animals 
differ  from  one  another  only  in  the  degree  in 
which  their  parts  are  developed  ;  when  certain 
parts  are  considerably  developed,  others,  by 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

the  law  of  compensation,  become  rudimen- 
tary ;  (2)  the  principle  of  analogous  organs  : 
though  considerably  modified  as  to  their 
form  and  function,  organs  may  be  said  to 
remain  analogous,  so  long  as  both  their 
position  and  their  relation  to  the  other  organs 
remain  the  same  ;  (3)  the  principle  of  con- 
nexions :  whatever  their  variations  in  volume 
and  diversity  of  function,  the  parts  always 
retain  the  same  relative  positions.  An  organ 
is  rather  perverted,  atrophied  or  destroyed, 
than  transposed.  In  accordance  with  these 
principles,  Geoffroy  decidedly  regarded  mor- 
phology as  an  advance  on  physiology.  He 
affirmed  that  differences  in  function  and 
form  resulted  from  the  conditions  in  which 
the  animal  happened  to  be  placed.  In  short, 
he  reduced  monstrosities  to  general  laws, 
showing  that  they  are  based  on  assignable 
physical  causes ;  and  so  he  established 
teratology  as  a  science. 

Geofrroy  Saint-Hilaire  is  opposed  by  Cuvier. 
The  former  started  with  the  idea  of  continuity ; 
the  latter  declares  that  he  deals  with  facts  alone ; 
he  is  in  favour  of  discontinuity.  He  tries  to 
find  in  anatomy  the  basis  of  natural  classifica- 
tion, and  lays  down  the  principle  of  ruling 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

characteristics.  In  accordance  with  these 
guiding  ideas,  he  rejects  the  doctrine  of  a 
unity  of  division  and  recognizes  four  funda- 
mental planes  :  that  of  Vertebrata,  that 
of  Mollusca,  that  of  Articulata  and  that  of 
Radiata.  He  looks  upon  interfecundity  as 
the  distinguishing  mark  of  a  species,  though 
he  does  more  than  simply  try  to  find  a 
method  of  classification.  His  principle  of 
the  subordination  of  characteristics  goes 
beyond  simple  description.  He,  too,  seeks 
for  laws  of  solidarity  and  of  relations. 
Such  is  his  principle  of  the  correlation  of 
forms,  in  virtue  of  which  :  (i)  no  part  can 
change  without  the  rest  changing  also ;  (2) 
given  the  form  of  one  organ,  it  is  possible  to 
calculate  that  of  the  other  organs.  Such,  also, 
is  his  principle  of  the  conditions  of  existence, 
in  virtue  of  which  every  animal  possesses 
exactly  what  it  needs  to  ensure  its  existence 
under  the  conditions  in  which  it  is  placed. 
LHitherto,  we  have  seen  that  nature  is  con- 
sidered as  a  system.  Still,  from  the  heart  of 
the  Cartesian-Baconian  philosophy  there  arose 
doctrines  the  tendency  of  which  was  to  regard 
the  supreme  object  of  natural  science  as 
existing  not  in  immutable  order,  but  in  the 

136 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

history  and  genesis  of  beings.  Kant,  in  his 
Universal  History  of  Nature  and  Theory  of  the 
Heavens,  actually  infers  the  genesis  of  the  world. v 
In  the  eyes  of  the  philosopher,  Schelling  and 
Hegel  glorify  investigation  into  historical 
development,  assuming  the  identity  of  the 
logical  with  the  historical  order.  In  France, 
Condillac  sets  forth  his  system  of  the  transform-  - 
ation  of  sensation  as  both  historical  and  logical. 
They  go  so  far  as  to  attribute  to  the  past,  not 
merely  an  influence  over  the  present,  but  real 
causality  with  regard  to  it.  Hence  we  have 
the  doctrine  of  progress,  brilliantly  expounded 
by  Condorcet  in  his  Esquisse  d'un  tableau  his- 
torique  des  pr ogres  de  V esprit  humain.  Hence 
also  the  idea  of  historical  laws,  strictly  so 
called,  laws  which  no  longer  bind,  necessarily, 
the  simple  elements  of  things,  but  the  various 
phases  they  present  in  timer~jThese  ideas  came 
to  light  in  zoology,  in  so  far  as  they  were 
favoured  by  the  results  of  philosophy  which 
was  inclined  towards  an  explanation  of  the 
system  of  nature.  Philosophers  wedded  to 
the  idea  of  continuity  are  disposed  to  say  that 
identity  of  origin  gives  identity  of  type.  On 
the  other  hand,  partisans  of  the  discontinu- 
ous are  also  classifiers.  Consequently,  they 

137 

t 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

admit  that  species  are  not  wholly  sepa- 
rated, but  that  they  resemble  one  another 
in  certain  of  their  characteristics.  The  ideal 

J  of  classification  is  the  reduction  of  the  diverse 
to  a  single  principle.  But  then,  may  it  not 
happen  that  beings  countenance  such  a  distri- 
bution because  they  have  one  common  origin 
and  have  gradually  become  diversified,  like 
a  tree  whose  trunk  is  divided  into  branches 
more  or  less  distant  from  one  another  ? 

Buff  on  actually  builds  up  the  history  of  the 
earth.  Not  only  that,  but  when  comparing 
with  one  another  the  fauna  of  different  coun- 
tries, he  puts  forth  the  hypothesis  that  numer- 
ous species  may  be  reduced  to  a  small  number 
of  principal  stocks  from  which  all  the  rest  have 
arisen.  It  is  Lamarck,  however,  who  launches 

\  the  idea  of  a  genetic  explanation  of  the  variety 
of  beings,  clearly  conceived  for  the  first  time 
in  all  its  generality  and  means  of  realiza- 
tion. 

Lamarck  starts  by  investigating  the  lower 
organisms  ;  here  we  have  the  origin  of  his 
philosophy.  He  conceives  the  higher  forms 
as  having  sprung  from  these  lower  ones, 
and  seeks  the  explanation  of  these  trans- 
formations in  the  action  of  environment. 

138 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

Environment  makes  a  demand  upon  the  living 
being,  and  the  latter  adapts  itself  to  environ- 
ment. Lamarck  invokes  need  and  habit,  as 
links  between  cause  and  effect.  The  de- 
mand gives  rise  to  a  need,  the  need  deter- 
mines a  habit,  and  the  habit  creates  the  organ. 
Modifications  are  perpetuated  by  heredity,  . 
and  so  the  present  diversity  of  species  is 
explained.  The  changes  that  have  come 
about  in  environment  are  the  original  cause 
of  this  diversity. 

Darwin  takes  the  opposite  course.  He 
starts  with  the  present  fact  of  the  discon- 
tinuity of  species,  and  purposes  to  account  for 
this  discontinuity  by  mechanical  causes.  In 
contradistinction  to  Lamarck,  he  lays  it 
down  as  a  principle  that  every  species  is,  in 
itself,  plastic.  Indeed,  it  is  one  of  the 
characteristics  of  heredity  that  children  are 
never  exactly  like  their  parents.  Again, 
the  disproportion  between  propagation  and 
the  amount  of  food  sustenance  produces 
the  struggle  for  life.  This  latter,  in  turn, 
produces  natural  selection  which,  thanks 
to  heredity,  acts,  in  time,  like  our  arti- 
ficial selection.  And  so  Lamarck  explains 
variability  by  adaptation,  whereas  Darwin 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

explains  adaptation  by  variability ;    though 
both  are  alike  bent  upon  finding  an  explana- 

/    tion — and  that   a  mechanical   one — for   the 
genesis  of  beings. 

At  first,  no  one  paid  any  attention  to 
Lamarck's  system.  Darwin's  speedily  met 
with  huge  success,  but  it  was  not  long 
before  gaps  were  evident.  His  system  does 
not  go  back  to  the  causes  of  the  varia- 
tions upon  which  selection  is  exercised. 
It  does  not  explain  why  organisms  which 
were  found  side  by  side  grew  up  along 
different  lines,  instead  of  proceeding  along 
the  same.  Contemporary  science  attempts 
to  fill  up  these  gaps ;  M.  Espinas,  in  Societes 
animates,  and  M.  Edmond  Perrier,  in  Colon- 
ies animates  as  well  as  in  his  Traite  de 
Zoo  logic,  aim  at  ascending  to  the  very  origin 
of  organisms,  to  the  formation  of  original 
characteristics,  which  selection  may  emphasize 
or  obliterate.  Attempts  are  also  made  to 
discover  the  law  of  succession  itself,  or  the 
evolution  of  forms.  With  this  idea,  Haeckel 
put  forward  the  principle  of  the  parallelism 
of  ontogenetic  and  phylogenetic  develop- 

V    ment,  a  principle  which  scientists  are  inclined 
to  regard  as  true,  in  theory,  at  all  events,  i.e. 

140 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

basing  their  conclusions  on  normal  embryo- 
genetic  development. 

^To  sum  up,  whereas  Aristotle  tried  to 
discover  laws  of  finality,  and  Linnaeus,  Geoffroy 
Saint-Hilaire  and  Cuvier  laws  of  co-existence, 
the  modern  doctrine  of  evolution  seeks  after 
laws  of  causality  J7  it  claims  to  reach 
origins,  not  merely  relations  of  solidarity ; 
this,  too,  apart  from  all  metaphysical  con- 
siderations. It  looks  upon  origin  as  generation 
in  time.  Its  arguments  are :  (i)  the  refutation 
of  the  doctrine  of  separate  creations,  as  being 
connected  with  finality  and  powerless  to 
make  out  a  definite  list  of  species  ;  (2)  in- 
ductions based  on  comparative  palaeonto- 
logy, anatomy  and  embryogeny ;  (3)  the 
effective  reconstruction  of  more  or  less 
considerable  portions  of  the  genealogical  tree. 
Still,  the  opposite  school  does  not  regard  itself 
as  beaten.  It  invokes  facts,  and  alleges : 
(i)  that  it  is  the  evolutionists  who  introduce 
metaphysics  into  science  ;  (2)  that,  scientifi- 
cally, the  system  is  only  a  hypothesis  ;  (3) 
that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  links  that  are 
sought  for  are  lacking  in  a  number  of  cases  ; 
(4)  that  the  only  experimental  proof  of  a  con- 
vincing nature,  viz.  inter-fecundity  changed 

141 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

into  inter-sterility,  or  vice  versa,  is  altogether 
lacking. 

In  the  next  chapter,  we  shall  inquire  into 
the  philosophical  meaning  of  this  conten- 
tion. 


142 


X 

THE   BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

(Continuation  and  End) 

THE  preceding  chapter  was  given  up  to 
an  enquiry  into  the  various  phases 
through  which  zoological  philosophy  has 
passed.  In  antiquity,  it  was  the  meta- 
physical point  of  view  that  dominated ; 
species  are  connected  with  the  principle  which, 
to  the  mind,  accounts  for  their  existence, 
and  this  principle  is  type,  as  a  final  cause. 
The  illustrious  scientists  of  the  eighteenth 
and  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century 
abandoned  all  investigation  into  first  prin- 
ciples, and  purposed  more  particularly,  in 
their  systems  of  nature,  to  offer  a  survey  of 
the  logical  relations  which  connected  species 
with  one  another.  In  more  modern  times, 
the  followers  of  Lamarck  and  Darwin  have 
again  taken  up  the  question  of  origin,  from 
the  historical — not  the  metaphysical — point 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

of  view,  and  they  are  endeavouring  to  draw 
up  the  genealogical  tree  of  species.  What  is 
the  philosophical  meaning  of  the  contention 
referring  to  species  ? 

Here  we  must  beware  against  confusing 
the  scientific  with  the  philosophical  problem. 
Have  species  a  common  origin,  and  do  they 
descend  from  one  another  by  way  of 
generation  ?  Thus  stated,  the  question  is  an 
exclusively  scientific  one.  Nor  let  it  be 
said  that  questions  of  origin  belong  to  the 
realm  of  metaphysics,  and  not  to  that  of 
science.  This  is  true  of  the  absolute  origin 
of  being,  not  of  the  chronological  origin  of  the 
phenomenon,  and  it  is  the  latter  with  which 
we  are  here  dealing.  It  may  be  that  the 
problem  is  practically  an  insoluble  one  ;  that, 
however,  is  owing  to  insufficient  data,  not  to 
the  nature  of  the  question.  Whenever  we 
are  concerned  with  facts  which  either  have 
been  or  might  have  been  observed,  it  is  the 
business  of  the  scientist  to  try  to  discover  or 
infer  them.  Thus,  it  is  the  province  of 
science  alone  to  solve — so  far  as  it  can  be 
solved — the  problem  of  production  by  evolution 
or  of  the  original  separation  of  species.  Philo- 
sophy has  no  part  in  the  solution  of  this 

144 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

question,  its  business  is  to  investigate  the 
nature  of  the  laws  regarded  as  controlling 
either  the  transformation  or  the  permanence 
of  species,  and  to  find  out  if  these  laws  elimin- 
ate all  metaphysical  ideas,  or  if  they  involve, 
in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  some  element  that 
cannot  be  reduced  to  experimental  mechanism. 
On  this  question  there  are  certain  current 
opinions  that  are  almost  prejudices.  It  is 
frequently  said  that  to  concede  fixity  of 
species  is  to  appeal,  for  an  explanation  of 
nature,  to  the  supernatural  action  of  a 
providence  that  is  the  transcendent  per- 
sonification of  finality.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  is  often  declared  that  to  maintain  vari- 
ability is  straightway  to  repudiate  any 
doctrine  of  finality,  to  adhere  to  causality 
strictly  so  called,  and  to  conform  to  the  true 
scientific  spirit.  But  it  does  not  seem  at  all 
necessary  that  the  doctrine  of  fixity  should 
imply  belief  in  Providence,  or  that  trans- 
f ormism  should  do  away  with  every  principle 
of  finality.  It  might  even  be  affirmed  that 
there  is  something  unexpected  in  these  inter- 
pretations. Speaking  generally,  is  it  not 
the  principle  of  immutability  that  is  invoked 
to  show  that  things  are  self-sufficient  and 

145  K 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

have  no  need  of  God  ?  Eadem  sunt  omnia 
semper,  was  the  motto  of  Lucretius,  when  he 
maintained  that  the  gods  do  not  trouble 
about  the  world.  To  those  who  ask  :  Who 
made  things  ?  the  answer  comes :  They 
were  not  made,  for  in  essence  they  are 
eternal  and  change  not.  According  to  this 
view,  Newton  thought  that,  if  the  laws 
allowed  of  no  exception,  Providence  would 
cease  to  be  demonstrated.  Fortunately  the 
system  called  for  revision,  the  realization 
of  which  testified  to  the  workings  and 
presence  of  God.  Such  is  the  general 
thought  on  the  matter.  But  when  we  are 
dealing  with  natural  history,  everything 
changes  :  fixity  becomes  a  sign  of  finality, 
and  it  is  change  that  is  regarded  as  denoting 
the  absence  of  providential  action. 

The  proof  that  the  interpretation  here 
made  of  fixity  and  variability  is  not  in- 
evitable, is  that  Lamarck,  who  first  advanced 
the  idea  of  transformism,  purposely  con- 
nected his  doctrine  with  belief  in  a  supreme 
principle  of  order  and  harmony.  The  scale 
of  beings  represents,  he  said,  "  the  order  be- 
longing to  nature  and  resulting,  as  do  also 
the  objects  which  this  order  brings  into 

146 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

existence,  from  the  means  she  has  received 
at  the  hands  of  the  supreme  Author  of  all 
things.  .  .  .  Through  these  means,  which  she 
genuinely  continues  to  use,  (nature)  has  given 
and  is  perpetually  giving  existence  to  her 
productions  ;  she  is  continually  varying  and 
renewing  them,  and  thus  everywhere  pre- 
serves the  whole  order  resulting  therefrom."1 
Again:  "Thus,  by  such  wise  precautions, 
everything  is  maintained  in  the  established 
order  .  .  .  ;  the  progress  acquired  in  im- 
proving organization  is  by  no  means  lost ; 
everything  that  seems  to  be  disorder  and 
anomaly  is  continually  reverting  to  the 
general  order  and  even  contributing  thereto ; 
at  all  places  and  times,  the  will  of  the  supreme 
Author  of  nature  and  of  all  existence  is 
invariably  being  done."2 

How  has  the  habit  come  about  of  connecting 
with  the  question  of  variability  the  idea  of  a 
purely  natural  causality  ?  To  begin  with, 
there  would  appear  to  be  a  somewhat  futile 
cause  for  this  prejudice.  We  read  in  Genesis 


1  Lamarck,  Philosophie  zoologique,  1. 1,  p.  113,  quoted 
by  Perrier,  La  philosophie  zoologique  avant  Darwin,  p.  83. 

2  Idem,  p.  84. 

147 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

that  the  plants  and  trees,  animals  and  birds 
were  created,  each  bearing  seed  after  its  own 
species  or  kind.  This  text  has  been  inter- 
preted literally,  and  the  irreducibility  of 
species  has  been  regarded  as  one  with  the 
doctrine  of  creation.  To  uphold  fixity,  then, 
was  to  acknowledge  a  creator  ;  to  deny  fixity 
was  to  overthrow  the  foundations  of  meta- 
physics and  religion,  by  convicting  the  writer 
of  Genesis  of  being  scientifically  at  fault. 
Nevertheless  the  opinion  in  question  is  based 
on  other  foundations  also.  The  Greeks  looked 
V  upon  immobility  as  being  perfection  ;  the 
reason  they  thought  of  God  as  apart  from  the 
world,  was  that  the  world,  to  their  mind, 
was  essentially  subject  to  motion.  The 
doctrine,  therefore,  which  connected  the 
fixed  with  the  divine,  was  a  classic  one,  and 
it  is  quite  conceivable  that  this  point  of  view 
is  also  that  of  many  thinkers.  Still,  speaking 
generally,  the  moderns  are  not  of  this  opinion  ; 
^  they  extol  motion,  life  and  progress,  and 
consider  immobility  as  akin  to  stagnation 
and  death. 

In  a  word,  neither  fixity  nor  variability, 
of  themselves,  denote,  nor  do  they  exclude, 
finality.  We  must  determine  more  closely 

148 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

the  conditions  of  this  latter,  and  see  if  these 
conditions  are  to  be  found,  either  in  the  laws 
laid  down  by  the  partisans  of  conservation, 
or  in  those  laid  down  by  the  partisans  of 
transformism. 

By  what  sign  may  we  recognize  finality  and 
distinguish  it  from  simple  causality  ?  When- 
ever past  facts,  strictly  observable,  suffice 
fully  to  explain  a  phenomenon,  the  explana- 
tion is  a  causal  one.  If  the  past  facts  are 
inadequate  and  appeal  has  to  be  made  to 
something  which  has  not  been  realized,  does 
not  yet  exist,  will  never  perhaps  be  fully  real- 
ized, or  which  must  be  so  only  at  some  future 
time,  and  thus  appears  only  as  possible,  then 
the  explanation  is  more  or  less  finalistic. 

On  the  whole,  the  doctrine  of  the  fixity 
of  species,  as  supported  by  its  representa- 
tives, sets  up  fewer  philosophical  claims  than 
the  contrary  doctrine.  It  is  based  solely 
on  observation  and  experiment,  and  consists, 
essentially,  in  affirming  that  up  to  the 
present,  no  single  fact  of  the  creation  or  the 
blending  of  species  has  been  established.  The 
explanation  of  this  fixity  by  the  operation 
of  Providence  is  rather  an  addition  to  the 
doctrine  than  an  integral  part  of  it.  No 

149 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

doubt  the  order  and  harmony  with  environ- 
ment which  we  find  in  species  may  make  one 
think  of  some  guiding  intelligence ;  but 
then,  they  may  be  affirmed  as  facts,  without 
any  attempt  to  explain  them.  Certainly  no 
great  value  can  be  attributed  to  the  explana- 
tion offered,  so  long  as  the  consideration  of  the 
present  state  of  things  is  insisted  on,  without 
inquiring  if  this  state  may  be  indefinitely 
extended  to  past  and  future.  This,  indeed, 
is  the  attitude  of  the  antitransformist  school. 
It  abides  by  present  facts,  troubling  neither 
about  origins  nor  future  possibilities.  And 
this  is  why  it  can  give  a  philosophical 
bearing  to  its  doctrines  only  by  modifying 
their  character  and  spirit.  Finalistic  beliefs, 
though  frequently  connected  with  antitrans- 
formism,  form  no  part  of  it. 

Transformism,  on  the  other  hand,  usually 
shows  itself  as  a  philosophy  pregnant  with 
metaphysical,  religious  and  moral  conse- 
quences ;  what  it  purposes  to  do  is  to  explain 
the  existence  and  order  of  species,  apart  from 
any  finalistic  hypothesis.  It  is  this  system 
more  particularly  that  we  have  to  examine. 
As  we  have  seen,  it  assumes  two  forms : 
Darwinism  and  evolutionism.  Let  us  examine 

150 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

Darwinism,  the  first  in  point  of  time  and  also 
the  more  rigorous  of  the  two,  from  the  scienti- 
fic aspect. 

We  begin  by  establishing  the  present 
existence  of  species  and  their  adaptation  to 
environment ;  but  instead  of  generalizing 
this  fact  ad  infinitum,  in  time  and  space,  an 
attempt  is  made  to  explain  it,  and  that 
historically,  by  the  action  of  the  past  on  the  V 
present,  in  conformity  with  the  law  of  inertia. 
Heredity  offers  a  succession  of  beings  relatively 
similar  to  one  another  ;  though,  on  the  whole, 
they  admit  of  a  few  slight  variations.  These 
variations  are  looked  upon  as  the  starting- 
point  of  the  present  diversity  of  species.  In 
cattle-breeding,  nature,  by  the  aid  of  blind 
forces,  effects  the  same  results  as  man  brings 
to  pass  by  his  skill.  The  struggle  for  life  is 
nature's  substitute  for  intelligence.  Through 
this  struggle  there  mechanically  comes  about 
a  natural  selection,  analogous  to  artificial 
selection. 

Darwinism,  accurately  stated,  considerably 
restricts  the  part  played  by  finality,  since  the 
struggle  for  life  on  which  it  is  based  results 
from  the  disproportion  between  the  number 
of  living  beings  and  the  means  they  have  of 


s 

NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

supporting  life :  a  disproportion  that  is 
altogether  opposed  to  harmony  and  fitness. 
Still,  the  struggle  for  life  itself  implies 
that  every  individual  has  a  tendency  to  live 
and  grow,  and  that  it  uses  the  right  means  to 
attain  this  end ;  and  heredity,  established 
as  a  fact,  though  its  principle  is  unknown, 
possesses  the  remarkable  characteristic  of 
ensuring  the  perpetuity  of  the  type,  through 
the  disappearance  of  its  individual  members. 
Nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that  finality  may 
well  be  realized  by  means  of  very  general 
and  constant  laws.  The  main  objection  to 
Darwinism,  however,  is  that  it  offers  a  gap ; 
for  it  identifies  natural  with  artificial  selec- 
tion. Now,  this  identification  is  possible 
only  if  the  useful  accidental  characteristics 
reach  a  sufficient  stage  of  development  to 
be  capable  of  being  used.  At  the  outset, 
they  are  scarcely  noticeable  and  altogether 
lacking  in  consistence.  Who  sustains  and 
fosters  them,  between  the  time  when  they 
first  appear,  and  the  time  when  they  become 
capable  of  ensuring  the  survival  of  the  beings 
endowed  therewith  ?  Does  not  everything 
take  place  as  though  beings  possessed  an 
instinct  which  makes  a  more  or  less  vague 

152 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

choice  of  the   means  fitted  to  ensure  their 
existence  ? 

However  it  be,  Darwinism  is  a  system  that 

is  mainly  scientific.     It   does  not   claim  to 

explain    everything  or  to   be   exempt   from 

'  gaps.     Evolutionism,    on    the    other   hand, 

s,  offers    itself    as    a    complete    system,    both 

S  scientific  and  philosophical,  in  which  finality 

''  must  be  wholly  replaced  by  mechanism.     The 

means  employed  is  the  establishment  between 

all  beings  of  a  dual  relationship  of  continuity 

and  efficient  causality.     It  is  thought  that  this 

will  be  done  by  picturing  to  oneself  the  scale 

of  beings  as  follows  :  (i)  At  the  lowest  stage, 

we  find  protoplasm,  endowed  with  irritability. 

When   subjected   to   excitation,    it   becomes 

modified,    forming   colonies   and   organisms. 

(2)  The    physical   and   social    conditions,  in 
which  living  matter  has  been  historically  found, 
have  determined  all  the  forms  it  has  assumed. 

(3)  All  beings  come  into  existence,  by  way  of 
generation,  from  protoplasm,  and  science  will 
build   up   this  genealogical   tree  with  ever- 
increasing  completeness,  and  thus  explain  the 
compound  by  means  of  the  simple,  after  the 
fashion  of  the  physical  sciences. 

This  system,  being  conceived  as  complete, 
153 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

is  all  idea  of  finality  thereby  rendered  illusory  ? 

We  have  succeeded,  it  would  appear,  in 
getting  rid  of  external  finality.  But  there  is 
also  immanent  finality,  another  form  of  it, 
which,  even  in  Aristotle,  by  no  means  ex- 
cluded but  rather  required  a  certain  degree  of 
variability. 

We  invoke  continuity ;  but  apart  from 
the  fact  that  we  do  not  see  why  continuity, 
which  is  by  no  means  identity,  should  exclude 
final  causes,  we  are  here  dealing  only  with  a 
very  rough  kind  of  continuity  which  always, 
when  more  accurately  observed,  resolves  itself 
into  discontinuity.  Indeed,  discontinuity 
is  explained  by  discontinuity :  the  degree 
alone  differs  in  elements  and  compounds. 
Still,  when  dealing  with  the  organic  world,  a 
slight  difference  may  be  very  serious. 

The  sign  of  efficient  causality  would  be  to 
explain  specification  and  adaptation,  which 
seem  to  imply  finality,  by  principles  in 
themselves  devoid  of  these  two  character- 
istics. But  here  the  element  is  actually  an 
individual,  and  reproduces,  by  heredity,  its 
very  individuality.  In  addition,  it  possesses 
within  itself  an  evolutive  force,  by  means  of 
which  it  adapts  itself  more  and  more  to  the 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

conditions  in  which  it  must  live.  The  result  is 
that  the  characteristics  it  is  proposed  to  ex- 
plain are  presupposed  in  the  very  elements 
taken  for  granted.  The  difference  is  only  one 
of  degree.  In  reality,  we  ascribe  to  ourselves 
the  power  of  specification  and  adaptation, 
and  show  how,  if  circumstances  permit,  this 
power  passes  into  action,  and  realizes  the 
species  we  have  before  our  eyes.  Finality 
is  presupposed  by  the  entire  system. 

The  zoological  laws,  therefore,  are  not  actu- 
ally reduced  to  the  physico-chemical  laws.    In 
the  very  systems  in  which  they  come  nearest  to 
them,  they  remain  separate  and  original.     In-] 
deed,  they  regulate  the  order  of  things  in  time.  I 
The  physical  laws  regulate  only  relations  oft 
cause  and  effect,  one  of  the  two  terms  being  1 
assumed  as  given.     Evolutionism  transfers  to 
succession  of  beings  in  time  the  notion  of  physi-  i 
cal  causality,  which,  of  itself,  relates  only  to  a  | 
couple  of  phenomena  taking  place  at  any  par-  * 
ticular  time.     It  introduces  the  historical  idea 
of  law.    According  to  this  system,   nature 
may  be  compared  to  a  man  who  is  acquiring 
experience   and   advancing  more    and  more 
directly    towards    his    goal.     By    means    of 
this  uew  type  of  law,  we  may  conceive,  as 

155 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

determinate,  relations  which  the  purely  static 
sciences  left  indeterminate.  But  we  are  going 
farther  and  farther  away  from  the  type  of 

\  necessity.     According  to  the  idea  of  necessity, 

i indeed,  the  nature  of  things  is  immutable, 

(and    laws    are    the    relations    that    result 

•therefrom.     Here    the    nature    of    things    is 

variable,    and    laws    unite   to    one    another 

terms  that  are  always  modified.     More  than 

this :    they    connect    the    less    perfect    with 

the    more  perfect.    These  are  laws  of  pro- 

rgress.     Is  it  still  necessity,  and  nothing  else, 

that    gives    a    new  aspect    to   these    laws  ? 

Science   answers   neither  in   the   affirmative 

nor   in    the  negative,  for  it    by    no    means 

reduces  the  biological  to  the  mechanical  laws. 

Here  we  are  left  to  the    intuitions    of    our 

^mind.  If  we  believe  that  the  word  progress 
has  indeed  but  a  relative  meaning,  and  that, 
in  essence,  everything  is  as  good  as  every- 
thing else,  we  shall  believe  that  matter  must 
have  produced  life,  which,  in  this  case,  is 
nothing  more  than  a  word.  If  we  believe 
that  the  progress  of  organization  possesses 
real  worth,  we  shall  also  attribute  worth  to 
the  human  intellect,  which  insists  on  good 
being  an  end,  and  it  will  cost  us  no  more  to 

156 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

regard  nature,  from  which  man  must  issue,  as 
a  step  in  the  direction  of  human  nature,  than 
to  regard  man,  the  offshoot  of  nature,  as  a 
grouping  together  of  material  elements.  If 
then,  when  dealing  with  biology,  determinism 
becomes  more  confined  and  restricted,  less 
and  less  does  it  coincide  with  necessity  and 
mechanism.  Contemporary  philosophy  is  at 
fault  in  having  confused  the  two  terms : 
necessity  and  determinism.1 

1  Compare  the  following  lines  of  Huxley  :  "  It  is 
certain  .  .  .  that  the  notion  of  necessity  is  something 
illegitimately  thrust  into  the  perfectly  legitimate  con- 
ception of  law.  .  .  ."  Huxley's  Lay  Sermons,  p.  158. 

In  his  work  on  Evolution,  Professor  Calderwood,  of 
the  University  of  Edinburgh,  expressed  himself  as 
follows  :  "  There  is  a  Power  operating  continually  in 
Nature,  which  does  not  come  within  range  of  the  obser- 
vation possible  to  scientific  modes  and  appliances,  yet 
to  which  Science  is  ever  indirectly  bearing  witness." — 
PROF.  CALDERWOOD  :  Evolution  and  Man's  Place  in 
Nature,  London,  1893,  p.  341. 


157 


XI 

[THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LAWSJ 

THERE  is  not  the  same  degree  of  precision 
and  clearness  in  the  concepts  of  psycho- 
logy as  in  those  of  the  physical  or  natural 
sciences :  consequently,  before  examining 
the  notion  of  psychological  law,  [we  will  go 
over  the  main  phases  through  which  psycho- 
logy has  passed,  and  thus  the  more  easily 
investigate  its  object  and  spirit .1 

At  the  present  time,  psychology  is  mainly 
concerned  with  scientific  interests.  This  re- 
mark, however,  calls  for  an  explanation,  for 
the  word,  science,  has  changed  its  meaning 
from  the  one  it  had  in  antiquity.  f The  ancients 
defined  science  as  the  knowledge,  a  priori, 
of  that  which  is,  i.e.  of  that  which  consti- 
tutes the  substratum  of  things  and  subsists 
throughout  all  change.  According  to  them, 
this  substratum  of  things  consisted  in  perfect 
form  and  final  cause.  To  investigate  the  / 

158 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL  LAWS 

science  of  the  soul,  along  these  lines,  was 
to  determine  the  idea  which  psychic  mani- 
festations tend  to  realize.  The  moderns 
adopt  a  different  standpoint ;  they  deter- 
mine the  idea  of  science  not  d  priori,  but 
from  the  sciences  actually  realized.  Thus, 
in  Bacon,  we  come  across  the  idea  of  pheno- 
menal law  or  the  constant  relation  between  \/ 
heterogeneous  things .v  Science,  in  his  view  ^ 
must  be  practical  and  establish  the  maxim 
that  governs  production,  i.e.  it  should  teach 
us  what  phenomenon  must  be  laid  down  ir 
order  that  the  one  we  have  in  view  ma) 
appear.  Here,  there  is  nothing  to  compe 
the  two  phenomena  to  be  reduced  to  each 
other  in  mind  :  there  may  be  no  logical 
connexion  between  them.  Descartes,  on 
the  other  hand,  taking  as  his  type  not 
material  production,  but  rather  mathematics, 
or  ideal  production,  thinks  that  exact 
science  consists  in  starting  with  rationally 
simple  elements,  and  composing,  from  these 
elements,  by  rational  deduction,  wholes 
which,  as  regards  essentials,  are  simi- 
lar to  the  objects  offered  us  by  experi- 
ence/] 
Now,  whether  we  take  Bacon  or  Descartes 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

as    our   guide,     it    would    seem    a    difficult 
matter  to  set  up  psychology  as  a   science. 
Will   the   Baconian   laws,    which   consist    of 
constant  relations  of  co-existence  or  of  succes- 
sion, be  included  in  manifestations  whose  com- 
plexity seems  infinite,  and  their  impermanence 
essential  ?     On  the  other  hand,  can  a  mathe- 
matical explanation,   such  as  Descartes  re- 
quires, be  applied  to  what  does  not  seem  amen- 
able to  measurement  ?     Seeing  that  Science  is 
I  looked  upon  as  either  an  ensemble  of  physical 
I  laws  or  a  chain  of  mathematical  demonstra- 
/  tions,  it  is  a  paradox,  so  to  speak,  to  expect 
\to  set  up  psychology  as  a  science.     And  yet 
the  moderns  have  done  all  they  could  to  effect 
this.     Let   us   look   at   the   results  of   these 
efforts. 

Hit  is  in  the  philosophy  of  Descartes  himself 
that  we  find  the  first  elaboration  of  psychology 
as  a  science.  Descartes  makes  a  distinction 
between  the  domain  of  science  and  that  of 
extension.  This  latter  is  the  peculiar  object 
of  science,  whereas  mind  is  its  artisan.  To 
become  an  object  of  science,  therefore,  the 
mind  must  be  regarded  from  the  standpoint 
of  extension/]  If  we  are  dealing  with  the 
essence  of  the  soul,  this  condition  is  impossible 

1 60 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LAWS 

of  realization.  Apart  from  thought  and 
extension,  however,  Descartes  admits  of  the 
union  of  soul  and  body  as  an  irreducible 
reality.  From  this  union,  there  result,  in 
the  soul,  accidental  modes  relating  to  exten- 
sion, and  which  may  be  regarded  from  the 
standpoint  of  extension.  Knowledge  of  these 
modes  may  be  scientific  in  the  same  way 
as  knowledge  of  sensible  phenomena.  This 
knowledge  relates  to  physiology,  which  is  no  / 
more  than  a  complex  aspect  of  physics. 

The  Cartesian  conception  is  a  very  clear 
one,  though  it  gives  rise  to  difficulties  that 
were  soon  noticed.  In  the  first  place,  it  re- 
moves from  science,  strictly  so  called,  under 
the  name  of  pure  thought,  a  considerable 
portion  of  psychic  life.  Then  it  raises  the 
question  as  to  the  right  by  which  there  is 
substituted  for  the  psychical  phenomenon, 
strictly  so  called,  i.e.  for  the  modification 
of  which  we  are  conscious,  a  wholly  hetero- 
geneous external  phenomenon.  The  solution 
of  this  difficulty  takes  up  the  whole  of  Car- 
tesian metaphysics,  culminating  in  confidence 
in  divine  truth,  nt  is  this  problem  of  the 
relation  between  soul  and  body,  implied  in 
the  claim  to  make  the  latter  the  standard 

161  L  ' 


/I 

V 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  former,  that  finds  a  response  in  the 
learned  though  transcendent  hypotheses  of 
occasional  causes,  unity  of  substance,  pre- 
established  harmony.  Here  science  is  justi- 
fied, though  really  by  belief.  Thus,  the 
correspondence  postulated  by  Cartesianism 
could  be  neither  rigorously  defined  nor  demon- 
strated ;  it  remained  founded  upon  the 
God,  the  common  principle  of  soul  and  body, 
to  which  Descartes  had  appealed.  But  whilst 
the  Cartesians  were  using  their  utmost  efforts 
to  find  in  the  body  the  faithful  expression  of 
the  soul,  others  tried  to  discover  in  the  soul, 
considered  apart,  the  elements  of  a  scientific 
psychology.  These  were  the  English  philo- 
sophers. They  started  with  the  Baconian 
idea  of  natural  law  and  combined  this  idea 
with  Cartesian  principles. 

Locke  regards  a  distinctively  psychic  ele- 
ment, the  idea,  as  lying  at  the  roo^  of  the 
science  of  the  soul.  Ideas  form  the  counter- 
parts of  material  atoms.  They  are  definite, 
impenetrable  units,  external  to  one  another, 
and  are  brought  into  the  understanding  by 
experience,  without  the  intervention  of  any 
intellectual  activity.  They  cannot  collect  of 
themselves  any  more  than  atoms  can  ;  but 

162 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL  LAWS 

whereas  the  collecting  of  the  latter  takes 
place  by  means  of  natural  forces,  that  of 
ideas  is  artificial ;  being  due  to  the  activity  of 
the  human  mind.  Combining  or  separating 
the  ideas  that  come  to  it,  the  understanding 
converts  them  into  a  structure  which  forms 
the  fabric  of  our  knowledge. 

In  Locke,  we  have  dualism  :  the  arrange- 
ment of  ideas  or  materials  comes  about,  not  of 
themselves,  but  through  the  activity  of  mind  : 
the  architect.  |  As  it  developed,  this  philosophy 
became  dual :  two  groups  of  doctrines  corre- 
spond to  the  two  elements  of  knowledge, 
distinguished  by  Locke. 

The  first  direction  it  took  is  represented 
by  the  philosophers  who  may  accurately  be 
termed  Ideologists.  They  attempt  to  build 
up  the  whole  of  psychology  from  ideas  alone. 
Their  concern  is  to  render  of  none  effect  all 
that  Locke  did  with  the  object  of  grouping 
ideas.  To  discover  more  and  more  com- 
pletely in  ideas  themselves  the  cause  of 
their  connexion  :  this  is  the  direction  of 
the  progress  of  these  doctrines.  For  in- 
stance, Berkeley  shows  that  there  exist 
distinctively  psychic  laws  :  the  visual  per- 
ception of  distance  cannot  be  explained 

163 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

by  a  necessary  inference  obtained,  without 
having    recourse    to    experience,  by    means 
of  visual  geometry.     It  consists  of  the  sug- 
gestion  of  tactile   perceptions   produced   by 
visual   perceptions,    within   the    imagination 
and  through  experience.     The  various   per- 
ceptions have  thus  the  property  of  suggest- 
ing  one  another,   in  spite   of    their    mutual 
irreducibility  ;    consequently,  this  suggestion 
is  contingent.      Here  is  an  instance  of  a  psychic 
S     law  conceived  in  an  ideological  sense.  /This 
idea  of  psychic  law,  as  a  substitute   for  the 
spiritual  activity  of  Locke,  forms  the  ground- 
work of  Hume's  philosophy.     By  the  aid  of 
jnental   impressions   and   the   laws    inherent 
~"~7*£  in  them,  Hume  thinks  that  the  entire  system 
of  our  knowledge  can  be  explained.]  Impres- 
sions, as  they  weaken,  become  ideas.     These 
ideas  associate  of  themselves,   according  to 
relations  of  resemblance,  contiguity  and  causa- 
V    tion,  causation  being  nothing  but  the  tendency 
of  an  idea  to  call  forth  a  heterogeneous  idea 
with  which  it  has  frequently  been  associated. 
[^Bodies,  likewise,  according  to  Newton,  attract 
one  another  in  accordance  with  a  law  by 
which  only  their  mass  and  their  distance  are 
taken  into  account.     Here  we  have  no  longer 

164 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LAWS 

a  duality  of  mind  and  idea,  as  in  the  case  of 
Locke,  since  the  psychological  laws  are  but 
relations  that  result  from  the  nature  of  the 
ideas  themselves.  And  yet,  the  notion  of 
tendency,  i.e.  of  the  habit  of  imagination,  to 
which  Hume  appeals,  has  something  mysteri- 
ous about  it.  Whilst  founding  or  basing  this 
habit  upon  kindly  nature,  Hume  endows  it  with 
a  kind  of  objective  value.  John  Stuart  Mill 
endeavours  to  eliminate  even  more  completely 
every  trace  of  activity.  By  the  mere  force  of 
ideas,  an  association  becomes  inseparable,  if 
it  has  often  been  reproduced  and  never  con- 
tradicteoTT[  Association,  taken  literally,  that 
is  to  say,  a  law  analogous  in  all  points  to 
the  physical  laws,  must  explain  all  those 
concepts  and  processes  which  it  has  been 
deemed  necessary  to  attribute  to  spontaneity 
of  mind  :  viz.,  causality,  first  truths,  reason- 
ing, will,  morality,  exteriority,  body  and 
mind. 

(Such  is  the  development  of  Locke's  philo- 
sophy, conceived  in  an  ideological  sense.  It 
raises  a  certain  number  of  difficulties.  What 
is  this  given  :  the  starting-point  of  the  ideolo- 
gists and  the  thing  by  which  they  endeavour  to 
explain  the  entire  psychic  life  ?  The  atom-idea 

165 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

r  is  no  clearer  a  concept  than  the  material  atom. 
Is  it  true  that  there  may  be  psychic  indivisibles, 
when  we  are  unable  even  to  find  a  corporeal 
indivisible  ?  And  if  we  analyse  this  pre- 
tended given  :  the  idea  of  the  ideologists,  do 
we  not  always  find  in  it,  along  with  an  element 
that  has  been  introduced  from  without,  that 
very  mental  activity  we  purposed  to  eliminate  ? 
-  What  is  the  value  of  a  doctrine  if  its  principles 
take  for  granted  the  one  thing  it  claims  to 
dispense  with  ?  Thus  reason  the  second 
category  of  Locke's  followers,  whom  we  may 
designate  as  the  "  dynamist  "  psychologistsj 
Moreover,  amongst  the  dynamists,  we  may 
distinguish  those  who  proceed  by  analysis 
and  those  who  proceed  by  simple  observa- 
tion. 

L,Condillac  may  rightly  be  included  amongst 
the  representatives  of  analytical  dynamism. 
Indeed,  the  sensation  which  he  posits  as 
primal  and  fundamental  is  no  mere  indivisible, 
inert  datum  ;  it  is  a  faculty,  and  develops 
by  reason  of  the  activity  proper  to  it.  This 
activity  consists  in  analysing  itself,  and 
thereby  becoming  diversified  and  transformed 
into  higher  and  more  special  faculties.  The 
greatest  representative  of  analysis,  however,/ 

166 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL  LAWS 

is  Kant.  He  regards  it  as  impossible  to 
explain  the  judgment  of  existence,  implied 
in  all  experience,  unless  we  admit  that 
the  mind  is  originally  active.  In  spite  of 
everything,  then,  this  activity  is  to  be  found 
at  the  root  of  all  that  is  called  given. 
The  given,  pure  and  simple,  is  nothing  but  a 
chimera.  The  only  given  is  what  the  mind 
gives  itself  when  it  assimilates  the  materials 
supplied  by  the  outside  world.  Thus  was 
formed,  by  the  use  of  the  analytical  method, 
the  so-called  "  faculty "  doctrine. 

Along  another  path,  by  interior  observation 
followed  out  as  far  as  it  could  possibly  be 
carried,  the  Scottish  philosophers  reach  similar 
results.  Reid  discovers,  by  a  process  of  in- 
trospection, that  external  perceptions,  which 
Locke  interpreted  as  simple  ideas,  possess  three 
elements :  sensation,  the  conception  of  an 
external  object  of  which  sensation  is  the  sign 
or  mark,  and  immediate  belief  in  the  present 
existence  of  this  object.  Now,  this  belief 
is  a  primitive  judgment  formed  in  virtue 
of  fundamental  psychic  laws,  called  the 
principles  of  common  sense  J  Following  on 
Reid,  Jouffroy  thinks  he  perceives,  beneath 
phenomena,  the  faculties  that  are  the  govern- 

167 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

ing  factors  in  them  ;  and  beneath  the  faculties, 
the  very  substance  which  possesses  these  facul- 
ties. He  arrives  at  apriorism  by  observation 
pure  and  simple.  Whether  it  be,  then,  by  the 
method  of  observation  or  by  that  of  analysis, 
something  besides  facts  is  obtained.  Over 
against  associationism  stands  apriorism  in  the 
development  of  Locke's  philosophy.  The 
two  principles  this  philosophy  had  brought 
together  have  become  dissociated  and  anta- 
gonistic to  each  other. 
/"We  have  seen  that  the  mathematical 
psychology  of  the  Cartesians  was  incap- 
able of  firmly  establishing  its  position.  Will 
the  psychology  of  introspection,  which 
originated  with  Locke,  suffice  for  modern 
philosophy,  which  investigates  the  science 
of  the  soul  ?  Dynamists  and  associationists 
are  engaged  on  a  problem  which,  on  the 
ground  of  interior  observation  alone,  seems 
impossible  of  solution.  Experience  pre- 
supposes principles  d  priori,  say  Kant's 
followers.  I  can  explain  your  principles  d 
priori  by  experience  itself,  replies  Mill.  Both 
sides  accuse  each  other  of  arguing  in  a  circle. 
Besides,  neither  doctrine,  in  itself,  really 
fulfils  the  conditions  of  science.  The  dyna-  / 

168 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LAWS 

mists  are  reproached  for  an  apriorism  which 
goes  beyond  the  bounds  of  science  and  admits 
of  no  definite  relation  to  facts.  On  the  other 
hand,  when  associationism  itself  comes  to  be 
completely  formulated,  it  acknowledges  its  own 
inadequacy.  The  self  indeed,  according  to 
this  doctrine,  would  appear  to  be  only  a 
series  of  conscious  states,  a  series  that  knows 
itself.  But  then,  how  can  a  series  know  itself, 
i.e.  unify  itself  ?  Whence  comes  the  bond 
between  them  ?  Mill  himself  agrees  that  this 
unity  cannot  be  a  simple  product  of  the  laws 
of  thought,  and  so  he  appeals  to  the  Self/] 
On  the  other  hand,  the  connexions  between 
psychic  phenomena  which  can  be  discovered 
by  interior  observation  remain  extremely 
loose  and  indeterminate.  The  ideologists 
postulated  that  ideas  form  a  world  apart,  one 
which  has  its  own  laws,  like  the  world  of 
bodies.  But  is  the  psychic  thus  self-sufficient  ? 
This  does  not  seem  to  be  the  case,  and  so 
associationism,  which  deals  only  with  states 
of  consciousness,  may  well  be  descriptive, 
though  not  explanatory ;  or,  anyhow,  it 
can  offer  none  but  the  vaguest  and  most 
general  explanations. 

Fin  presence   of  the  gaps,  irremediable,  it ^ 

169 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

/ 

may  be,  in  the  psychology  of  introspection, 

the  Cartesian  idea  of  the  explanation  of  the 
soul  by  the  body  has  again  been  advanced. 
Has  man  any  other  means  of  knowing 
scientifically  than  through  matter  ?  May 
not  matter  be  just  the  form — and  nothing 
else — that  mind  gives  to  things  when  at- 
tempting to  attain  to  a  knowledge  of  them  ? 
To  try  to  find  in  external,  measurable  things, 
the  expressions  and  substitutes  of  mental 
affections  :  such  is  to  be  the  spirit  of  the 
investigation  we  now  have  to  examine.  But 
the  psychologists  will  endeavour  to  avoid 
the  difficulties  which  compromised  Cartesian- 
ism.  This  latter  evidently  wished,  off-hand 
and  once  for  all,  to  ensure  that  the  psychic 
corresponded  with  the  physical ;  to  do  this, 
it  plunged  into  the  most  difficult  metaphysical 
investigations.  The  moderns,  gradually  and 
in  the  light  of  experience,  will  endeavour 
to  set  up  a  series  of  relations  between  physical 
phenomena  and  psychic  phenomena,  con- 
sidered in  detail.  I 

Bain  remained  a  Scotchman,  in  many 
respects.  All  the  same,  he  assimilated 
the  new  tendency,  when  he  conceived  of 
observation  in  a  way  that  combines  external 

170 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL  LAWS 

with  internal  observation.  According  to  him, 
if  we  would  attain  to  the  real,  and  not  merely 
to  something  abstract,  we  must  consider  the 
psychic  fact  in  its  natural  totality,  and 
never  isolate  the  internal  element  from  its 
physiological  and  physical  concomitants.  To 
study  both  terms  in  their  conjunction,  is 
the  method  to  be  followed. 

Spencer,  in  one  vast  synthesis,  appealed 
to  the  infinite,  and  intercalated,  between  the 
psychic  and  the  physical,  an  infinity  of  inter- 
mediaries, which  enabled  the  former  to 
be  conceived  as  a  product  of  the  latter.  He 
considered  that  the  psychic  has  its  explana- 
tion in  the  physical,  in  so  far  as  even  the  most 
complicated  mental  phenomena  are  gradually 
reducible  to  reflex  action  and  in  so  far  as  this 
evolution  itself  has  for  its  principle  the  growing 
correspondence  of  the  organism  with  its  en- 
vironment. Adaptation  to  external  conditions 
is  thus  the  common  characteristic  both  of  the 
life  of  the  soul  and  of  that  of  the  body.  The 
laws  of  the  body  are  simpler ;  those  of  the 
soul,  more  complicated.  Again,  whereas 
changes  in  the  body  are  both  simultaneous 
and  successive,  in  the  soul  they  are  only 
successive.  The  essential  constitution  of  the 

171 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

soul  is  the  property  of  perceiving  a  difference  ; 
it  is  the  specification  of  this  property  that 
causes  all  its  faculties  to  appear. 
{/Thus,  whereas  Spencer  regards  as  legitimate 
the  point  of  view  of  external  observation  in 
psychology,  professional  scientists  enter  upon 
the  problems  in  detail,  after  the  fashion  of  the 

j  physicist  or  the  naturalist.^  The  question 
with  them,  as  with  Descartes,  is  to  find  the 
exact  angle,  so  to  speak,  from  which  things 
may  be  known  scientifically. 
U  It  was  with  this  idea  that  Fechner  sought 
for  the  mathematical  relation  between  ex- 
citation and  sensation.  His  law  is  strictly 
scientific  in  form,  but  it  is  difficult  to  bring 
it  into  perfect  accord  with  minutely  ob- 
served facts,  and  so  to  determine,  with 
certainty,  their  psychological  signification. 
He  brought  the  psychical  into  direct  contact 

j  with  the  mathematical  .J]  It  is  more  prudent 
to  intercalate  intermediaries,  and  these  are 
supplied  by  physiology.  Hence  we  get  experi- 
mental physiological  psychology.  In  accord- 
ance with  this  discipline,  the  psychic  ele- 
ment is  grasped — and  will  be  for  a  long  time 
yet — only  by  consciousness  ;  still,  we  are 
entitled  to  acknowledge  that  it  corresponds 

172 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL  LAWS 

to  a  physiological  process  which  is  connected, 
according  to  the  general  laws  of  physiology, 
with  observable  physiological  processes.  In- 
deed, the  phenomena  of  nerve- transmission, 
which  are  undoubtedly  phenomena  of  material 
motion,  are  not  known  by  consciousness.  It 
may,  then,  be  the  case  that  thought  also  is 
accompanied  by  movements,  without  our 
being  aware  of  them.  And  so,  between  the 
impression  from  without  and  the  correspond- 
ing visible  action,  it  is  natural  to  admit  of 
a  continuity  of  physical  phenomena.  The 
psychologist,  then,  seeks  to  become  acquainted 
with  psychic  acts  through  their  observable 
physical  and  physiological  antecedents  and 
consequents.  He  sets  up  relations  of  cause 
and  effect  between  physical  phenomena  and 
states  of  consciousness,  until  these  latter 
are  themselves  known  in  their  immediate 
material  substratum.  C~~And,  according  to 
Descartes'  method,  experimental  psychology 
proceeds  from  the  simple  to  the  com- 
plex :  at  first,  it  purposes  to  measure  the 
duration  of  psychic  acts,  from  the  most 
elementary,  which  is  simple  reaction,  to  the 
most  advanced,  such  as  the  perception  of 
difference,  the  action  of  counting  and  naming^ 

173 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

and  the  increasingly  complex  process  of 
reasoning.  I  Thus,  it  gradually  extends  its  do- 
main ;  and,  where  experimentation  cannot  yet 
find  scope,  it  is  content,  for  the  time,  to  be 
descriptive,  as  Bain  meant  it  to  be,  when 
taking  into  consideration  not  only  sane  states 
but  more  particularly  morbid  ones,  which 
are,  as  it  were,  experimental  decompositions 
of  the  phenomena  wrought  by  nature  her- 
self. What  is  it  that  this  psychology  desires  ? 
Its  founders,  Helmholtz  and  Wundt,  without 
mentioning  Fechner,  do  not  profess  to  elimin- 
ate all  a  priori  elements.  Helmholtz  admits 
causality  in  the  Kantian  sense.  Wundt  super- 
imposes on  the  mechanism  of  the  lower  func- 
tions an  intellectual  activity  which  uses  this 
mechanism  to  realize  ends  proper  to  itself. 
Several  are  inclined  to  go  further  in  this 
direction.  Beaunis,  however,  is  of  opinion 
that,  for  the  time  at  all  events,  we  must 
neglect  moral  phenomena  and  all  that  seems 
to  be  the  special  characteristic  of  man,  and 
confine  ourselves  to  a  consideration  of  the 
psychic  phenomena  common  to  man  and 
animal  alike. 

tJt  now  remains  for  us  to  examine  the  philo- 
sophical signification  of  the  psychological  laws.^f 


XII 

THE    PSYCHOLOGICAL   LAWS 

(Continuation  and  end) 

L  A  FTER  reviewing,  in  the  last  chapter,  the 
JL\.  various  methods  relating  to  the  deter- 
mination of  the  psychological  laws,  we  have 
now  to  estimate  the  results  to  which  these 
methods  may  lead.  Of  the  two  main  types  of 
psychological  laws  which  we  have  recognized, 
the(firsb,  the  ideological  type,  is  analogous  to 
the  physical  laws,  mutatis  mutandis,  i.e.  it  sets 
up  a  connexion  between  terms  of  the  same 
nature,  these  terms  being,  in  the  present 
instance,  states  of  consciousness.  This  con- 
ception of  the  psychic  law  dates  back,  more' 
especially,  to  Locke.  The  laws  of  the^secoTi 
kind,  those  that  have  their  first  model  in  th 
Cartesian  doctrine,  set  up  a  relation  between 
a  psychic  phenomenon  and  a  physical  one 
From  this  point  of  view,  it  is  hoped  not  only 
to  constitute  psychology  as  a  science  analogous 

175 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 
/ 
fto  the  physical  sciences,  but  also  to  bring  it 

/expressly  within  the  domain  of  the  sciences  of 

'nature."! 

Now,  of  what  do  these  two  kinds  of 
laws  consist  ?  Are  they  really  of  the  same 
nature  as  the  laws  of  the  sciences  that  deal 
with  matter  ?  Can  they  comprehend  psychic 
reality  without  appealing  to  any  notion  of 
activity  ?  In  what  way  is  a  soulless  psycho- 
logy possible  and  how  far  does  its  influence 
extend  ? 

CXet  us  first  consider  the  ideological  laws, 
or  the  laws  of  psychic  associations.  To  estab- 
lish such  laws,  Locke  and  his  followers  must 
have  brought  psychic  facts  before  their  mind 
in  an  altogether  artificial  manner.  To  them, 
these  facts  are  indivisible  elements  bound 
to  one  another  from  without,  like  the  ele- 
ments of  matter  in  atomism.^  But  how  is  it 

«j 

possible  to  bring  before  the  mind,  to  conceive 
of  an  indivisible  psychic  element  ?  In  this 
order  of  things,  where  are  fixed,  definite 
materials  to  be  found,  set  alongside  and  yet 
distinct  from  each  other,  like  the  stones  of 
a  building  ?  Properties  of  this  kind  are 
shown  by  words  and  letters.  The  associa- 
tionist  psychology  takes  the  data  of  lan- 

176 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL  LAWS 

guage  for  the  elements  of  the  inner  life,  of 
which  they  form  only  a  rough  image. 

But,  it  will  be  urged,  do  not  the  most 
perfect  sciences  presuppose  artifices  and  sym- 
bols ?  Certainly,  and  these  latter  are  justified 
by  the  services  they  render.  For  instance, 
/In  chemistry,  the  atomic  hypothesis  leads 
to  consequences  which  can  be  confronted  with 
facts,  by  means  of  definite  experiments.  In 
psychology,  there  is  nothing  of  the  kind,  for 
it  is  not  possible  to  build  up  a  mechanical 
collection  of  ideas  and  compare  with  facts 
the  results  of  a  strict  deduction  J  Here, 
synthesis  merely  reproduces  a  more  or  less 
exact  and  searching  analysis.  Demonstration 
is  never  anything  else  than  illusory. 

Taken  for  what  they  are,  i.e.  for  simple 
metaphorical  interpretations  of  psychological 
relations,  the  laws  of  association  have  the 
disadvantage  of  being  strangely  vague.  They 
seem  to  be  realized  because  they  imply  ob- 
jects of  knowledge  to  but  a  slight  extent. 
One  idea  is,  speaking  generally,  preceded  by 
another ;  and  as  associationism  requires 
not  the  faintest  logical  connexion  between 
two  ideas  for  one  of  them  to  be  proclaimed 
the  cause  of  the  other,  so  we  are  always  en- 

177  M 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

titled  to  set  up  the  antecedent  as  the  cause, 
and  explain  by  simple  association  the  appear- 
ance of  an  idea.  The  system  supplies  tables 
of  cases  in  which  a  relation  of  causality  takes 
place,  but  it  neglects  to  do  so  in  cases  where 
this  relation  does  not  take  place.  How  many 
ideas  are  contiguous  in  consciousness  without 
being  associated  with  one  another !  We  must 
also  assure  ourselves  that  explanations  by 
association,  which  we  all  like  to  give,  are  not 
simple  products  of  the  imagination,  inventing, 
in  accordance  with  its  tastes  and  habits,  some 
romantic  episode,  the  denouement  of  which 
coincides  with  the  state  of  consciousness  to  be 
explained. 

Again,  not  only  do  the  laws  of  association  re- 
main vague  and  hypothetical,  but  cases  happen 
in  which  they  are  clearly  inadequate  to  explain 
the  phenomena.  These  are  the  cases,  evi- 
dently numerous,  in  which  unconscious  or 
physical  influences  are  intercalated  between 
the  states  of  consciousness.  For  instance, 
consider  the  ideas  due  to  impulsions.  Are 
they  to  be  explained  by  other  ideas  ?  Is 
not  the  reason  for  them  rather  to  be  sought 
in  organic  conditions  ?  If  the  unconscious 
and  the  physical  play  a  role  in  the  produc- 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   LAWS 

tion  of  our  ideas,  consciousness  can  grasp 
only  scattered  fragments,  it  lacks  middle 
terms  to  connect  them  with  one  another. 

The  laws  of  association,  artificial  and 
hypothetical,  vague  and  superficial,  are  incap- 
able of  founding  a  system  of  determinism. 
Even  when  successful,  they  cannot  go  so  far 
as  this.  It  is  a  mistake  to  think  that  an 
action  is  known  to  be  necessarily  determined 
solely  because  it  can  be  foreseen.  Why 
should  not  habit  and  character,  feeling  and 
even  will  produce  mechanical  uniformities  ? 
The  inhabitants  of  Konigsberg  were  wont  to.  - 
set  their  watches  to  the  time  of  Kant's  usual 
daily  walk. 

Cln  an  attempt  to  fill  up  the  gaps  inseparable  * 
from  associationism,  physical  psychology 
considers  the  soul  in  its  relation  to  the  body. 
It  expects  to  superimpose  a  truly  scientific 
psychology  on.  to  descriptive  psychology  by 
studying  the  psychic  phenomenon  in  all  its 
elements  and  conditions,  and  trying  to  ex- 
plain the  conscious  by  the  mechanical/^ 

Let  us  first  consider  the  negation  implied 
in  this  method.  Physical  psychology  denies 
the  efficacy  of  the  will-act  as  such.  Is  this 

negation  legitimate  ?     It  offers  itself  before 

179 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

us,  at  the  outset,  as  a  plea  in  bar.  Physical 
psychology,  it  is  declared,  proceeds  like  chem- 
istry or  physics  :  it  neither  affirms  nor  denies 
free-will ;  it  ignores  it  as  being  outside  its 
domain.  We  have  to  find  out,  however, 
whether  this  voluntary  ignorance  is  as  legiti- 
mate, in  psychology,  as  in  the  preceding 
sciences.  The  latter  deal  with  phenomena 
very  far  removed  from  mind,  and  perceptibly 
isolable  from  the  manifestations  of  will. 
Their  domains  are  fixed  by  definitions  that 
retain  something  of  the  freedom  of  mathe- 
matical definitions.  If  the  physicist  meets 
with  facts  which  do  not  come  within  the  circle 
he  has  traced  for  himself,  he  relegates  them 
to  other  seekers.  Can  we  likewise,  when 
entering  upon  the  study  of  the  soul,  announce 
that  we  will  trouble  ourselves  about  nothing 
that  manifests  a  will  which  is  free  ?  Are 
we  not  running  the  risk  of  imposing  on 
nature  a  delimitation  it  does  not  admit  ? 
As  regards  the  sciences  that  deal  with  mat- 
ter, events  have  shown  the  legitimacy  of 
the  method.  Physical  psychology,  however, 
is  not  sufficiently  advanced  to  call  for 
such  an  argument.  We  must  possess  satis- 
factory proofs  that  free-will  does  not  in- 

180 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL  LAWS 

tervene    in    the    production    of   phenomena. 

True,  it  is  believed  that  we  possess  these 
proofs.  The  impossibility  of  the  effective 
existence  of  free-will  has  often  been  very 
powerfully  demonstrated.  All  these  demon- 
strations rest,  ultimately,  on  Spinoza's  argu- 
ment, which  regards  consciousness  as  being, 
in  reality,  nothing  but  the  faculty  of  trans- 
forming into  final  causes  the  efficient  and 
mechanical  causes  unperceived  as  such.  This, 
however,  is  rather  a  very  ingenious  hypo- 
thesis than  a  genuine  demonstration,  /jfn 
order  really  to  reduce  free-will  to  mechan- 
ism, it  would  be  necessary  to  offer  a  mechani- 
cal explanation  of  the  sense  of  free-will ; 
and,  in  order  to  be  in  a  position  to  offer  such 
an  explanation,  all  the  less  complicated 
psychic  phenomena  implied  in  the  sense  of 
free-will  must  have  been  explained  mechani- 
cally. These  demonstrations  also  would  have 
to  be  based  on  brain  knowledge,  not  on  meta- 
physical hypotheses.  *  Still,  if  even  the  most 
elementary  sensations  cannot  yet  be  com- 
pletely explained  by  the  brain,  how  can  such 
be  the  case  with  the  sense  of  free-will  ?  J 

This  is  all  we  can  say  with  regard  to  the 
negations  implied  by  any  physical  psychology 

181 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

that  claims  to  go  to  the  root  of  the  matter. 
f  LLet  us  now  look  at  the  positive  side  of  the 
doctrine,  viz.  the  type  of  law  which  it  has  in 
view.  This  type  of  law  consists  in  the  depen- 
ence  of  the  moral  on  the  physicaLJ  This 
dependence,  however,  may  be  understood  in 
two  ways.  In  the  first  place  the  law  connects 
a  mental  with  a  physical  phenomenon,  linking 
together  two  heterogeneous  terms  by  a  con- 
nexion of  constancy  or  invariability  and  of 
necessity.  A  law  of  this  kind  has  been  quite 
conceivable  ever  since  Hume  formulated  the 
famous  principle  :  "Any  thing  may  produce  any  V 
*  thing."  But  if  both  terms  are  entirely  distinct 
in  nature,  their  conjunction  is  to  us  a  simple 
concomitance ;  and,  h  priori,  we  have  no 
ground  for  affirming  that  the  physical  cannot 
depend  on  the  psychic,  as  well  as  the  psychic  on 
the  physical.  Consequently,  the  enunciation 
of  such  laws  is,  speaking  generally,  nothing 
more  than  a  stage  that  we  hope  to  transcend. 
By  the  dependence  of  the  moral  on  the 
physical,  we  really  mean  the  reduction,  as  corn- 
Diet  ely  as  possible,  of  the  moral  to  the  physical. 
LThis  reduction  would  be  realized  by  showing 
that  to  each  psychic  phenomenon  there 
corresponds  a  determinate  physical  one,  and. 

182 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LAWS 

/r  that  this  latter  can  wholly  be  explained  by 
physical  causes.  The  psychic  would  thus 
be  no  more  than  an  expression,  a  translation, 
in  a  special  language,  of  certain  physical 
phenomena. 

To  bring  about  this  reduction,  the  psycho- 
physical  measures  mental  states,  and  at- 
tempts to  discover  the  law  of  their  corre- 
spondence with  certain  physical  phenomena^} 
Compelled,  however,  to  substitute,  for  the 
sensations  themselves,  the  smallest  percep- 
tible differences,  it  takes  for  granted  that 
differences  as  small  as  possible  are  equal. 
Now,  there  is  nothing  less  evident  than  this  ; 

uwe  look  in  vain  for  psychic  units  susceptible 
of  addition  or  subtraction  like  mathematical 
units  J 

Still,  this  criticism  is  not  decisive.  It  is 
not  necessary  that  psychic  phenomena  should 
be  treated  as  quantities  for  them  to  be  redu 
cible  to  physical  phenomena.  It  is  sufficient 
if  each  of  them,  however  heterogeneous  witl 
regard  to  the  rest,  is  connected  with  a  deter- 
minate physical  phenomenon.  But  here  we 
encounter  certain  difficulties  set  forth  above 

Hff  we  insist  on  some  particular  mechanica 
equivalent   representing   each   mental   state 

183 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

we  admit  that  the  latter  are,  in  a  way,  fixed 
and  rigid  entities,  immutable  atoms  ;  a  state 
of  things  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  not  really 
the  case.  Qualities  cannot  be  set  outside 
of  one  another  like  material  things.  It  is 
impossible  for  us  to  say  where  one  ends  and 
another  begins  :  they  are  insuperably  complex 
and  fluid. 

This,  then,  is  the  dilemma  which  confronts 
the  psycho-physical :  either  the  psychological 
laws  connect  heterogeneous  terms  with  one 
another,  and  then  there  is  no  reason  why  the 
former  should  depend  on  the  latter  rather 
than  the  latter  on  the  former ;  or  they  bear 
only  upon  homogeneous  and  quantitative 
terms,  and  in  this  case  it  is  impossible  to 
establish  the  correspondence  between  these 
objective  laws  and  the  subjective  phenomena 
of  the  soulQ 

The  fact  is  that  the  problem  before  physical 
psychology  is  a  paradoxical  one.  [The  positive 
sciences,  from  mathematics  to  natural  history, 
could  be  constituted  only  by  dividing  reality 
into  two  parts  :  the  one  capable  and  the  other 
incapable  of  being  quantified ,j  Since  the 
second  part  excludes  precision  and  calcula- 
tion, it  may  be  neglected  ;  the  first  alone  will 

184 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL  LAWS 

K iS 

be  the  object  of  science.  /  Now,  this  residuum,/ 
which  the  preceding  sciences  have  had  tc  y 
eliminate  in  order  to  become  positive,  viz 
the  sum  total  of  the  subjective  elements,  is 
what  physical  psychology  insists  on  knowing 
scientifically.  This  point  of  view  is  the 
reverse  of  that  of  the  sciences.  There  are, 
then,  two  alternatives  :  either  we  mean  abso- 
lutely to. reduce  the  within  of  the  phenomena 
— which  the  sciences  had  held  in  reserve — 
and  this  reduction  will,  metaphysically,  have 
a  retroactive  influence  on  the  sciences.  It 
will  convert  their  objects  into  baseless 
abstractions.  Scientific  concepts,  intelligible 
as  a  measure  of  reality,  will  lose  all  meaning, 
if  we  insist  on  the.  measure  finally  measur- 
ing nothing  but  itself.  We  shall  thus  land 
ourselves  in  nihilism.  Or,  as  the  second 
alternative,  we  shall  follow  the  solution  only 
up  to  a  certain  point,  as  the  sciences  do."l  In 
this  case,  the  science  that  will  be  built  up, 
will  be  as  legitimate  as  the  rest.  Like  these, 
however,  it  will  leave  spirit  subsisting,  and 
with  it  the  possibility  of  a  spiritualistic 
metaphysics. 

In  conclusion,  psychology  will  be  singularly 
restricted  and  limited,  if  it  really  eliminates 

185 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

all  notion  of  soul,  and  refuses  to  accept 
a  special  postulate.  Indeed,  the  notion  of 
soul  is  constantly  intervening  in  the  so-called 
mechanical  explanations  of  phenomena  that 
are  offerecL  In  effect,  the  reactions  we 
attribute  to  psychic  being  are  not  simple  re- 
flexes, fitted  to  realize  life.  They  are  calculated 
to  bring  science  into  being,  and,  through 
science,  the  rule  over  things.  The  being  that  is 
endowed  with  a  soul,  is  not  simply  a  given  end, 
like  the  being  that  is  endowed  with  life  ;  it  is 
capable  of  proposing  an  end  for  itself  and  ima- 
gining means  fitted  to  realize  it.  It  may  pro- 
pose as  an  end,  not  only  its  own  existence,  but 
an  infinite  number  of  objects  which  have 
little  or  nothing  to  do  with  it.  It  may  go  so 
far  as  to  propose  absurd  ends,  such  as  a  state 
of  nothingness.  If  this  be  so,  there  are  two 
psychologies,  as  it  were,  though  the  distinc- 
tion between  them  is  not  very  definite.  There 
is  the  distinctively  human  psychology,  which 
cannot  leave  out  of  account  the  faculty  of 
reflection  that  constitutes  man.  And  there 
is  also  animal  psychology,  within  the  sphere  of 
which  enter  the  psychic  manifestations  of  man 
himself,  in  so  far  as  he  allows  the  forces  within 
him  to  act,  without  directing  them?/  And 

186 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LAWS 

the  mechanism  which  this  second  psychology 
determines  is  not  unconnected  with  the  free- 
dom revealed  by  the  first.  It  represents  the 
instrument  upon  which  freedom  is  immediately 
exercised,  and  which  brings  it  into  relation 
with  nature. 


187 


XIII 
SOCIOLOGICAL   LAWS 

HOW  has  sociology  been  established  ? 
What  are  the  principal  stages  of  its 
historical  development  ?  Greek  antiquity, 
along  with  Aristotle,  declared  man  to  be  a 
political  animal.  In  what  sense  ?  Modern 
naturalism  is  only  too  ready  to  criticize  the 
definition.  Aristotle,  however,  gave  it  a 
meaning  related  to  the  whole  of  his  philosophy 
and  to  Grecian  ideas.  To  him,  TTO'X*?  means 
"city-state/*  not  society  in  general.  More- 
over, nature  does  not  signify  causality,  pure 
and  simple,  the  necessity  immanent  in  things, 
but  rather  finality,  i.e.  the  perfect  form,  the 
finished  type,  towards  which  beings  tend  to 
move  i  yiyvojuLGvy  (TroXt?  understood)  TOV  l£jv  eveic&t 

ov<ra  Se  TOV  ev  jjfi/.  Aio  7ra<ra  TroXt?  (j)v<T6i  earrlv 
.'•.;.  *}  $e  (j)vcri$  reXo?  ecmv'  olov  yap  eKcurrov  ecrrt 
Ttjs  yevecredos  TeXeo-^e/cr?;?,  Tavrrjv  (pajuev  TT^V  (pv(riv 

eimi  e/caVrou.i      Thus,  instead  of  Aristotle  re- 
1  As  the  "  city-state  "  came  into  being  for  the  sake 
188 


THE   SOCIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

garding  nature  as  the  opposite  of  art,  as 
contemporary  naturalism  supposes,  nature 
and  art  form  but  one  at  the  root  of  things ; 
nature,  the  artist,  tends  to  realize  an  ideal : 
the  "city-state,"  and  the  forms  that  human 
society  assumes  are,  in  effect,  the  result  of 
this  tendency,  more  or  less  gratified  or 
opposed. 

L  Amongst  the  moderns,  of  whom  Descartes 
is  the  pioneer,  the  scientific  spirit  holds  sway. 
Even  social  questions  are  to  be  dealt  with 
in  a  strictly  rationalistic  sense.  Descartes 
dismisses  them  as  irreducible  to  mathemati-L^ 
cal  evidence.  But  Mobbes  finds  the  way  to 
deal  with  society  from  a  scientific  point  of 
view  and  in  accordance  with  the  mathemati- 
cal method  itself.  He  starts  with  the  idea 
that  social  organization  is  a  reflective  work 
(artefact]  of  the  human  reason,  analogous  to 
material  machines.  Once  then,  we  have  de- 
termined the  precise  object  of  social  or- 
ganization, this  latter  may  mathematically./ 

of  life,  so  it  continues  in  being  for  the  sake  of  good  life. 
Wherefore  every  "  city-state  "  is  in  being  by  nature 
itself.  .  .  .  But  its  nature  proper  is  a  perfection  or  com- 
pletion. For  what  every  thing  is  when  it  has  reached 
its  perfection,  that,  we  say,  is  its  true  nature. — ARIS- 
TOTLE, Politics,  1,2,  1252,  b.  29,  etc. 

189 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

be  deduced  from  human  reason.  Now,  accord- 
ing to  Hobbes,  it  is  the  property  of  man 
to  be  intelligent ;  his  intellect  makes  an 
egoistic  being  of  him  :  homo  homini  lupus. 
Hence  we  have  war  waged  by  all  upon  all. 
When  this  phenomenon  happens,  human  reason 
necessarily  has  a  conception  of  the  general 
good.  Then  it  is  confronted  with  the  problem 
of  realizing  the  general  good  by  taking,  as 
agents,beings  whose  essence  is  egoism .  Hobbes 
solves  this  problem  deductively.  Observation 
and  reason  have  supplied  the  principles,the  ma- 
thematical method  deduces  the  consequencesT)  K 

Montesquieu's  method  is  also  largely  mathe- 
matical. His  starting-point  is  the  nature  of 
man  in  a  pre-gregarian  state  of  existence. 
This  nature  inclines  men  to  unite.  As  soon 
as  they  form  societies,  however,  they  lose 
the  sense  of  weakness  which  they  had  at 
first ;  the  equality  that  existed  amongst  / 
them  ceases,  and  a  state  of  warfare  begins. 
The  problem  consists  in  organizing  society^ 
so  as  to  regain,  within  this  new  state, 
the  primitive  state  of  peace  and  freedom. 
Deduction  determines  the  conditions  re- 
quired for  the  attainment  of  this  result. 

It  remains  to  apply  these  principles  to  the 

190 


j 


THE   SOCIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

various  cases  that  present  themselves  in  the 
world,  just  as  the  mechanician  applies  the 
principles  of  his  science  to  the  various  forces 
offered  him  by  nature. 

Rousseau  starts  with  the  state  of  society 
in  TuTtirne ;  in  it  he  sees  nothing  but  oppres- 
sion. Man,  he  says,  is  born  free  ;  and 
must  be  free.  Whence  comes  the  actual 
contradiction  ?  In  all  probability,  says  R^USr. 
seau,  men  had  to  defend  themselves  against 
causes  of  destruction,  and  in  presence  of  these 
difficulties  and  drawbacks  individuals  felt 
themselves  too  weak.  Possessing  no  capacity 
whatsoever  for  generating  new  forces,  but  only 
for  uniting  and  controlling  the  existing  ones, 
their  only  means  of  self-preservation  was  to 
form,  by  a  process  of  aggregation,  a  sum  total 
of  forces  capable  of  overcoming  the  opposing 
force.  This  collective  force,  in  turn,  could 
only  be  constituted  in  accordance  with  ajacit 
contract,  by  which  each  member,  in  order  to 
preserve  his  existence  and  freedom,  trans- 
ferred all  his  rights  into  the  hands  of  the  com- 
munity. Some,  however,  diverted  the  force  to 
their  own  advantage.  The  problem  consists 
in  really  organizing  society  on  the  idea  of  the 
original  contract. 

191 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

From  Hobbes  to  Rousseau,  then,  we  find 
society  regarded  as  a  work  of  art,  art  being 
clearly  distinguished  from  nature. 

From  the  eighteenth  century  onward,  a 
third  point  of  view  is  met  with.  Those 
who  maintain  the  doctrine  of  progress  pur- 
pose to  show  that  the  natural  course  of 
things  brings  about,  of  itself,  the  progress 
of  knowledge,  and  that  the  latter  is  inevi- 
tably followed  by  the  progress  of  morality 
and  of  happiness.  This,  according  to  Condor- 
cet,  is  the  effect  of  a  natural  law,  indepen- 
dent of  the  human  will.  Rousseau,  on  the  con- 
trary, maintained  that  the  progress  of  science, 
when  pursued  for  its  own  sake,  diminishes 
happiness  and  corrupts  mankind ;  this  it 
does  by  a  law  of  nature.  The  Economists 
assume  that  men,  in  a  state  of  nature,  were 
in  possession  of  freedom  and  property  as 
indefeasible  rights.  Governments  have  more 
or  less  robbed  them  of  these  rights  under  the 
pretext  that  individual  freedom  would  be 
incompatible  with  public  interests.  The 
Economists  purpose  to  show  that,  according  to 
the  laws  of  nature,  private  and  public  interests, 
far  from  being  opposed,  take  each  other  for 
^  granted.  Here,  then,  we  have  the  idea  of  / 

192 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

natural  law  present  in  social  science  ;  but 
the  publicists  just  mentioned  have  assumed 
beforehand,  in  accordance  with  their  desires, 
the  very  laws  they  require  to  discover  in  the 
natural  course  of  things.  I 

Auguste  Comta  was  the  first  who^dearly 
hit  upon  the  idea  of  a  sociology  analogous 
to  the  rest  of  the  sciences.  He  regards  a 
social  law  no  longer  as  the  expression  of  a  v 
pious  wish,  but  rather  as  the  expression  of 
impartially  observed  facts.  Society,  how- 
ever, in  Comte's  mind,  retains  a  nature  of 
its  own,  one  that  is  irreducible  to  the  lower 
forms  of  being.  To  Herbert  §pejocej,  on 
the  other  hand,  human  society  is  nothing 
but  one  particular  instance  of  animal  so- 
cietjO]  Still,  why  does  Spencer  uphold  in- 
dividualism as  an  end  for  society  ?  Is  it 
not  that  he  makes  synthesis  follow  too 
closely  upon  analysis ;  that  he  is  gov- 
erned by  personal  preferences  ?  Many,  nowa- 
days, maintain  that  the  true  method  is  . 
impartially  to  study  the  lesser  facts,  trace 
their  laws  in  accordance  with  the  general 
rules  of  induction,  and  rise  to  general  views 
only  by  degrees.  This  is  the  completion! 
of  the  third  conception  :  society  considered^ 

193  N 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

as  a  natural  work,  to  the  total  exclusion 
of  the  idea  of  art. 

Let  us  now  examine  the  notion  of  sociologi- 
cal law  as  resulting  from  this  evolution,  and 
enquire  whether  it  corresponds  exactly  with 
the  nature  of  things  themselves. 

We  first  note  that  naturalist  sociology 
runs  parallel  with  an  exclusively  experi- 
mental psychology.  Just  as  the  latter  would 
xplain  psychological  facts  by  leaving  the 
soul  out  of  account,  so  the  former  would 
account  for  sociological  facts  by  elimina- 
ting man.  It  refuses  to  have  recourse  to 
a  strictly  human  faculty,  to  conscious,  re- 
flective finality.  To  explain  phenomena,  it 
s  declared,  is  to  condition  them  to  the  law 
of  efficient  causes.  If  sociology,  then,  would 

;  a  science  like  the  rest,  it  must  connect 
"acts  with  conditions,  not  with  ends. 

Admitting  that  sociology  must  be  a 
science,  in  the  narrow  acceptation  of  the 
word,  what  form  will  it  take  ?  At  the  time 
when  the  mathematical  sciences  were  most 
developed,  it  was  required  that  this  form 
should  be  a  mathematical  one.  At  the 
present  time,  when  the  natural  sciences 
are  soaring  to  wonderful  heights,  it  is  they 

194 


THE   SOCIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

that  are  set  up  as  models.  In  this  we  see  a- 
historical  influence,  rather  than  a  necessary  j 
phenomenon.  Why  should  not  sociology 
demand  particular  postulates  and  a  method 
of  its  own,  as  Auguste  Comte  required  ?  It 
is  not  sufficient  to  say :  sociology  must 
assume  such  or  such  a  form;  only  on  this 
condition  will  it  be  science.  Is  science  a 
single  indivisible  entity,  and  may  there 
not  be  really  different  sciences,  each  with 
an  originality  of  its  own  ? 

Now,  what  is  the  nature  of  the  laws  in 
which  sociology  culminates  ?  To  assume 
called  historical  laws  appears  to  be  the  least 
hazardous  attempt  in  this  direction.  It  is 
the  characteristic  of  these  laws  that  they 
connect  the  present  with  the  past  along  the 
lines  of  efficient  causality.  The  idea  is  clear 
enough,  but  when  we  pass  from  theory  to! 
practice,  we  encounter  difficulties.  The 
method  consists  in  explaining  social  facts 
by  their  historical  antecedents,  whilst  elimina- 
ting all  human  initiative  ;  but  the  question  of 
causality,  human  or  mechanical,  is  propounded 
anew  with  regard  to  these  very  antecedents, 
and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  From  the  fact 
that  I,  for  my  own  part,  merely  follow  the 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

impulsion  given  me  by  my  ancestors,  it  by 
no  means  follows  that  my  ancestors  were 
as  passive  as  myself.  Speaking  generally, 
the  necessity  of  the  consequences  does  not 
forejudge  that  of  the  origin. 

But  if  we  waive  the  question  of  origin 
md  consider  the  so-called  historical  law  in 
(itself,  we  find  that  such  a  law  is  not  regarded 
by  men  as  necessitative.  Quite  the  contrary, 
we  hear  them  say:  such  or  such  a  nation, 
under  conditions  analogous  to  our  own,  has 
been  afflicted  in  such  or  such  a  fashion  : 
let  us  see  to  it  that  a  like  misfortune  does 
not  befall  us.  In  questions  of  this  kind 
the  antecedent  is  never  considered  as  neces- 
sarily compelled  to  entail  any  one  conse- 
quent to  the  exclusion  of  any  other.  An 
antecedent  is  regarded  as  an  influence,  not 
as  a  cause  strictly  so  called. 

We  may  go   further  and  enquire  whether 
there     really    are     historical    laws.      It     is 
noteworthy  that  professional  historians  find  V 
some  difficulty  in  affirming  this.     Fust  el  de 
v    Coulanges  was  wont  to  say  that  in  history 
it  is  sometimes,  though  very  seldom,  possi-     > 
ble  to  determine  causes,  but  that  all  idea  of 
discovering  laws  must  be   abandoned.     In- 

196 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

deed,  according  to  his  view,  a  law  implies 
the  reappearance  of  one  and  the  same  ante-  ' 
cedent.     Now,  where  do  we  find  history  re- 
peating itself  ?     The  essential  feature  of  the 
historical   mind,    Jules   Zeller   was   fond   of 
saying,   is   the   discernment   of   the   charac- 
teristics   peculiar   to    each    epoch ;    we    are 
generally  mistaken  when  we  judge  the  past ; 
by    the    present,    or    vice    versa.     Historical 
facts  are  too  complex  and  unstable  intermix-\    >< 
tures  to  be  reproduced  as  they  are.     If  they 
exhibit  laws,  it  is  in  their  elements,  not  in  their 
concrete  sequence,  that  we  must  seek  them. 

Hence  we  have  a  second  point  of  view, 
which  may  be  called  the  physico-sociologi- 
cal :  we  endeavour  to  connect  social  facts, 
not  with  their  equally  social  antecedents, 
but  with  external  conditions  that  are  capa- 
ble of  being  observed  and  measured,  such 
as  geographical  circumstances,  density  of 
population,  amount  of  sustenance.  Here, 
however,  a  distinction  must  be  made. 
Population  and  amount  of  sustenance  are 
not  crude  facts  like  climatic  conditions. 
Man,  the  social  human  being,  intervenes 
in  the  former  class  of  conditions  :  therefore 
they  are,  to  a  certain  extent,  social  facts ; 

197 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

to  demand  from  society  an  explanation  of 
them  is  partly  to  take  for  granted  what  we 
purpose  to  explain. 

Nor  is  this  all ;  we  require  that  social 
phenomena,  as  well  as  physical  phenomena, 
should  derive  from  external  conditions ; 
but  it  is  very  difficult  to  demonstrate  this 
derivation.  Suppose,  for  instance,  we  ex- 
plain the  development  of  the  division  of 
labour  by  the  progress  of  social  density,  the 
interdependence  of  the  members  of  a  so- 
ciety. The  saying  of  Darwin  is  recalled, 
that  different  beings  live  side  by  side  more 
easily  than  similar  beings :  they  inconve- 
nience one  another  in  a  less  degree  and  the 
struggle  for  life  amongst  them  is  not  so 
keen.  Man  obtains  this  salutary  diversity 
by  developing  division  of  labour,  and  so  this 
division  of  labour  shows  itself  as  the  necessary 
result  of  the  struggle  for  life.  Vital  com- 
petition :  a  physical  cause,  thus  explains 
division  of  labour :  a  social  fact. 

But  does  the  law  stated  by  Darwin  neces- 
sarily apply  when  we  are  dealing  with  man  ? 
Is  it  correct  to  say  that,  in  a  human  society, 
diversity  of  functions  is  in  variably  a  principle 
of  mutual  tolerance  ?  Look  at  capital  and 

198 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

labour :  the  difference  that  separates  them 
does    not    prevent    them    from     combating 
each   other.     It   often   happens   that   diver- 
sity  of   education    and    occupation    inclines 
men  to  misunderstand  and  despise  one  ano- 
ther.    If  men  are  to  agree,  it  is  not  enough 
that  they  cannot  understand  one  another. 
Let  us  admit,  however,   that  division  of 
labour  is  a  solution  of  the  struggle  for  life. 
In  what  way  will  this  antecedent  determine 
this  consequent  ?     Have  we  here  some  rela- 
tion of  necessity,  similar  to  that  which  con- 
nects   the    attraction    of    bodies    to    their 
mass  and  their  distance  from  each  other  ? 
Division  of  labour  appears  to  be  necessary, 
if  men  are  to  live  at  all.     But  here,  necessary 
means  indispensable,  i.e.  a  condition  of   the 
realization  of  a  certain  end,  viz.  the  cessa- 
tion  of  the   struggle   for  life.    This   is   by 
no  means  a  mechanical  and  inevitable  neces- 
sity.    Must  we  even  translate,  in  this  case, 
the  word   necessary  by  indispensable  ?    The 
struggle    for   life,    indeed,    admits   of   other 
solutions,  the  simplest  of  which  is  the  eat- 
ing   of    one    another.    That    is    really    the 
law  of  nature,  and  division  of  labour  is  in- 
stituted for  the  very  purpose   of  impeding 

199 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

the  fulfilment  of  this  law.  Indispensable, 
then,  in  turn,  really  means,  preferable,  i.e. 
more  in  conformity  with  the  idea  of  human- 
ity, responding  more  completely  to  that 
sympathy  with  the  weak  which  we  assume 
to  exist  in  man.  As  Aristotle  said,  we  do 
not  wish  merely  £5",  but  eu  ty.  Division 
of  labour  is  a  more  or  less  intelligently  con- 
ceived means  of  realizing  this  ideal.  What 
does  this  mean,  except  that  what  we  took 
to  be  a  crude  law  of  causality  involves  a 
relation  of  finality,  and  that  we  are  assum- 
ing the  intervention  of  the  human  intellect 
and  will  where  we  think  we  are  bringing 
into  action  none  but  external  and  material 
conditions  ? 
Thus  the  physico-social  law  does  not  satisfy 

:he  conditions  of  a  strictly  positive  science. 

To  bring  sociology  really  within  the  sphere 
of  the  physical  sciences,  we  should  have  to 
discover,  for  social  facts,  legitimate  substi- 
tutes, in  their  mechanical  equivalents.  The 
physicist  therefore  looks  upon  physical  agents 
only  in  their  measurable  manifestations.  But 
do  such  equivalents,  so  difficult  to  find  in 
psychology,  exist  in  sociology  ?  We  imagine 
that  statistics  will  supply  them,  but  do  not 

200 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

statistics  constantly  need  to  be  supple- 
mented by  judgment  ?  Where  do  we  meet 
with  figures  that  admit  only  of  one  inter- 
pretation,  and  immediately  express  the  social 
reality  with  which  we  are  dealing  ?  Is 
the  number  of  persons  who  can  read  and 
write  a  faithful  standard  by  which  to  judge; 
of  the  development  of  instruction  in  a  coun-f 
try  ?  Can  religious  feeling  be  gauged  by  the 
business  carried  on  in  the  various  articles  used 
in  public  worship  ?  It  is  a  fact  that,  in 
this  order  of  things,  men  of  tact  and  experi- 
ence, by  means  of  literary  descriptions  anc 
without  using  figures,  often  hit  upon  a  truth 
which  cannot  be  acquired  by  mathemati- 
cal quantification.  If  some  day  we  succeec 
in  bringing  social  facts  within  the  scope 
of  physical  facts,  it  will  be  by  intercala- 
ting between  the  latter  and  the  former  an 
infinite  number  of  intermediaries  of  whose 
existence  we  have  now  not  the  faintest  sus- 
picion. 

At  present,  mathematics  and  society  form 
two  extremes  with  an  abyss  between  them; 
by  attempting  to  make  them  coincide,  we 
run  the  risk  of  dwarfing  and  distorting  the 
social  reality. 

201 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 
(I 

In  the  determination,  then,  of  the  socio- 
logical laws,  we  cannot  possibly  leave  man 
out  of  account,  he  must  be  included  as  an 
agent,  with  his  own  nature,  his  powers  of 
intellect  and  will.  These  are  perhaps  data 
that  are  partially  irreducible  and  impossi- 
ble of  analysis ;  but  when  we  look  more 
closely,  the  inferior  sciences  actually  imply 
such  data.  Moreover,  there  are  degrees  in 
the  social  laws.  Some  of  them  express  the 
conditions  of  a  society  in  which  man  scarcely 
acts  at  all  as  a  man  and  does  little  more 
than  follow  the  promptings  of  his  animal 
nature.  Others  have  reference  to  the  more 
strictly  human  societies,  wherein  man  makes 
a  greater  or  less  use  of  his  reason  and  energy. 
The  former  are  in  existence  before  the 
second,  they  form  the  substratum,  so  to  speak 
upon  which  human  activity  works.  The 
animal  state  is  first  necessary  before  one 
can  become  a  man.  Man,  however,  in  a 
certain  measure,  controls  the  animal  on 
which  his  human  nature  is  based.  No  doubt 
this  view  takes  for  granted  that  an  idea, 
as  such,  may  be  efficacious.  Still,  though 
the  immediate  sway  which  an  idea  holds 
over  matter  may  be  unintelligible,  is  it  so 

202 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  LAWS 

with  activity  exercised  through  an  infinite 
number  of  intermediaries,  affecting  mind 
on  the  one  hand,  and  matter  on  the  other  ? 
Let  us  not  forget  that  pure  mind  and  pure 
matter  are  but  abstractions  and  fancies. 
When  thoroughly  understood,  mechanism, 
instead  of  shutting  us  in  on  every  hand, 
constitutes  the  means  at  our  disposal  for 
acting  upon  things  and  for  obtaining  power 
over  them. 

Through  the  psychic  and  sociological 
mechanism,  which  depend  on  ourselves,  we 
have  a  hold  on  the  physical  mechanism.  A 
knowledge  of  the  laws  of  things  enables 
us  to  control  them ;  consequently,  instead 
of  checking  our  freedom,  mechanism  makes 
it  efficacious. 


203 


XIV 
CONCLUSION 

WE  have  analysed ;  the  various  types 
of  natural  laws  offered  us  by  the 
sciences,  from  the  standpoint  of  these 
sciences  themselves.  In  the  physical  laws, 
we  have  seen  the  data  supplied  to  philoso- 
phy by  the  sciences,  just  as  science  sees  in 
facts  the  data  supplied  to  it  by  nature.  In 
conclusion,  we  ask  ourselves  what  becomes 
of  human  freedom  and  responsibility,  over 
against  these  laws,  which,  to  us,  represent 
the  nature  of  things.  The  problem  is  a  more 
urgent  one  now  than  it  was  a  century  ago. 
When  the  domain  of  science,  strictly  so- 
called,  was  not  so  wide-spread,  it  was  pos- 
sible to  admit  that,  outside  this  domain, 
there  was  room  for  freedom.  Science,  how- 
ever, is  daily  gaining  both  in  precision  and 
in  extent  of  influence.  It  is  bringing 
under  its  sway  the  very  manifestations 
which  seemed  most  hostile  to  its  influence. 

204 


CONCLUSION 

May  it  not  be,  then,  that  everything,  de 
jure,  belongs  to  it ;  that  everything,  con- 
sequently, is  determined  and  rendered  neces- 
sary ?  As  the  sense  of  freedom,  in  spite  of 
this  progress  on  the  part  of  science,  exists,  de 
facto,  in  the  human  soul,  it  is  expedient  to 
find  out  whether  there  is  any  contradiction 
between  these  two  facts,  and  whether  the 
second  must  be  attributed  to  illusion  resulting 
from  ignorance. 

There  are  weighty  reasons  why  determin-  ^ 
ism  should  nowadays  appear  more  limited 
than  it  must  have  seemed  to  the  men  of 
the  past.  No  doubt  the  latter  saw  above 
them  a  Destiny  which  was  crushing  them ; 
but,  as  Pascal  says,  even  though  he  suc- 
cumbs, man  is  still  nobler  than  that  which  / 
slays  him,  because  he  knows  that  he  dies. 
Ancient  philosophy,  in  its  classic  manifes- 
tations, is  based  on  a  dualism  which  prevents  , 
determinism  from  being  absolute.  Being 
consists  of  two  elements  :  truth,  the  abode 
of  the  eternal  and  the  necessary ;  and 
phenomenon,  impermanent  matter,  incapable 
of  being  definitely  fixed  in  any  form.  This 
quality  of  being  ensures  the  possibility  of 
the  contraries,  the  condition  of  freedom. 

205 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

And  so,  even  in  the  case  of  the  Stoics,  who 
were  rationalistic  pantheists,  the  wise  man 
retains,  deep  in  his  soul,  the  free  power  to 
acquiesce   in  destiny  or  to  resist  it.     There-/ 
fore  the  ancients  maintain  that    there    an 
two   sciences,  the    second    of  which    canno* 
be  included  in  the  first :   the  science  of  being 
strictly  so-called,  perfect  and  permanent  like 
its    object,   and    the    science    of    becoming 
imperfect   and   impermanent  like    becoming 
itself. 

Now,  the  essential  characteristic  of 
modern  science  is  a  tendency  to  do  away 
with  this  duality.  Its  fundamental  idea, 
ormulated  by  Descartes,  consists  in  admit- 
ting that  there  is  a  point  at  which  the  sensible  . 
coincides  with  the  mathematical,  and  becoming  / 
coincides  with  being  ;  that  things  are  not  more 
or  less  imperfect  copies  of  transcendent  para- 
digms, but  rather  particular  determinations 
of  the  mathematical  essences  themselves. 
Hence,  we  have  an  altogether  new  compass  or 
range  attributed  to  inductive  reasoning.  In 
Aristotle's  mind,  no  empirical  knowledge, 
as  such,  might  lay  claim  to  universality 
and  necessity.  Experience  was  inevitably 
limited  to  the  relative.  But  if  all  the  pro- 

206 


CONCLUSION 

perties  of  things  are,  in  their  essence,  mathe- 
matical, even  experience  may  attain  to  the 
necessary,  provided  it  succeeds  in  discerning 
and  unravelling  or  extricating  this  interior  warp 
and  woof  of  reality.  Distinct  as  they  were  in 
the  minds  of  the  ancients,  mathematics  and 
experience  remained,  the  former,  transcen- 
dent ;  the  latter,  uncertain.  Closely  united, 
they  are  the  foundation  of  a  complete  science 
of  sensible  reality  itself.  Mathematics  im- 
parts to  science,  necessity ;  experience  im- 
parts conformity  with  facts.  Such  is  the 
root  of  modern  determinism.  We  believe 
everything  to  be  necessarily  determined, 
because  we  believe  everything,  in  essence 
to  be  mathematical.  This  belief  is  the 
spring,  manifest  or  unperceived,  of  scien-i 
tific  investigation.  What  we  have  to  find} 
out  is  whether  this  is  a  truly  constitu- 
tive principle,  or  simply  a  regulating  prin- 
ciple and  a  guiding  idea.  Does  science 
prove  that  the  basis  of  things  is  exclusively 
mathematical,  or  does  it  only  assume  this  ? 

Modern  determinism  is  based  on  the  two 
following  assertions  :  (i)  mathematics  is  per- 
fectly  intelligible  and  is  the  expression  of 
an  absolute  determinism ;  (2)  mathematics 

207 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

applies  to  reality  in  the  most  precise  manner ; 
de  jure,  at  all  events,  and  in  the  essence  of  things. 
Let  us  begin  with  the  first  of  these  two 
theories.  It  regards  mathematics  as  simply 
a  special  development  of  logic.  Now,  logic, 
real  logic,  at  any  rate,  including  the  theory 
of  concept,  judgment  and  reasoning,  actu- 
ally presupposes  data  that  are  irreducible 
to  a  strictly  analytical  relationship :  the 
only  type  of  perfect  intelligibility.  Concept, 
judgment  and  syllogism  have  ever  given  rise 
to  controversy.  The  reproach  of  barren 
tautology,  as  regards  their  importance,  is 
removed  only  by  the  introduction  of  con- 
siderations that  have  nothing  to  do  with  pure 
logic.  Such  is  the  notion  of  the  implicit 
and  the  explicit,  which  meets  the  difficulty, 
in  a  fashion,  though  only  by  appealing  to  the 
obscure  metaphysical  distinction  between  act 
and  potency. 

PWhile  logic  contains  elements  that  cannot 
be  reduced  to  pure  thought,  mathematics  con- 
tains a  greater  number  of  these  elements. 
In  spite  of  all  their  efforts,  mathematicians 
have  not  succeeded  in  bringing  mathematics 
within  the  compass  of  simple  logic .  Descartes, 
by  means  of  his  theory  of  intuition  and  deduc- 

208 


CONCLUSION 

tion  makes  a  radical  distinction  between 
mathematical  method  and  syllogistic  reason- 
ing. Mathematical  knowledge,  to  his  mind, 
compasses  principles  that  have  a  content ; 
it  proceeds  from  the  simple  to  the  com- 
pound, which  logic  does  not  do.  Under  the 
various  names  of  synthetic  d  priori  judg- 
ments, postulates,  definitions,  axioms  and 
fundamental  facts,  philosophical  mathema- 
ticians admit,  either  as  coming  from  experi- 
ence or  from  the  intellect,  given  and  in- 
scrutable principles ."J  In  effect,  mathematics 
has  been  established  and  is  moving  towards 
perfection  by  a  process  of  generalization  which 
consists  in  imagining  axioms  and  definitions 
that  allow  of  the  development  of  demonstra- 
tions with  the  utmost  possible  continuity 
and  the  fewest  possible  gaps.  How  are  we 
to  affirm  that  principles  thus  received  for 
the  needs  of  the  cause  are  all  necessary 
and  perfectly  intelligible  ?  The  philoso- 
phical analysis  of  principles  and  of  mathe- 
matical methods  reveals  therein  many  a  contin- 
gent determination,  many  an  artifice  accepted 
mainly  because  it  is  successful. 

And  so  mathematical  necessity  itself  is  no 
longer  unconditioned  in  our  minds,  as  it  may 

209  o 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

have  been  in  the  minds  of/Jhe  ancients,  who 
regarded  mathematics  as  entirely  d  priori.  J 
On  the  other  hand,  this  necessity  has  lost 
the  aesthetic  character  it  possessed  for 
the  Pythagoreans  and  the  Platonists.  To 
us,  it  is  a  blind  and  brutal  necessity  which 
goes  straight  ahead,  without  either  goal  or 
check.  Is  this  necessity,  such  as  it  is  con- 
ceived to  be,  really  part  and  parcel  of 
things  ?  Is  the  complete  fusion  of  mathe- 
matics and  experience,  the  object  of  modern 
science,  effectually  realized  ?  Does  it  appear 
as  though  some  day  it  will  have  to  be  realized  ? 

To  enable  mathematics  and  experience  to 
become  closely  united,  it  has  been  assumed 
that  everything  given  may  be  split  up  into 
two  elements  incapable  of  permeating  each 
other :  movements  and  states  of  consciousness  ; 
and  that  the  first  of  these  two  elements  is,  as 
regards  knowledge,  the  legitimate  substi- 
tute of  the  second.  In  so  far  as  things  may 
be  looked  upon  as  consisting  of  movements, 
they  fulfil  the  conditions  of  a  mathematico- 
experimental  science. 

Can  this  separation — so  precise  and  strict 
in  philosophy — between  quantity  and  quality, 
be  accurately  realized  in  the  sciences  ?  This 

210 


CONCLUSION 

r 

is  more  than  we  can  affirm.  (^Mechanics,  the 
concrete  science  which  must  be  the  basis  of 
all  the  rest,  offers  elements  that  are  irre- 
ducible to  pure  mathematical  determina- 
tions ;  it  is  incapable  of  entirely  transform- 
ing its  experimental  data  into  rational  truths. 
Known  by  experience  alone,  the  most 
general  connexions  between  things  remain, 
so  far  as  we  are  concerned,  radically  con- 
tingent, as  Newton  said.  Why  are  bodies 
attracted  to  each  other  in  the  ratio  of  their 
mass  and  not  of  the  square  of  their  mass  ? 
This  is  a  fact,  nothing  more.  Celestial 
mechanics,  after  all,  implies  the  very  idea  of 
natural  law,  in  so  far  as  this  law  is  distinct 
from  purely  mathematical  relations,  i.e.  in 
so  far  as  it  brings  together  two  terms,  one 
of  which  can  in  no  way  be  deduced  from  the 
other.] 

Moreover,  it  would  be  incorrect  to  say 
that  mechanics,  of  itself  alone,  de  jure,  at 
all  events,  constitutes  the  entire  science  of 
the  real.  For,  in  the  present  state  of  our 
knowledge,  science  is  not  one,  it  is  multi- 
ple. Science,  regarded  as  including  all 
the  sciences,  is  but  an  abstraction.  That 
which  is  given  consists  of  sciences,  each 

211  o* 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

of  which,  whilst  remaining  connected  with 
the  rest,  has  its  own  distinctive  aspect  and 
evidence.  In  proportion  as  we  advance 
from  the  study  of  the  motions  of  the 
heavenly  bodies — the  most  external  reality 
with  which  we  are  acquainted  —  to  the 
study  of  life  and  thought,  the  postulates 
required  are  the  more  numerous  and  in- 
accessible. 

Physics,  by  regarding  work  as  superior  to 
heat,  actually  makes  an  open  appeal  to  the 
notion  of  quality.  Chemistry  is  based  upon 
the  postulate  that  elements  of  different  kinds 
exist  and  are  maintained  in  existence.  The 
reflex  act  of  biology  is  no  simple  mechani- 
cal reaction,  for  it  has  the  property  of  en- 
suring the  conservation,  evolution  and  re- 
production of  a  determinate  organization. 
Psychic  reaction  is  something  more,  since  it 
tends  to  provide  an  individual  with  the 
science  of  things,  i.e.  the  knowledge  of  laws, 
and  thereby  with  an  indefinite  power  to 
utilize  them  for  ends  laid  down  by  himself. 
[To  sum  up,  in  sociology,  the  action  of  en- 
i  vironment  is  not  sufficient  to  explain  pheno- 
\mena ;  we  must  introduce  man,  with  his  know- 
ledge and  prejudices,  his  power  of  sympathy 

212 


CONCLUSION 

with  other  men,  and  his  ideas  of  happiness/ 
and  progress,  justice  and  harmony. 
•Thus,  the  objects  of  the  various  sciences  are 
not  wholly  permeated  by  mathematics,  and 
we  look  upon  the  fundamental  laws  of  each 
science  as  the  least  def ective^comgromisfiathat 
the  mind  has  succeeded  in  finding  for  bring- 
ing together    mathematics  and   experience. 
Moreover,  we  must  distinguish  between  the 
physical  sciences,  which  readily   unite    with 
mathematics,    and    the    biological    sciences, 
for  which  this  union  is  far  more  artificial. 
In  the  former,  man  himself  limits  his  field 
of    investigation ;     he     purposes    to    take 
into   consideration   only  a   certain    order   of 
manifestations    of    nature — that    which    is 
amenable  to  measure  and  number — and  to 
neglect  the  rest.     Owing    to    this  partially 
arbitrary  delimitation,  we  have  to  deal  with 
something  that  sensibly   admits  of   mathe- 
matical    determination.     In    the    biological 
sciences  this  method  may  still  be  employed ; 
but  here  we  are  manifestly  leaving  out  of  our 
investigation  the  best  and  most  character- 
istic part  of  the  phenomena^  The  more  we 
resolve  to  grasp   or  understand  being  in  its 
concrete  reality,  the  more  we  must  be  con- 

213 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

tent  with  observing  and  inferring,  and  must 
refrain  from  using  mathematical  analysis. 
Thus  the  mathematical  form  gives  the  sciences 
a  certain  character  of  abstraction.  The  con- 
crete living  being  refuses  to  be  confined  therein. 
In  a  general  way,  then,  there  are  two 

inds  of  laws :  the  first,  which  are  more 
akin  to  mathematical  conjunction  and  imply 
considerable  elaboration  and  purification  of 
concepts ;  the  second,  which  are  nearer  to 

>bservation  and  induction,  pure  and  simple. 
The  former  express  a  rigorous,  if  not  absolute, 
necessity,  but  they  remain  abstract  and  in- 
capable of  determining  the  details  and  the 
mode  of  effective  realization  of  the  phenomena. 
The  latter  treat  of  the  details  and  the  rela- 
tions which  complex  and  organized  wholes 
have  with  one  another  :  consequently  they  are 
far  more  determinative  than  the  former  ;  but 
as  they  have  no  other  basis  than  experi- 
ence and  connect  together  wholly  hetero- 
geneous terms,  they  cannot  be  regarded 
as  necessitative.  Possible  prediction  does  not 
imply  necessity,  since  free  acts  may  admit 

>f    it.    Thus,   necessity    and    determination 

ire   distinct    from   each   other ;    our  science 

:annot  blend  them  into  one. 
214 


CONCLUSION 

r 

To  sum  up,  on  the  one  hand,  mathema- 
tics is  necessary  only  with  reference  to  pos- 
tulates whose  necessity  cannot  be  demon- 
strated, and  so  is  only  hypothetical  after 
all.  On  the  other  hand,  the  application  of 
mathematics  to  reality  is  only  approxi- 
mate, and  seems  as  though  it  could  be 
nothing  else.  Under  these  conditions,  what 
is  the  doctrine  of  determinism  ?  It  is  a 
generalization  and  a  passing  over  to  the 
limit.  Certain  concrete  sciences  approach 
mathematical  rigidity ;  the  inference  is  that 
they  are  all  destined  to  attain  to  the  same  per- 
fection. The  distance  that  separates  us  from 
the  goal  may  be  increasingly  lessened:  the 
inference  is  that  it  may  become  nil.  This 
generalization,  however,  is  a  theoretical  view. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  distance  between 
mathematics  and  reality  is  not  on  the 
point  of  being  abolished ;  and,  if  it  is  les- 
sening, the  number  of  intermediaries  which 
would  have  to  be  intercalated  to  effect  the 
junction  of  the  two,  appears  more  and  more 
to  be  infinite.  Historically,  the  idea  of 
reducing  the  real  to  the  mathematical  is 
due  to  ignorance  of  this  incommensurability 
of  the  real  and  of  the  mathematical ;  iguor-  i/ 

215 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

ance,  in  this  case,  has  had  good  results ;  for  less 
eagerness  would  have  been  shown  in  making 
for  a  goal  known  to  be  inaccessible.  The 
application  of  the  Cartesian  idea  not  only 
demonstrated  its  fertility,  it  also  transformed 
into  a  transcendent  ideal  what,  to  Descartes, 
was  a  principle  and  a  starting-point,  f 

But  if  we  compare  with  the  present  state 
of  science  the  testimony  of  consciousness 
in  favour  of  freedom,  we  shall  find  this  testi- 
mony far  more  acceptable  now  than  it  was 
in  Cartesian  dualism,  for  instance.  When 
things  were  reduced  to  matter  and  thought,  to 
assume  man  to  be  free  and  his  freedom  to  be 
efficacious,  was  to  admit  that  spirit,  as  sub- 
stance, moves  matter,  as  discrete  substance. 
Now,  this  is  incomprehensible,  whether  we 
assume  that  spirit  creates  motor  force,  or 
admit  that  what  is  not  itself  motion  can 
directly  determine  motion.  Science,  how- 
ever, by  no  means  establishes  the  reality 
of  this  dualism.  It  rather  shows  us  a 
hierarchy  of  sciences,  a  hierarchy  of  laws, 
which  we  can  compare  with  one  another  1 
but  not  blend  into  a  single  science  of  exter-  \ 
nal  things  and  into  a  single  law.  It  shows  us, 
besides,  along  with  the  relative  heterogeneity 

216 


CONCLUSION 

of  laws,  their  influence  upon  one  another. 
The  physical  laws  involve  living  beings,  and 
the  biological  laws  combine  their  action  with 
that  of  the  physical  laws.  In  presence  of  these 
results,  we  are  led  to  enquire  whether  thought 
and  motion,  along  with  the  abyss  that  separ- 
ates them,  might  not  be  our  mode  of  bring- 
ing things  clearly  before  the  mind,  rather 
than  their  real  mode  of  being.  Motion, 
per  se,  it  would  appear,  is  but  an  abstrac- 
tion, as  also  is  thought,  per  se.  What 
exists  are  beings,  whose  nature  is  inter- 
mediate between  the  pure  idea  of  thought 
and  of  motion.  These  beings  form  a  hier- 
archy, and  action  moves  amongst  them 
from  above,  downwards,  and  from  below, 
upwards.  Spirit  moves  matter  neither  im- 
mediately, nor  even  mediately.  There  is  no 
crude  matter,  however,  and  what  constitutes 
the  being  of  matter  is  in  communication  with 
what  constitutes  the  being  of  spirit.  Thafj 
which  we  call  the  laws  of  nature  is  the  sum 
total  of  the  methods  we  have  discovered 
for  adapting  things  to  the  mind,  and 
subjecting  them  to  be  moulded  by  the  will  / 
In  the  beginning,  man  saw  nothing  but 
supernatural  caprice  and  arbitrariness  every- 

217 


NATURAL  LAW  IN  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

where.  Consequently,  the  freedom  he  attri- 
buted unto  himself  had  nothing  on  which  it 
could  lay  hold.  Modern  science  showed  him 
physical  law  everywhere,  and  he  imagined  he 
saw  his  freedom  being  engulfed  in  universal 
determinism.  A  correct  idea,  however,  of  the 
natural  laws,  restores  him  to  true  self-posses- 
sion, and  at  the  same  time  assures  him 
that  his  freedom  may  be  efficacious  and 
control  phenomena.  Of  things  without  and 
things  within,  the  latter  alone,  said  Epictetus, 
depend  on  ourselves,  and  he  was  right  at 
the  time  he  spoke.  The  mechanical  laws 
of  nature,  revealed  by  modern  science,  form, 
in  reality,  the  chain  that  binds  the  without 
to  the  within.  Instead  of  being  a  necessity, 
they  set  us  free  ;  they  enable  us  to  supple- 
ment, by  active  science,  that  state  of  contem- 
plation in  which  the  ancients  were  plunged. 


THE   END 


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218 


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